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ABSTRACT
Awful Nearness: Rape and the English Novel, 1740-1900
by
Erin A. Spampinato
Advisor: Talia Schaffer
“Awful Nearness” studies the intersection of two preoccupations of the early English
novel: rape and otherness. Its central claim is that between 1740 and 1900, rape was a
particularly resonant representational site for novelists concerned with exploring the essential
isolation of human minds and the various ways such minds try and fail to connect to one another.
That a number of influential eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novels use representations of
rape to capture these tensions has gone largely unrecognized. Through chapters on
representations of rape in the novels of Samuel Richardson, Jane Austen, Anthony Trollope, and
Thomas Hardy, “Awful Nearness” tells a forgotten, even suppressed, history of the English
novel.
Early rape plots are psychologically realist in two important ways. The first, most
obviously, is that they describe a category of experience which was widely shared by real
historical women in the period, yet functionally legally invisible. That said, representations of
rape are also psychologically realist because they embody the novel’s exploration of the mental
alterity of others. Since in reality each of us only ever has access to one mind, the great wonder
of narrative omniscience is in its access to multiple distinct minds. Because rape is almost always
perceived from at least two phenomenological accounts of experience, it forces us to contend
with the remoteness of the Other’s experiences, even those experiences that we share with them.
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The old cliché that accusations of rape often boil down to “he said/she said” captures a genuine
problem we face when trying to think about rape: that it is always possible, and often likely, that
the people involved experienced reality differently.
We are left with a simple and haunting question: how could one experiencer believe they
had sex, while the other believes they were raped? How could something we do in such close
physical proximity to another produce such drastically different accounts of experience? Rape
puts the baseline confusion that we experience with others all the time into extravagant terms,
revealing the perverse reality that physical contact—even of the most intimate kinds—is
incapable of breaking down the immutable barriers between our own perceptions and those of
others. The purpose of our laws is often to intervene in these moments of disagreement, to decide
which account of reality is going to be marked as legally ‘real’. In the case of literature, however,
we are not constrained to decide between phenomenological accounts of experience. The
psychological novel feels tailor-made to represent events, like rape, which dramatically
exemplify this paradox. Indeed, the centerpiece of my argument is a reading of Clarissa which
shows that the realist novel’s innovations with regard to representing subjectivity to some degree
rely on its engagement with plots of rape.
of ways an experience can be perceived? How is rape used to illustrate the way context
shapes perception and experience in these texts? How do novelists use rape to demonstrate the
conflicts produced by the recognition that others have inaccessible mental experiences? How
does rape work in these novels as a tragic fantasy of unfettered contact, that is as an attempt at
breaching the unconquerable gap between two minds? Finally, and perhaps most crucially, how
does the rape plot—in its attempt to describe the experiences of women—help bring female
subjectivity into prominence as an issue in novels? Does this rise of novelistic interest in female
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subjectivity help actual historical women achieve the status of political subjects in any way? Or,
does it further exploit them and thus impede the legal and political recognition of their
subjectivity?
“Awful Nearness” is both a literary history and an interrogation of our contemporary
culture’s curious ambivalence about the seriousness of rape. We are not the first culture to treat
rape primarily as a psychological phenomenon at the expense of understanding its political
dimensions, as I show through my reading of early British novels. In particular I want to
understand why rape still carries a special status as an ‘especially heinous’ crime, while
simultaneously recording the ways its meaning as a political act has been assiduously
suppressed. The penetration of the vagina remains our most forceful symbol, our most obvious
cultural shorthand, for violation. By looking at literature, we can see that this contradictory
impulse with regard to rape is deeply connected to a post-enlightenment ethos of individual
liberty, which treats impingement and violation as the most profound imaginable harms. Thus
the novel, a form which elaborated such post-enlightenment accounts of personal liberty, and
disseminated them to the masses, must be considered as part of the discursive history of rape. By
restoring the explosive power of rape, and tracking its represented harm through early novels,
this project aims to understand why—in a world where women are victimized in myriad ways—
rape continues to be invested with profound and varied symbolic powers, among them to
essentialize male sexuality, to characterize a biologically deterministic account of sex difference,
to represent women’s supposed weakness, and to discipline women into submission.
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INTRODUCTION

“Our minds shine not through the body, but we are wrapt up here in a dark covering of
uncrystallized flesh and blood.”
—Laurence Stern, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman (1759)
Marriage is so unlike everything else. There is something even awful in the nearness it
brings.
—George Eliot, Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life (1871-2)
The subject of this work is the relation between two preoccupations of the early British
novel: rape and otherness. Its central claim is that between 1740 and 1900, rape was a
particularly resonant representational site for novelists concerned with exploring the essential
isolation of human minds and the various ways such minds try and fail to connect to one another.
For this reason, I primarily focus on representations of rape which are motivated by fantasies of
unfettered contact with the Other. These are rapists who are tragically and perversely earnest in
their desire for meaningful contact with their victims, imagining that sexual contact (even forced)
will grant them some kind of authentic contact with the victim’s inner experience, the part of her
which is necessarily remote. Early British novelists were far more attuned to the harms which
their sexual culture inflicted on women than we give them credit for. Indeed, they marshalled
representations of that harm—most often and most characteristically produced by rape—to make
a case for the status of women as thinking subjects.
I focus on the period in which the psychologically realist British novel coalesced as a
form (which I have designated 1740-1900) for a few reasons. During these years the realist novel
experienced new heights of both popularity and literary sophistication. I draw the boundaries of
the period (which are necessarily constructed) around the careers of two figures who radically
shaped the novel form and the rape plot: Samuel Richardson and Thomas Hardy. If Richardson
1

inaugurated the psychological novel, Hardy, it might be said, brought it to its conclusion. Both
figure the event we call rape from the perspective of both the perpetrator and the victim, and in
so doing render historically particular psychological worlds. While Richardson revealed the
remarkable possibilities of this breed of fiction, Hardy tested its limits. The expansion of
empathy and insight offered to the reader by a novel like Clarissa fails in Hardy’s late novels:
Clarissa’s community learns from her tragic death, Tess’s does not. No growth comes from her
tragedy. Hardy’s literary inheritors would find that realism no longer suited their attempts to
describe a chaotic, unjust, and heterogenous universe in which meaning could never be fixed.
Thus I choose their careers as my temporal boundaries because while Richardson brought
psychological realism into popularity by investing the project of understanding the Other with
meaning, Hardy showed how futile it might be to understand the experiences of others if that
understanding could not change the real world. Both masters of the form, Richardson created,
and Hardy broke, literary psychological realism.
The epigraphs which begin this introduction bookend a similar arc, wherein the
psychological novel moves from bafflement at the imperceptibility of the Other’s experience to
horror at the failures of the societal structures meant to bridge that alienation. Tristram Shandy
expresses bemused frustration that his only mode of description is through his perceptions, since,
unfortunately, humans are not designed with windows over their hearts by which we may
observe their emotions. A century later, Dorothea Brooke describes that same frustration as
metastasized by a terrible marriage. It is awful, she says, to misunderstand your husband, and to
furthermore be made constantly aware of that misunderstanding by the intimate closeness you
share with him. Intimacy, in this account, becomes a torture, since it only serves to remind one of
what she is missing. Dorothea’s locution of the “awful nearness” of marriage also not-so-subtly
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suggests the sexual horror of such a marriage. As I discuss in chapter two, the novels with which
I am concerned very often reveal the disjunction between physical contact and mental contact to
which Dorothea’s statement refers. As these novels show, sharing a bed, even inhabiting
another’s body, is no sure route towards overcoming their alterity.
In her influential study of narrative modes for representing consciousness, Transparent
Minds, Dorrit Cohn argues that psychological realism paradoxically “attains its greatest ‘air of
reality’ in the representation of a lone figure thinking thoughts she will never communicate to
another.” (7) When Tristram Shandy imagines a window that could literally show him the
working of his uncle’s heart, Cohn points out that this fantasy “stand[s] as [a] mepho[r] for the
singular power possessed by the novelist: the creating of beings whose inner lives he can reveal
at will” (3-4). The novelist, in getting to know the minds of their characters, is allowed access in
fiction which they could never possess in real life. It is ironic, then, that it is in giving us access
to another’s private thoughts, that psychological realists conjure verisimilitude. As Cohn’s
analysis suggests, the psychological novel wants contact with other minds. In some sense, the
novelist enacts Tristram’s fantasy of complete access to the Other when they narrate their
characters’ mental experiences.
That a number of influential eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novels use
representations of rape to capture this tension has gone largely unrecognized by critics. Most
accounts of the role of women in the rise of the British novel suggest that the eighteenthcentury’s ‘seduction plots’ (in which virtuous young women are seduced by rakes) were replaced
by ‘marriage plots’ in the novels of the nineteenth century (in which virtuous young women are
tasked with choosing between suitors). Influential accounts such as Nancy Armstrong’s Desire
and Domestic Fiction (1990) and Ruth Perry’s Novel Relations (2004) have so positioned the
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seduction plot as a literary forerunner of the marriage plot. Scholars have tended to see texts that
frustrate these boundaries—texts that represent outright rape, ‘violent’ seduction, or ‘coercive’
marriage—as outliers rather than as representing a class unto themselves. Instead of conflating
sexual violence and seduction, or viewing rape in the early novel as a transgression of the
marriage plot, I hope to show that these plots are worthy of sustained attention on their own. The
dissertation identifies an overlooked British literary tradition: the rape plot.
Early rape plots are psychologically realist in two important ways. The first, most
obviously, is that they describe a category of experience which was widely shared by real
historical women in the period, yet functionally legally invisible. But representations of rape are
also psychologically realist because they embody the exact “paradox” to which Cohn refers
when she claims that the novel is most realistic when it describes private experiences (7). If
readers are awed by the “air of reality” captured in the novelist’s “representations of a lone figure
thinking thoughts she will never communicate,” then we are even more impressed by the
novelist’s ability to conjure multiple such isolated perspectives on the same event. Since in
reality each of us only ever has access to one mind, the great wonder of narrative omniscience is
in its access to multiple distinct minds. Because rape is almost always perceived from at least
two phenomenological accounts of experience, it perpetually occasions this paradox, wherein as
Catherine MacKinnon puts it, “reality is split” (652). It forces us to contend with the remoteness
of the Other’s experiences, even those experiences that we share with them. The old cliché that
accusations of rape often boil down to “he said/she said” captures a genuine problem we face
when trying to think about rape: that it is always possible, and often likely, that the people
involved experienced reality differently.
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We are left with a simple and haunting question: how could one experiencer believe they
had sex, while the other believes they were raped? How could something we do in such close
physical proximity to another produce such drastically different accounts of experience? Rape
puts the baseline confusion that we experience with others all the time into extravagant terms,
revealing the perverse reality that physical contact—even of the most intimate kinds—is
incapable of breaking down the immutable barriers between our own perceptions and those of
others. The purpose of our laws is often to intervene in these moments of disagreement, to decide
which account of reality is going to be marked as legally ‘real’. In the case of literature, however,
we are not constrained to decide between phenomenological accounts of experience. The
psychological novel feels tailor-made to represent events, like rape, which dramatically
exemplify this problem. Indeed, as we shall see in the cases of Richardson and Hardy, the realist
novel’s innovations with regard to representing subjectivity to some degree rely on its
engagement with plots of rape.
This project revises debates both about rape and about the history of the novel. The
recognition of the alterity of other minds, and the way such recognition complicates any
supposedly ‘objective’ account of experience, is where these two seemingly distinct discourses
come together. Some of the questions, prompted by a feminist phenomenological account of the
problem of other minds, which animate my readings of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
British novels are: first, how does the impossibility of arriving at an objective understanding of a
sexually violent act make rape useful for novelists interested in depicting both the isolation of
individual minds and the variety of ways an experience can be perceived? How is rape used to
illustrate the way context shapes perception and experience in these texts? How do novelists use
rape to demonstrate the conflicts produced by the recognition that others have inaccessible
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mental experiences? How does rape work in these novels as a tragic fantasy of unfettered
contact, that is as a means of breaching the unconquerable gap between two minds? Finally, and
perhaps most crucially, how does the rape plot—in its attempt to describe the experiences of
women—help bring female subjectivity into prominence as an issue in novels? Does this rise of
novelistic interest in female subjectivity help actual historical women achieve the status of
political subjects in any way? Or, does it further exploit them and thus impede the legal and
political recognition of their subjectivity?
As I define it, the rape plot is distinguished from, though coextensive with, the seduction
and marriage plots. It treats sex as a site of conflict, not only by representing sexual violence,
coercion, and aggression, but also by treating the epistemological power of sex as an open
question, to be debated and enacted by the characters. For instance, is the physical act of sex
(whether consented to or not) so revelatory that it brings women in contact with their true
natures? This is the fantasy which underwrites Lovelace’s harassment and assault of Clarissa. Or,
as Clarissa avers, do women have a right (and indeed a natural mandate to) define their
relationship to sex and gender individually, before they do so in relation to men?1 Obviously, a
culture which has difficulty imagining the reality of a woman’s mind might struggle to accept
this view. What makes a novel like Clarissa so interesting, of course, is its expansive
representation of Clarissa’s mind in defiance of this culture. Though the characters who surround
her cannot deny the existence of her mind, they struggle to accept that she has a right to that
mind.

1
Obviously, these questions arise in a world which does not admit the possibility that women—or at least
propertied, attractive women being raised by ambitious parents, like Clarissa—might exist without being in relation
to men. This context is not so much heteronormative in our contemporary sense as resistant to acknowledging any
relationship formation that at all decenters men.
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As I will show, Clarissa is an early novel wherein the struggle to rape a woman character
becomes overlain by the struggle to control her mind. One character rapes her, but many try to
control her mind, a fact which uncomfortably disrupts a post-Enlightenment model of individual
agency and reminds us that rape is not simply a violent act occasioned by individual pathology,
but a symptom of a societal structure which (in the world of the novel) refuses to accept women
as political subjects with a right to or capacity for agency. In Clarissa, Lovelace conflates his
desire to control Clarissa’s body with his desire to control her mind to a tragic, almost parodic
degree, wherein he comes to think of her internal space of subjectivity as literally synonymous
with her vagina, as if her intact hymen is a cork which keeps her subjectivity contained within
her body. By the time he succeeds in raping her, Lovelace has (at least for the moment)
convinced himself that penetrating the space of her vagina will grant him equal access to the
imagined space of her mind.
Rape brings up challenging ethical and philosophical questions in ways no other plot
event can. Novels by some of British literature’s most canonical authors (like Richardson,
Austen, Bronte, Dickens, Eliot, Trollope, and Hardy) make this pattern clear. Chapter One,
“Rape as Theory: Adjudicative Criticism and the Capacious Conception,” argues for broadening
our literary critical understanding of rape such that we can use the concept to identify the
structural oppression these texts depict. This chapter introduces two of this work’s central
interventions: a critique of what I term “adjudicative criticism” and an argument for embracing
what I call the “capacious conception” of rape. Adjudicative criticism occurs when critics of
literary history over-employ legalistic modes while reading fictional rape. As I show, this
practice is both widespread and regressive, often unconsciously re-entrenching outmoded ideas
about sexuality, gender, and the law in the literary critical canon. In response to it, I argue that
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we read rape capaciously, identifying rape—in a theoretical sense—whenever we observe sexual
violence that oppresses. Though it may at first seem frightening to broaden the definition of a
term like “rape”, I show that doing so in a non-legal context may also be liberating. It gives us a
language for talking about literary representations of sexual violence which elude legal
understanding, and helps us identify representations of sexual violence that have previously gone
unrecognized. Ultimately, my capacious conception of rape leads me to consider the ways in
which we might see the rape victim as a broad, but not limiting or exclusive, identity category.
Such a paradigm shift, I argue, might allow us to address the serious harms of rape without being
burdened by the assumptions that we usually uphold when discussing rape (such as that rape can
only happen to those possessing vaginas or be perpetrated with a penis, that it ‘naturally’ reflects
male aggression and female passivity, or that women are more vulnerable to rape’s unique harm
than victims of other genders). A less-gendered, harm-based approach to rape is, I argue, both a
good strategy for engaging widespread political will to end rape and a better (because more
ethical and more complete) way to read the literature in question.
Chapter Two, “Truth,” argues that Richardson’s Clarissa inaugurated a conception of
rape that continues to circulate today. We owe to Richardson what I call the “rape-as-aberration”
plot, the first sustained, psychological account of rape which cast it not as an extreme expression
of normative male sexuality, but as a moral crime because of its impingement on the body and
subjectivity of the victim. Situated as it was within a tradition of seduction fiction that routinely
represented sexual violence as normative, Clarissa offers a wholly new view of rape as first, a
moral and spiritual crime (a minority position in the period) and second, a crime motivated by
pathology. In this way Richardson actually anticipates Susan Brownmiller’s paradigm-shifting
1975 theorization of sexual violence, which casts rape as a manifestation of the desire for power
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rather than a ‘natural’ impulse towards sex. Indeed, we misread eighteenth-century texts when
we expect sexual violence to be treated as unnatural, for it was only in the later eighteenth
century that our modern sense of such violence—as violence, as crimes against nature—began to
circulate. In its figuration of the violation of the mind through the violation of the body, Clarissa
inaugurated this new tradition by offering readers the rape-as-aberration plot, which would have
profound influence on representations of sexual violence and thus on the later history of the
novel.
Chapter Three, “Experience,” argues that in Austen’s invocation of the seduction plot,
seduction, coercion, and rape are treated as sites of epistemic experience. Austen unites the
courtship and seduction plots: by displacing seduction onto a secondary character (often a sister),
the protagonist can learn the lessons of seduction without its attendant social consequences. This
chapter also shows that Austen picked up on Richardson’s new account of rape, and the new
figuration of normative masculinity that it entailed. One consequence of representing rape as a
crime of aberrant psychology rather than natural male rapacity is that the male romantic and
sexual ideal must shift in response. During the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries,
novelists were refashioning their representations of ideal masculinity away from what had
previously been considered attractive, the rake, towards a new type of man, the gentleman. This
project begins with Richardson’s titular Sir Charles Grandison and is then taken up by Burney,
Edgeworth, Austen, Charlotte Bronte, and Dickens, among others. My analysis focuses on
Austen, positioning her oeuvre as a hinge between eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
representations of men. The gentleman, I argue, is only defined through novelistic confrontation
with his opposite, the dangerous seducer.
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Chapter Four, “Consent,” argues for the prevalence of representations of rape in
Victorian novels generally, ultimately focusing on Anthony Trollope’s thematization of consent
as a chief example of how rape actually structures many of these texts. The chapter begins with a
survey of Victorian legal texts, periodicals, and divorce records which provides evidence that the
term “cruelty” was recognized in the period as a byword for sexual violence within marriage. For
instance, by reading the famous case of John Ruskin and Euphemia Gray, I show (through this
counter-example) that rape is often the unspoken term in Victorian divorce and annulment
proceedings. The second half of the chapter turns to the novels of Anthony Trollope, who excels
at what I think of the as the discursive rape scene, in which rape as a plot event is totally
displaced, and yet still manifestly evident in the represented relational logic. These scenes rely
on the logic of (and often the threat of) sexualized violence, whether or not they explicitly depict
it. That these scenes are also very often stages of the marriage plot prompts questions about the
structural relationship between the institution of marriage and the event of rape.
Chapter Five, “Harm,” argues that Thomas Hardy’s novels are to a large degree about the
harm of rape. The chapter begins with a historical account of coverture, and the mid-Victorian
reforms to marriage laws which affected women’s rights. Then, by connecting Hardy’s novels to
this contemporary discourse, I show how Hardy represents the harms of marriage as continuous
with those of sexual violence. By tracing the way Hardy’s engagement with the harms of sexual
violence evolves from Far from the Madding Crowd to Tess of the d’Urbervilles, I show that as
his career progressed Hardy was more intent on depicting the way widespread sexual violence
against women threatened not just women but other forms of social organization which
Victorians held dear, particularly marriage. Hardy’s thematization of rape is a fitting place for

10

this study to end because unlike his predecessors, Hardy fully recognizes the systemic structure
of and threat posed by sexual violence.
A very brief conclusion reflects once again on the arc I have traced from Richardson to
Hardy, in the course of which we can see two influential theorizations of rape taking shape.
Richardson’s model emphasizes individual psychological pathology, making an emphatic case
for the reclamation of male morals which allow such pathology to flourish, while Hardy treats
rape as a symptom of a larger cultural structure which is organized around the abuse and
dispossession of certain people (for Hardy, usually women and the agrarian poor). Both are
harshly critical of contemporary mores, but the targets of their ire are meaningfully different, and
each view of rape has its limitations. To treat rape as a psychological pathology is to
deemphasize the ways in which historical societies have enshrined a sexually abusive logic into
the cultural order. Hardy’s conception of rape, by contrast, in which the real harm of the event
arises from society’s response to it, risks dismissing the psychological harm of intimate
violation, and even naturalizing rape.
The conclusion meditates on the continued circulation of both the psychological and
structural account of rape, ultimately suggesting that no one theorization will explain rape. In
fact, I believe we pursue a grand theory of rape (as an expression of power, biology, or whatever)
at our peril. No one theory will explain rape, because rape is not one thing. We understandably
what to theorize it, because it is frightening and painful to think about, but when we do so we
may actually erase its complexity and risk reinscribing its violence. For instance, hashtags like
#BelieveWomen offer a contradictory message, which on the one hand endorses the idea that
women’s particular stories matter, while on the other lumps all “women” into one monolithic
identity group. To forget the complexity and uniqueness of each event of sexual violence, or to
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disregard the historically specific ways in which sexual violence expresses itself in particular
cultural moments, is to accept or be defeated by the erroneous conclusion that rape is a natural,
transhistorical feature of human life. For me, this is why the capacious conception of rape is
useful, because it allows for rape to be theoretical without losing its particularity. Ironically, in
defining rape more vaguely, we acknowledge that it is always particular.
Representations of rape were once the place at which the novel worked through its most
pressing concerns about the self and its ability to make contact with others. Our contemporary
cultural productions suggest that our interest in (and perhaps need for) rape as a concept has not
dwindled. If anything, art and culture that deals with (and even eroticizes) sexual violence is
experiencing a renaissance. A year post #metoo, revelations of sexual predation on the part of
powerful men continue to be regularly revealed. Though each new revelation is treated by the
news media and general public as shocking, literary and cultural history might have prepared us
for them. (How different, I wonder, were Jeffrey Epstein’s lurid fantasies than those of the
eighteenth-century Hellfire Clubs? How different were their abuses of power?) A fuller
understanding of our current moment will not be achieved without a better understanding of the
history of representations of sexual violence. My project offers not only a new view of the
history of the English novel and a theorization of rape which contributes to the burgeoning field
of sexual violence studies, but also a meditation on how Anglo-American culture has arrived at
its curious ambivalence about sexual violence.2
In particular I want to understand why rape still carries a special status as an ‘especially
heinous’ crime, while simultaneously recording the ways its meaning as a political act has been
assiduously suppressed. The penetration of the vagina remains our most forceful symbol, our

2

See Thierauf and Spampinato, “Special Session Proposal for ‘Theorizing the New Rape Studies,’” for an
articulation of the goals of the New Rape Studies.
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most obvious cultural shorthand, for violation. By looking at literature, we can see that this
contradictory impulse with regard to rape is deeply connected to a post-enlightenment ethos of
individual liberty, which treats impingement and violation as the most profound imaginable
harms. Thus the novel, a form which elaborated such post-enlightenment accounts of personal
liberty, and disseminated them to the masses, must be considered as part of the discursive history
of rape.
By restoring the explosive power of rape, and tracking its represented harm through early
novels, this project aims to understand why—in a world where women are victimized in myriad
ways—rape continues to be invested with profound and varied symbolic powers, among them to
essentialize male sexuality, to characterize a biologically deterministic account of sex difference,
to represent women’s supposed weakness, and to discipline women into submission. In other
words, if we knew more about the ways we discursively and symbolically use rape—as both a
carrot, and a stick—we might be able to change.
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CHAPTER ONE
Rape as Theory: Adjudicative Criticism and the Capacious Conception

“Who can decide between a Clarissa and a Lovelace?”
—Honoré de Balzac, Illusions Perdues (1855)
“The novel’s mode of imitating reality may…be equally well summarized in terms
of the procedures of another group of specialists in epistemology, the jury in a court
of law.”
—Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel (1957)
One of the key claims this work makes is that literary scholars have tended to
imaginatively ‘adjudicate’ whether rape happens in novels which represent it, and that doing so
has caused us to misread representations of rape in early British novels. As the above epigraphs
demonstrate, readers often feel invited to decide between the competing versions of reality
offered by a novel, and this style of reading has long been an accepted mode of literary analysis.
I have coined the term “adjudicative criticism” to describe this practice in which readers attempt
to adjudicate—that is decide in a legal sense—whether rape occurred in the fictional world of a
novel. Such readings trace characters’ motivations and the physical outcomes of their actions,
treating novels as if they can offer evidence, or lack thereof, of criminal conduct. In this chapter I
reread the critical histories of Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa (1748) and Thomas Hardy’s Tess of
the d’Urbervilles (1891-2), demonstrating that such adjudicative criticism has often limited our
understanding of the function of rape in literature.3 Though Clarissa and Tess are far from the
only novels which have been subjected to such readings, the critical histories of the two novels
offer classic examples of the way adjudicative reading has limited our ability to understand the
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Tess first appeared, in bowdlerized form, in the periodical The Graphic in 1891. It was published as a single
volume in 1892.
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ethical meaning of sexual violence as it is represented in literature. As such, my critique of the
adjudicative criticism with which these novels have been treated lays the groundwork for the rest
of this project, which aims to imagine other ways—besides adjudication—that scholars might
approach representations of rape in literature.
I want to begin, perhaps unexpectedly, by quickly examining one element of the rhetoric
around the confirmation hearings of now-Supreme court justice Brett Kavanaugh. In so doing I
hope to show that adjudication is often called into service in non-legal arenas, not in service of
justice, but in that of concealing the workings of power. Throughout Kavanaugh’s confirmation
hearings, his supporters repeatedly invoked the principle of due process, arguing that it was
being tested by a hearing which seemed to put the judge on trial for the crime of sexual assault.
Such arguments operated to some degree in bad faith: while it was true, as many Kavanaugh
supporters pointed out, that the judge was not on trial, that point seemed to obviate the
imperative that due process be granted to him. In other words, one cannot fairly argue that
Kavanaugh is both not on trial and that he is being illegally denied due process. And yet Maine’s
Senator Susan Collins, who cast one of the decisive votes in Kavanaugh’s favor, defended her
decision on exactly these grounds, implying that she was responsible for protecting Kavanaugh’s
right to due process in the proceedings. Speaking the night before the vote, Collins emphasized
that she was not responsible for adjudicating the case in a court of law while simultaneously
invoking a standard of evidence which suggested the exact opposite:
The facts presented do not mean that Professor Ford was not sexually assaulted that
night—or at some other time—but they do lead me to the conclusion that the allegations
fail to meet the ‘more likely than not’ standard. Therefore, I do not believe that these
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charges can fairly prevent Judge Kavanaugh from serving on the Court.” (The New York
Times 5 Oct. 2018)
This statement somewhat gymnastically asserted the claim that Ford was simultaneously credible
and not: capable, it seemed, of accurately reporting on the fact of her assault, but not on that of
her assailant. It also implied that Collins had a responsibility to allow Kavanaugh to serve if no
reason could be found which precluded him.
There is no ‘right’ to serve on the Supreme Court, nor any actionable ‘right,’ on the part
of Presidential appointees, to consideration for congressional approval (as the example of
Merrick Garland demonstrates). In fact, as a senator, Collins is charged with safeguarding the
rights of the American people, not those of Presidential appointees (except in as far as such
appointees are members of the public themselves). It was James Madison who famously argued,
at the constitutional convention, that the Senate’s role was to provide “a necessary fence” to
protect “the people against their rulers” (“Madison Debates”). Instead of providing such a fence,
Collins and many others defended what they seemed to see as Kavanaugh’s right to
consideration, and ultimately, confirmation. While the stated goal of the hearing was to
determine Kavanaugh’s fitness for the bench, it became an opportunity for Senators to perform
an adjudication of rape—that is, an attempt to decide in a legal sense whether rape had
happened. This was a misdirection (whether conscious or not). In making his potential
criminality the standard for his confirmation, his supporters renegotiated the terms of the debate
such that it seemed Kavanaugh could not be precluded from serving if he could not be proven a
criminal. And yet the Senate Judiciary Committee was quite obviously never going to be able to
decide whether Kavanaugh had raped Blasey Ford. As numerous legal scholars have argued,
confirmation hearings traditionally place the onus on the appointee to “petitio[n] the public for
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the privilege of holding … public offic[e]” (Gerson 20 Sept 2018). This rhetorical strategy on the
part of Kavanaugh supporters like Collins meant that other indexes of Kavanaugh’s fitness
remained inadequately canvassed (such as the possibility—perhaps even likelihood—that he lied
under oath while addressing the Senate).
I begin with this anecdote because it demonstrates the continued effectiveness of the
adjudicative turn in obscuring the dimensions of sexual violence which are not addressed by a
juridical approach. Once we begin to adjudicate whether rape took place—even when that rape is
not the subject of our inquiry, or even when it is fictional—we tend to forget about the non-legal
ramifications of rape, such as whether the act constitutes a moral crime, how society might
redress the harms of rape, or how we might distinguish between the power dynamics of
normative or coercive sex. In such cases, difficult questions are dispensed with in favor of easily
(because legally) resolvable ones. As this example suggests, however, the turn to adjudication
does not always merely represent our temperamental resistance to difficulty; it can also evidence
an attempt on the part of power to direct critical attention away from its operations.
The rest of this chapter examines the critical history of Clarissa and Tess of the
d’Urbervilles, inviting readers to consider the similarity between critical readings of these novels
and this recent event in United States history, wherein legal principles were deployed in nonlegal arenas. My goal is two-fold: to invite readers to recognize a strain of what I call
“adjudicative criticism” in responses to Clarissa and Tess of the d’Urbervilles, and to ask them
to consider the vast possibilities which relinquishing such readings might open. One important
question throughout will be: in the case of literary criticism, who benefits from the deployment
of adjudicative readings of rape? If, as I will argue, such readings serve fictional perpetrators
more than their victims, why do literary critics, who have no responsibility for the actual lives of
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real people, continue to pursue them? What Senator Susan Collins might have to gain from
supporting Kavanaugh’s confirmation is obvious; what do literary critics have to gain, however,
from centering their readings on represented perpetrators, even to the degree that their readings
sometimes seem to defend these characters as if in a court of law? What hermeneutic problems, I
will ask, are we avoiding by persisting in reading literary rape this way? Finally, I will propose a
new definition of rape, which I hope will push against the adjudicative tendency and be one
starting point for the bourgeoning field of rape studies.

I. Reading Rape/ Reading the Law
Rape carries the reputation of being an exceptional crime (for a variety of reasons).
Historically, many societies treated rape as a property crime; rape laws were meant to protect
men from the “loss” of female property (as well as to organize aggression between men after
such losses took place). But the history of rape law is also quite remarkable: since at least the
seventeenth century, the adjudication of rape cases has been focused on the protection of the
accused and the credibility of the accuser far more than is customary in that of other crimes
(635). Even when the law began to recognize rape as a crime against a woman (and thus to
recognize that women were political subjects with rights), its adjudication was unusually focused
on protecting the rights of accused men.
Legal adjudication of rape is also notorious for the unusual emphasis that it has placed on
the accuser’s past, mental state, and actions during the alleged attack. Historically, opinions of
accuser’s credibility have often been based on their class positions or perceived sexual purity.
(For much of recent history, in practice this has meant that it has been almost impossible for
members of various underclasses, like servants and sex workers, to seek justice when they are
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victims of rape.) In the adjudication of rape, the law has also tended to require a higher standard
of evidence than that which is required for other crimes, focusing not just on the actions of the
accused, but on his mental state and perceptions (sometimes over and against those of the alleged
victim). For instance, philosopher Susan J. Brison offers the following thought experiment:
when your purse is stolen, the jury doesn’t expect the prosecutor to prove that the alleged thief
intended to steal your purse, only that they did, or tried to (Dec 2016). As Brinson points out, the
opposite has often been true in the adjudication of rape cases. Traditionally American juries have
expected prosecutions for rape to prove not only that the event (forced sex) happened, but also
that the accused intended to commit forced sex. The legibility of the event as forced sex to its
participants then comes into question. If the jury is convinced that he (and it is usually a he)
thought the sex was consensual, then they have tended to acquit.
This pattern betrays a prejudice towards the experience of the accused articulated
forcefully by seventeenth-century British judge Matthew Hale, whose account of rape would go
on to shape common law for hundreds of years (and arguably still does). Rape, according to
Hale, “is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the
party accused, tho never so innocent” (635). Despite the fact that in seventeenth-century England
convictions for rape were extremely rare, Hale positions the accused as the victim in his
extremely influential account. Echoing Hale’s sentiment from a very different standpoint,
second-wave feminist legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon wrote in 1983 that “the problem is
this: the injury of rape lies in the meaning of the act to its victims, but the standard for its
criminality lies in the meaning of the same act to its assailants” (652). This has generally meant,
as MacKinnon points out, that adjudications of alleged rape have privileged the intention and
other mental experiences of the accused, rather than that of the accuser.
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In an American legal context it makes perfect sense to privilege the rights of the accused:
a chief ideal of the American courts is presumed innocence. And yet historically that ideal has
often been deployed to deny women, when they are legal complainants, equal protection under
the law. Legal historians Lynn Schafran and Jillian Weinberger write that the “apparently
unremarkable legal principle” of presumed innocence “creates unique problems for rape victims”
because “rape is the only crime for which consent is a defense.” (197-8). If proving consent (or
lack there of) begins as a practical problem for complainants, it quickly becomes a conceptual
one. As Frances Ferguson memorably put it, rape “is remarkable for focusing attention on
mental states and their apprehension” (88). Again, it is not just that she must prove she did not
consent, but also that he understood that she did not consent.
What counts as evidence in rape cases is very often subjectively experienced, and to
further complicate matters, it is frequently the case that two actors disagree about the content of
that subjective experience. Common criticisms leveled at accusers are that they have either
misperceived, misunderstood, or misremembered the event. (This was one way that Senators
who supported Kavanaugh’s confirmation explained their decision while also paying lip service
to their support for survivors of sexual assault. As Collins put it, Blasey Ford was a victim, but
there was not enough evidence to suggest that she was a victim of Brett Kavanaugh.) It is
absolutely true that rape accusations arise from subjective, individual accounts of experience.
Why that should mean, however, that rape is legally indeterminable is an open question, since all
criminal accusations arise from such subjective accounts. Why, one wonders, has the legal
adjudication of rape so often emphasized the limits of individual experience? One obvious
answer lies in the fact that historically most complainants in such cases have been women. As
Miranda Fricker has argued, women have historically been victims of epistemic injustice in that
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their “capacity as … knower[s]” has been undermined (1). According to Fricker’s construction,
women have often been subject to two kinds of epistemic injustices: testimonial and
hermeneutical injustice. Fricker writes that
Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of
credibility to a speaker’s word; hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage, when a
gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it
comes to making sense of their social experiences. (1)
For instance, testimonial injustice might occur when a sex worker gives evidence of having been
assaulted. Prejudices against sex workers in general might lead jurors to believe that the
testimony of a person employed in sex work cannot be trusted. 4 Hermeneutical injustice would
have occurred at the stage of reporting, when said sex worker might have had difficulty
convincing law enforcement to take the account of assault into the police record. Without the
resources to understand how assaults against sex workers are usually perpetuated, or perhaps
sharing in the widespread prejudice against sex works, a police offer might interpret the reported
event as a “bad date” rather than a criminal sexual assault.
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This was notoriously the case in Vancouver, British Columbia, between 1983 and 2002, when Robert Pickton, a
serial killer who preyed on sex workers, murdered at least 25 women. Though Pickton had previously been charged
with kidnapping and attempted murder, and though numerous sex workers reported having been nearly murdered by
him, the Vancouver police department was extremely slow to act on credible information that might have led to his
arrest and the earlier cessation of his crimes. Their neglect lead to the Missing Women Commission of Inquiry,
which the Canadian government ordered between 2010 and 2013, and which showed that extreme discrimination on
the part of law enforcement, particularly against drug users and indigenous women, had “enabled a serial killer”
(Grantl). The case brought attention to the wider epidemic of violence against indigenous women in North America,
which lead the Canadian government to establish the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous
Women and Girls in 2016. For more on the Missing and Murdered women of Canada, see “Our Mandate, Our
Vision, Our Mission,” the report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls,
as well as Grantl, “Wouldn’t Piss On Them,” McDiarmid, “Still No Way To Tell,” the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, “Missing and Murdered Aboriginal Women,” Welch, “New Database,” and Pearce, “An Awkward Silence.”
For more general accounts of the victimization of indigenous women by sexual violence, see Cuneen and Tauri,
Indigenous Criminality, Dabiri, “Kiss the Ring, But Never Touch the Crown,” and Deer, The Beginning and End of
Rape.
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Fricker’s construction echoes Gayatri Spivak’s classic articulation of “epistemic violence,” in
which the ‘othering’ of certain groups renders them incapable of articulating themselves within a
recognized economy of knowledge. Sylvia Wynter makes a similar point when she argues that
“Man,” as defined by “Western bourgeois” society, “overrepresents itself as if it were the human
itself” (emphasis mine 260). Thus Wynter shows that what Fricker calls “epistemic injustice”
actually helps to construct this category of Man; in other words, the Western bourgeois Man can
only be maintained as an ideal subject if the knowledge arising from other subjects’ experience is
systemically degraded.
The real danger of adjudicative reading thus lies in failing to recognize the law as an
interpretive structure embedded in these conditions of inequality. Derrida calls this process of
recognizing, in characteristically ornate fashion, the “desedimentation of the superstructures of
law that both hide and reflect the economic and political interests of the dominant forces of
society” (“Force of Law” 13). In the same essay, Derrida points out that the force which the law
wields in punishment and in the maintenance of its own power always relies on mystification. As
I will show, literary critics have often recurred to the logic of the law in their readings of rape
plots without contextualizing the law fully, without recognizing that they are allowing the law’s
mystifications to remain undeconstructed; rather than treat the law as a mass of interpretations
ennobled only by our commitment to its being so, we have tended to conflate the law with other
forms of hegemonic power, allowing “its point of view [to become] the standard for point-ofviewlessness,” just as we have allowed a white, Western, bourgeoise image of Man to
“overrepresent[t] itself as if it were the human itself” (MacKinnon 638-9; Wynter 260). Or, to
put it in Fricker’s terms, we have generally treated the law with more epistemological justice
than it (or any structure) deserves. What’s more, literary critical readings that attempt to
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adjudicate rape have often reproduced the prejudices in historical rape law. Such readings are
troubling because they replicate the law’s mode of producing knowledge without context or
awareness, treating such knowledge production as if it is not conditioned by vast inequality.
Literary critical readings of rape have unfortunately conformed to the same biases to
which the law has fallen victim in its treatment of rape. Such readings very often focus their
analysis on questions of assailant motive and accuser credibility. As Ellen Rooney puts it,
literary critical readings of rape almost “inevitably…engage the problem of sexuality in the form
of the opposition between seduction and rape” (1270). That is, literary critics have spent a lot of
time arguing about whether fictional characters are guilty of rape in particular novels. When such
critics exonerate these characters, they usually reread the scene as one of seduction, in which
both parties are ‘complicit’ According to Rooney, “the quintessential expression of
[phallocentric] discourse” is to “establish the distinction between rape and seduction, violence
and sex, only to articulate a feminine complicity that renders such distinctions irrelevant” (1270).
In other words, when we treat “seduction” and “rape” as a dyad, as many critics of Clarissa and
Tess have, we not only place the two acts on a continuum of coercive sex, but simultaneously on
a continuum of normative sex. The seemingly clear opposition between “rape and seduction”
comes to represent a variety of more vaguely defined relationships (wherein “rape and
seduction” may mean, for instance, “rape and/or seduction”, “rape = seduction,” or “seduction =
rape”).
On the one hand, it makes sense, from a literary historical perspective, to engage this
distinction—what Alexander Pope famously (and sarcastically) termed the question of “force or
fraud”—in so far as early readers and writers often did use the distinction as a way to orient
themselves in the world of sexuality (2519). The early history of the British novel occurred in
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tandem with a revolution in English manners, with female sexual desire becoming increasingly
unspeakable during the period.5 Thus “force or fraud” became a common expression to describe
the means by which both consensual and non-consensual sex was achieved.6 That said, good
historicism can sometimes be bad formalism. And it is by and large formal accounts of such texts
that revert to what Rooney calls “phallocentric criticism”: that is, criticism that places undue
consideration on the legibility of the act in question as either rape or seduction.
I am calling this style of reading “adjudicative criticism,” not only because feminism no
longer represents male privilege through the phallus, but also because I am committed to
language that insists on the law’s imbrication in this issue. I also expand the purview of
Rooney’s account slightly, identifying as “adjudicative criticism” any reading of the text that
focuses on the question of whether rape has occurred (that is, not only those readings interested
in the distinction between rape and seduction, but those that attempt to adjudicate whether rape
happened in a text for any reason). For me, literary critical readings of rape are most problematic
when they ignore and indeed replicate the way that the law has—perhaps more than any other
structure of culture—worked to ideologically construct male privilege as neutrality. As the work
of MacKinnon, Fricker, Spivak, and Wynter show, courtrooms are not locations where truth is
produced; rather, legal arenas are interpretive stages. In parroting the language of the law,
adjudicative reading conflates the objectivity supposedly achieved in the legal arena with the
novel’s “truth.” It may be surprising that literary critics have conformed to this bias, since
literary criticism has long been invested in revealing hermeneutic conflicts concealed within
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See Stone, The Family, Sex, and Marriage, Perry, Novel Relations, and Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction.
“Force or fraud” does not telegraph perfectly onto our contemporary binary of “rape or seduction,” but it does
provide something like an eighteenth-century analog. See Bowers, Force or Fraud, Binhammer, The Seduction
Narrative, and Ballaster, Seductive Forms.
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representation. For us it should be quite natural to read the law as a set of representations that has
evolved in dialogue with other kinds of representations over time.
And yet, as I hope to show, literary critics have overrepresented the epistemological
stability of the law especially in cases of represented rape. In doing so, adjudicative criticism
very often employs legal diction stripped of its legal context (terms like “burden of proof,”
“evidence” and “case” abound in such readings). Indeed, it shares the “law’s assumption that a
single, objective state of affairs [once] existed, one which merely needs to be determined by
evidence” (MacKinnon 654). This style of criticism not only ignores the fictionality of
incidences of rape in novels (not to mention all incidences in novels), but it replicates the
prejudices inherent in historical rape law. According to MacKinnon, “when… reality is split,”
that is two people disagree about the meaning of their contact, or, as MacKinnon evocatively
puts it, “a woman is raped but not by a rapist,…the law tends to conclude that a rape did not
happen” (654). In this way the law’s construction of maleness as neutrality has limited its ability
to adjudicate rape, and thus literary criticism—in mimicking the law—has been similarly limited.
But the question still remains why literary criticism should seek to adjudicate rape at all, when
(unlike agents of the law) literary critics have no obvious responsibility for the lives of actual
people. Ironically, in terms of the moral seriousness with which we have afforded them, we have
often tended to treat actual rape allegations as speculative, and speculative fictional accounts of
rape as real.7
If such critical responses can be trusted, rape is also remarkable for its ability to occasion
vexing interpretive problems. In fact, it does so to such a profound degree that a representation of
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A notable exception is found in Sandra Macpherson’s Harm’s Way, which stands out for its continued awareness
that the terms it explores—like violence, law, and consent—are each ontological categories which are constantly
under construction.
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rape almost always elicits a question about the represented act’s status as rape. We barely
recognize rape’s presence before we begin to dispute not just the meaning of the represented
rape, but the represented act’s qualifications as rape and the definition of rape itself. Thus the
recognition of rape (or the recognition of the signs or symptoms of rape) is often quickly undone
by the hermeneutical problems that recognition occasions. By looking at two major case studies,
one from each century, we can see both how literary rape scenes often get addressed, and what
the dangers of adjudicative reading really are for critics. I will examine Clarissa (1748) to show
how deconstructive criticism has consistently subordinated rape to linguistic play, and Tess of the
d’Urbervilles (1892) to show how attempts to assert female agency in this text ironically ended
up making Tess seem like a willing participant in her own victimization.

II. Adjudicating Clarissa
Mid-twentieth-century readers of Clarissa cast it as a failed marriage plot, often placing
the blame for that failure on Clarissa’s sexual repression. In his massively influential The Rise of
the Novel (1957), Ian Watt characterized Clarissa and Lovelace’s relationship as a failed
“elopement,” and anticipated psychoanalytic readings of the novel when he speculated on
Clarissa’s “unconsciou[s]” attempt to “cour[t] sexual violation as well as death” (232). Others,
reading in a similar vein, saw Clarissa as the prototypical lady who protests too much; her
voluminous account of resistance to Lovelace could only mean that she was defending herself
from the conscious recognition of her attraction to him. Since Samuel Johnson’s famous
pronouncement that “there is always something [Clarissa] prefers to the truth,” such readings
have tended to conflate the critic’s suspicion that Clarissa is attracted to Lovelace with the
meaning of Lovelace’s sexual violence, as if one determined the status of the other (qtd. in Hill
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297). These critics assume, it seems, that previous attraction both implies consent and
transforms the harm of rape. In another influential mid-century account, Leslie Fiedler credited
Richardson with inaugurating “a continuing tradition of prose fiction” which “did not begin until
the love affair of Lovelace and Clarissa (a demythicized Don Juan and a secularized goddess of
Christian love) had been imagined” (emphasis mine, xx). Contemporary ears may be jarred by
such descriptions; it is hard for us, one hopes, to fold the story of Clarissa’s coercion, abuse, and
rape into a satisfying romance plot (even a tragic one). And yet, it is only comparatively recently,
given the long critical history of the novel, that Clarissa’s rape became the focal point of critical
readings, and even since then it has often been read only in service of the novel’s exploration of
gender conflict.
William Warner’s influential 1979 deconstructive reading of the novel inaugurated many
of the debates which continue to animate contemporary studies. Warner placed the rape at the
center of the novel’s meaning, but treated it primarily as a literalization of the novel’s
overarching interest in the conflicting views of reality presented by the protagonists. In Warner’s
reading, Clarissa and Lovelace are involved in an epic struggle to interpret what has occurred
between them, and how we understand their sexual contact will cast the die in one direction or
the other. Unfortunately, however, Warner falls into the trap which Rooney describes in her
account of phallocentric criticism: he ultimately cannot unthink the heroine’s complicity in the
violence (Rooney 1270). Warner casts Lovelace and Clarissa as equals, which though they are in
intellect and spirit, they certainly are not in terms of access to capital, ease of movement, or
recognized social power. Indeed it might be said that the whole plot of the novel is occasioned by
gender inequality, since it is Clarissa’s inheritance of property in her own name which initially
enrages her family and it is this family tension that Lovelace exploits in order to control her
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movements. In Warner’s reading, however, Lovelace’s abuse gives Clarissa “the occasion for her
brilliance” (74). Though he does not deny that Lovelace rapes Clarissa, he perceives the
characters’ relationship as one of mutual—if somewhat perverse—benefit. It is a symbiotic
“union” which though it “bear[s] no children…is not unfruitful…for Lovelace’s violence against
Clarissa plants the seed for a more insidious will to power over others: Clarissa’s idea for a book
that will tell her story” (75). Here Warner casts Lovelace’s violence in near positive terms, while
characterizing Clarissa’s attempts to self-determine as aggressive and manipulative of others
(another example: “Every hour she manipulates is an application of force, which sculpts her life
and helps to structure her self” [23]). Warner curiously evacuates the force and violence of
Lovelace’s behavior, discovering violence, and even an “insidious will to power” in Clarissa’s
defensive maneuvers (75).
In Warner’s view, it is only Clarissa’s stringent commitment to an ideology of virtue that
turns Lovelace’s violence into murder:
[Lovelace] does not wish to destroy Clarissa, though she accuses him of this. He wishes
to take her from the enclosure of a father’s house and violate the personal enclosure
called ‘virginity’. He hopes to undo the body’s integrity, its system of self-enclosed
meanings, and open it to new meanings—his own meanings. (67)
As a close reader of specific textual moments, I find Warner to be very convincing. And yet, in
the passage above and elsewhere, he betrays a native empathy for Lovelace’s conviction that
sex—even if it must be forced on another—is revelatory. (I shall further discuss the ramifications
of this Lovelacean view of sex in chapter two.) Even more problematic, however, is the
confidence with which Warner adjudicates (on this question and others); in fact, it might be said
that this book represents the most realized example of adjudicative criticism (and one which
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many other texts would follow). As Warner describes it, Clarissa is a problem to be solved. As
his subtitle indicates, he reads the book as “struggle for interpretation,” but without truly
destabilizing the idea that there might not be one true narrative to be found within the text.
Though he pays lip-service to the possibility that “interpretation of Clarissa never comes to
rest,” his final account of the novel’s aesthetic pleasures suggests that its real heart lies in the
Eros incapsulated in Clarissa and Lovelace’s struggle, and that critics and readers share in that
pleasure, even when it is derived from sadism (264). In a contemporary review of Warner’s
book, Jocelyn Harris wrote that the critic was “curiously old-fashioned…in assuming that all
readers of Clarissa are masculine” (87). In a wry response to his claim that the moment of rape,
in which “Clarissa will be undressed, seen, penetrated and known…are activities which will
engage every reader,” Harris wrote: “Hmm. Count me out” (Warner 50, Harris 87).
Warner’s tendency for adjudication arises from his deeply held conviction that the
orientation from which most readers will approach the book is the desire for “master[y]” (3).
This is not only characteristic of literary deconstruction, but also of mid-twentieth-century
criticism in general. Writing of another era of male writers and critics, Ann Ardis captures the
attendant assumptions of Warner’s position: the “preferred readers are ‘male’ not because they
have male genitalia but because they assume a certain stance towards the action…They notice
certain things and ignore others in [the] text. They feminize what they devalue” (107). Because
Warner can’t imagine approaching the text’s complexity without desiring to ‘master’ it, he
cannot but adjudicate, even if his adjudication results in the claim that the struggle to understand
will never really end. Despite this pronouncement, indeed, Warner ends his book by describing
the battle between Lovelace and Clarissa in mythic terms, wherein Clarissa will always be
“capable of playing a wide-eyed Eve” and Lovelace the serpent (261). The artifice this phrase—
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“a wide-eyed Eve”—imputes to Clarissa hammers home his (a-historical and counter-intuitive)
reading of Clarissa as a seducer herself. Seemingly un-self-consciously, Warner subscribes to
Lovelace’s view of Clarissa, not registering the brutal irony of Lovelace’s frequent refrain that
Clarissa is a ‘charmer’ who has tempted him into abusing and ultimately raping, her. In other
words, in Warner’s reading, the characters’ relation is one of mutual complicity, aggression,
curiosity, and temptation.
Warner’s book was justly critiqued for its implicit misogyny by Terry Castle and Terry
Eagleton, whose 1982 readings of the novel offered extremely influential feminist and Marxist
deconstructive accounts. Castle’s book was one of the first to explore the novel as a study of
harm, though her account of such harm is far more awake to the violence of misinterpretation
than that of rape. For Castle, the “violation of her body itself” is only the most literal example of
a pattern of “hermeneutic violence” which Clarissa suffers in the course of the novel (22). For
Eagleton, the rape of Clarissa ultimately disappears into the morass of competing interpretations
the book presents: “The ‘real’ of Clarissa,” he writes, “the point around which this elaborate two
thousand page text pivots—is the rape; yet the rape goes wholly unrepresented, as the hole at the
centre of the novel towards which this huge mass of writing is sucked only to sheer off again”
(61). Despite this evocative account of the text’s structure, Eagleton and Castle share a curious
(or perhaps characteristically deconstructive) coldness towards the rape’s harmful effects on
Clarissa. These readers do not, under any circumstances, want to imagine Clarissa in relation to
the historical women who read about her and who related to her represented experiences.
Eagleton’s deconstruction carries him close to a disturbing conflation of sex and rape: writing of
the emptiness of Lovelace’s experience of the rape, Eagleton reflects that “without sympathy and
affection the physical act itself is relatively trivial” (61). What is neglected by this conflation is
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the glaringly obvious perversity of Lovelace’s attempt to experience meaningful sexual
connection through rape. To cast Lovelace’s desire as perverse (rather than normative) would
refuse to collapse the categories of rape and sex in precisely the way Lovelace wants to do.
These books were shaped by the discursive landscape to which they responded, one in which the
rape of Clarissa had long been treated as a non-event. Though Castle and Eagleton depict
Clarissa’s victimization in cautious terms, both texts attempted to make a case for her as a
victim. By contrast, much of the twentieth-century criticism of Clarissa shamed the heroine for
overreacting to her rape, or even, in some sense, for initiating her rape by refusing to be seduced.
Judith Wilt’s well-known 1977 reading of Clarissa, in which Lovelace is cast as a
sufferer of erectile dysfunction, reveals the adjudicative impulse which lay beneath many
readings which do not obviously seek to adjudicate rape. Wilt pushes her sense that Clarissa’s
rape does not signify so far that she arrives at the conclusion that it has never happened at all (or
that if it happened, it was perpetrated by Mrs. Sinclair). Indeed, Wilt treats Lovelace as a victim
of erectile dysfunction, while functionally erasing Clarissa’s status as a victim of rape. For Wilt,
who naturalizes the connection between physical power and personal agency, this is a
roundabout way of rehabilitating Clarissa as an agent.8 This reading is nonetheless distressing:
Wilt shows herself attentive to the merest hints of sexual pain in Lovelace when she reminds
readers that he himself is the victim of “‘rape’ while a young creature,” and yet she pays no
attention to Clarissa’s pain (22). The cliché that allegations of rape can be boiled down to “he
said/she said” crudely encapsulates a real interpretive problem that rape exposes: the potential
conflict between two perceptions of a single event, and its different meanings to different
participants. This complexity does not mitigate, however, the irresponsibility of a move like
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Wilt’s, which would misread or even erase the text’s real violence in the spirit of playful
provocation. Clarissa’s rape is surely a representation of the larger conflict between Lovelace
and herself; that does not render its harms equivalent, however, to a ‘hit’ in a verbal jousting
match. Indeed, in this reading, Wilt shows herself to be particularly susceptible to what Kate
Manne calls “himpathy”: the tendency to direct “the flow of sympathy away from female victims
towards their male victimizers” (23).9

III. Adjudicating Tess
Another text whose critical history offers testimony to the costs of adjudicative criticism
is Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891). Critics have concerned themselves with the status of this
novel’s represented rape as a potential crime even more explicitly than they have in the case of
Clarissa. From the time of the novel’s publication, they have quite literally bickered over
whether the poor villager Tess is seduced or raped by the wealthy Alec d’Urberville. The novel’s
first reviewers were divided over whether its polemical subtitle (“A Pure Woman Faithfully
Presented”) was convincingly borne out by the text, and the status of the sexual event between
Tess and Alec has everything to do with their answers to that question. If Tess was raped, though
she may not be “pure,” she might still be “guiltless,” as one reviewer put it (qtd. in Elledge
390). If she was seduced, not so. In 1892 Mowbray Morros wrote for The Quarterly Review that
the novel’s subtitle places the reader in an impossible position: “compliance with [its] request
[that Tess be seen as a ‘pure woman’] entails something of a strain upon the English language”
(382). As recently as 2005, James A. W. Heffernan rehearsed the same logic, offering a by-now
familiar account of Tess’s complicities:
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We never learn exactly and directly how Tess responds to Alec's sexual advances in the
Chase. But in my judgment, the case for seduction decisively outweighs the case for rape.
Critics who would argue the opposite must assume a formidable burden of proof: must
explain why she chooses to stay with Alec for weeks after their night in the Chase; why
she remembers her sojourn with him in terms of mild arousal ("stirred to confused
surrender awhile"), and why she tells Alec that he has "won [her] back" with "cruel
persuasion.” (Heffernan 18).
While Heffernan seems to register the coercion to which Tess is subject (the “cruel persuasion”
with which Alec “[wins her] back”), his analysis is hamstrung by its reliance on and confidence
in the logic and language of the law. Instead of questioning the complexities implicit in his
conflation of seduction with coercion, he confidently asserts his “judgement,” thus aligning the
role of the critic with that of the adjudicator. In so doing, he employs legal diction (“formidable
burden of proof” and “the case for seduction decisively outweigh the case for rape”).
Though few readings of the novel are as explicitly adjudicative, a surprisingly large
handful of essays treat the question of whether Tess was raped or seduced, while many more
simply hinge interpretation on Tess’s complicity or lack there of.10 If she consented, the novel is
a bold refutation of conventional values which represents women as sexual beings in ways that
were radical for its historical moment. If she didn’t, the novel offers a realist account of the ways

10

See for instance: Marcia Baron, “Rape, Seduction, Purity, and Shame,” William A. Davis, “The Rape of Tess,”
and Thomas Hardy and the Law, Susan David Bernstein, "Confessing and Editing: The Politics of Purity in
Hardy's,” Eugene W. Davis, “Tess of the D’Urbervilles: Some Ambiguities About A Pure Woman,” Kristin Brady,
“Tess and Alec: Rape or Seduction?,” Irving Howe, “Tess of the d’Urbervilles—At the Center of hardy’s
Achievement,” Mary Jacobus, “Tess’s Purity,” John Sutherland, “Is Alec a Rapist?,” and Vladimir Tumanov,
“Under the Hood: Conflicting Reproductive Strategies in Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles,” among many
others.

33

a misogynist culture can drive a woman insane. Even critics who seek to defend Tess as a victim
of rape have fallen into the ethical and narrative traps set by adjudicative reading, for to prove
that Tess is a victim of the crime of rape as it was understood in the period is to implicitly
capitulate to the terms of adjudicative criticism, wherein Tess may only be an object of
identification or empathy if she is declared ‘innocent’.11
In lieu of such adjudicative readings, I want to stress that representations of rape offer a
unique hermeneutical opportunity. When we perform adjudicative reading we miss an
opportunity to explore questions about rape’s productive hermeneutical obtuseness. Rape in
Clarissa and Tess is resistant to interpretation for all the reasons that the law has historically
struggled to adjudicate it. For Tess this means that because she does not display bodily harm
after her rape, does not physically fight back (as far as we know), and is poor and part of the
servant class, her rape remains illegible. Similarly, Clarissa faces pressure to retroactively ‘undo’
the crime of rape by reinterpreting it: if she will only marry Lovelace, he and others argue, the
violation will be transformed. It is her behavior after the rape which will cement the event’s
status as rape or consensual sex. Lovelace has in fact cunningly devised a situation where her
accusation of rape will be disqualified because of her own behavior. And indeed, many critics
have argued that Clarissa’s complicity or attraction to Lovelace can be read in the moments
where she capitulates to his demands (as when she puts herself into his protection while fleeing
her family). To read this scene as an ‘elopement,’ as so many critics have, suggests a
misunderstanding of or a disbelief in the duress in which Clarissa finds herself. What these
critics have missed is the opportunity the text offers us to trouble the distinction between a form
of seduction which is erotic because it involves two characters with agency, or one which today

11

See William A. Davies and Melanie Williams, both of whom offer adjudicative accounts of rape in the novel
which argue that Tess is a victim of rape by both Victorian and modern standards.

34

we might call coercion, wherein eroticism (and indeed sadism) flows from a disequilibrium of
power.
Furthermore, we do not have to discover that Clarissa and Tess have been victims of rape
in order to read the text’s representations of harm to them. What if the sexual event in Tess, for
instance, is not explicitly represented for the simple reason that its status as rape or seduction
doesn’t matter? If we know how the characters feel about what happened, which we do, why do
we need to know what happened? Readers have ample insight into how Tess feels about what
happened to her. The narrative makes clear that she experiences coercion, manipulation, and
violation in her sexual contact with Alec. It also suggests that Alec may not understand this, at
least initially. All this is to say that whether Tess was raped or not (and I will go on to suggest a
definition of rape which would include her experience) the meaning of the novel does not hinge
on the answer to that question.
Rape is also resistant to close reading in Tess novel because, as so many critics have
noted, the textual event itself is obscured by a chapter break. As Ellen Rooney puts it, “’The
Maiden’ slips into the shadows and emerges ‘Maiden No More’”(1269). This is the prototypical
novel in which “the textual sign of sexual violence is…no more than a long passage of
mourning” (Rooney 1269).12 But the most fundamental reason that rape resists interpretation in
Tess, however, is that the novel represents rape as an act which happens between minds (and
perhaps this is why it is lost between chapters). By this I mean that we are offered two characters
who view their sexual contact differently, and we can only conclude that Tess was raped if we
prioritize her interpretation of the experience. In this way Tess dramatizes a paradox that the law
cannot resolve: that rape is both subjectively experienced and real. A juridical understanding of
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rape will never reconcile this tension; only an ethical and moral approach, which prioritizes
subjective experience, can begin to do that. When we abandon a legalistic mode of reading, we
can see that such representations are challenging, but far from unreadable.
One reason to abandon adjudicative criticism—and indeed attempts to definitively know
what happened in the fictional text—is precisely because we want to prioritize the novel’s
representation of harm as a moral and ethical category. Doing so would free us from the impulse
to weigh each character’s interpretation of the event against that of the other. When we turn rape
into an interpretive contest, we invite adjudicative interpretations. Perhaps one reason we have
turned so assiduously to adjudication as a response to depictions of rape in literature is that when
we refuse to do so we face home questions. For instance, one question which arises in the
absence of adjudication is why literary rape appears to inspire a crisis of hermeneutics in literary
critics such that they abandon the basic tenets of criticism they otherwise value (such as not
conflating literary characters with real people)? Perhaps one answer to this question is that
represented rape provokes a form of metalepsis, as it has been theorized by Elaine Freedgood,
for whom the metaleptic is characterized by “a breakdown of the boundary between levels of
narration” (398). Though the examples to which Freedgood primarily refers are to fictional
narratives which contain real historical figures and places—Holmes’s real Baker Street, or
Hardy’s fictional but realistically realized Wessex, for instance—Freedgood argues that such
moments reconfigure the text’s rules in such a way as to inspire a manageable and productive
ontological crisis for the reader. The resulting “breakdown of frames” is both disorienting and
thrilling: we are at once inside and outside the text, experiencing a kind of freedom (Freedgood
calls this “diegetic mobility”) that we can never experience in life, where we live in both our
“own diegetic space and in fictional spaces at the same time” (399). This kind of mobility within
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the text’s ontological registers, Freedgood speculates, is “necessary to imagining new ways of
being, or to working out old ones” (399).13
But what happens when metalepsis provokes an ontological crises which is
unmanageable or frightening? What happens when we move out the realm of the metalepsis
which winks at the reader, enjoying its self-referentially? What happens when, instead of
winking at us, a representation disrupts our sense of ourselves as in control of the text’s
meaning? Might metalepsis then become unbearable? With representations of rape I expect this
happens in two main ways: first, we realize that what we are being guided to imagine, with the
text, is the sort of thing that has occurred in history. This is a feeling we might get from all realist
fiction, if it’s convincing, but in the case of representations of large-scale historical traumas, it
can be profoundly disturbing and unwanted. The reader never knows if—in reading—they are
bearing witness to, or perpetuating that violence. What’s more, we recognize that this
representation is touching the realm of world-historical realness; that if not true in a literal sense
it is true in the sense that events very like it have been experienced by many people throughout
the history of the world. That realization can be a burden to bear. The other way in which
representations of rape are burdensome—rather than metaleptically magical—is that they may be
psychologically resonant: what is the “triggering” that we hear so much about these days except
the response of the psyche—as well as the nervous system, the bowels, the sweat glands, etc.—to
the lived experience of trauma? My guess is that represented rape often acts as a provocation to
the reader, and that many readers shut down, rather than open up, when they encounter such
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provocation. In this way rape is the kind of material ‘detail’ of violent oppression which
Freedgood has theorized in her book Ideas in Things, where she argues that certain kinds of
objects encourage us to read them incompletely, to, as D.A. Miller puts it, “ruthlessly skim” over
their complicated meaning (Jane Austen 39). Though rape is an event, not an object, I believe it
can operate according to similar rules, because—like the mahogany wood or chewing tobacco
which Freedgood’s book explores—it always carries with it a host of historically specific
meanings as well as a history of violence.
By this account the mistake we make when we try to read rape in literature is that we
treat it as transhistorical—because seemingly ubiquitous in human life—rather than as
historically specific. Like the literary spinsters whose “unendurable garrulity” encourages us to
read them badly, or the seemingly mundane material objects which give us no “indication” of
their “meaning beyond the limited…metonymic function” that they appear to serve, rape
somehow tricks us into reading it superficially (Miller 39; Freedgood 2). Despite the spectacle
which literary rapes sometimes offer us (or the spectacles which seem to be concealed by the
text’s allusion to rape), we persist in treating it as ubiquitous, natural, and even mundane because
of its frequency. At the same time, ironically, we mystify rape, refusing to see the way its
expression in particular moments connects to our social and cultural structures. Though we may
be very distressed by it, we also accept it, and perhaps more seriously, refuse to take
responsibility for it. If we view rape as an eternal problem, then we cannot see the ways in which
our investments, behaviors, and the very organization of society in a particular historical moment
props up rape as both a structure of oppression and a likely outcome of that structure.
Another important question to consider is why we have tended to close read “textual
signs” of represented rape—even when those signs are simple absences in the text—rather than

38

apply alternative reading styles which do not rely so fully on close reading’s hermeneutics of
suspicion? As numerous queer theorists, including Eve Sedgwick, Sharon Marcus, and Talia
Schaffer have shown, such “paranoid” reading styles provide only one way to interpret textual
absence: as the mark of something hidden, a secret jealously guarded by the text.14 One reason to
abandon adjudicative reading is simply that, thanks to the work of such scholars, we know where
it leads. What possibilities would be produced, I wonder, by refusing to privilege the text’s
absences as its true heart? In the case of representations of rape, doing so actually grants rape a
great deal of power to determine meaning; what might Tess be about if we didn’t situate Tess’s
rape as the locus of all meaning?15 (One goal of chapter five of this dissertation is to perform one
such reading.)

IV. Redefining Rape
Rape is a category forever in flux; it means different things to different people in
different times. We have witnessed this phenomenon in our current moment; the recent
reassessment of many powerful figures in the entertainment and political worlds provides a
contemporary example of how the meaning of “rape” can transform dramatically over time.
Hardy’s readers conceived of rape very differently than we do. They may not have registered a
meaningful distinction between “seduction” and “rape”; indeed we know from contemporary
reviews of the novel that many felt Tess had been unjustly served, without questioning the logic
of her fate. They accepted the impossibility of a future for a woman like Tess, after she had the
baby of her seducer or rapist. Perhaps counterintuitively, opening our readings up to the
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possibility that we cannot definitively find rape in the novel allows us to register the multiple
harms that Tess faces because of her gender and class position. Conversely, it allows us to see
Alec’s abuses in all their many expressions, beyond the one act of violence which we generally
take to represent all others.
Furthermore, from an ethical perspective, when we focus our critical attention on what
constitutes seduction or rape, we implicitly do so in service of the accused character. The
distinction between seduction and rape is one which determines the fate (or character) of the
accused, not the meaning or harm of the event to its represented victims. Thus the vast majority
of criticism which takes representations of rape as a key site of inquiry has failed to acknowledge
three things: its own investment in ‘the law’ as an entity which exists somehow beyond the
interpretative sphere, its interest in the accused character’s mental experiences over and against
those of the character who is victimized, and the personal, embodied bases of those investments.
Standpoint theory argues that all knowledge arises from the particular social location of the
knower. As Sandra Harding puts, it, “to the extent that an oppressed group’s situation is different
from that of the dominant group, its dominated situation enables the production of distinctive
kinds of knowledge” (7). Put simply, the scholars who’ve made the arguments I’m most critical
of have struggled to recognize the ways their experiences have shaped their standpoints with
regard to rape. Very often, they have persisted in adjudicative reading because, consciously or
unconsciously, they have identified more easily with the subject the text figures as a rapist than
that which it figures as a victim.
One way we can do rape studies differently starts with reconceptualizing rape as a
capacious category of phenomena, most defined by its use of sexualized violence to structurally
disempower people (in general, though not always, women). Here I purposely avoid the specific
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enumeration of physical acts or mental states, except to add the general qualification that rape
very often involves one person (or group of people) ignoring or being ignorant of another’s nonconsent. I call this the ‘capacious conception’ of rape, following feminist philosopher Kate
Manne, who theorizes a ‘capacious’ account of misogyny, which describes misogyny as a
structural state, rather than as a set of individual behaviors. I emphasize that this is not a legal
definition, but an attempt at an ethical one. Though I understand that rape can be a discrete event
which occurs between individual people and which causes (and is often caused by) psychological
trauma, I am more interested in thinking about the ways in which rape operates to, as philosopher
Kate Manne puts it, structure and “enforce” gender oppression (xiv).16 The psychological causes
and consequences of rape have already been thoroughly limned in ways that its social structural
causes and consequences have not, thus my conviction that a focus on the structural is necessary.
This is why, for instance, I want to read Tess’s rape as part and parcel of her larger oppression,
rather than as a manifestation of a psychological battle between herself and her rapist. This is
why, quite simply, I want to refuse to read Alec’s psychology.
To some degree I am being purposefully provocative in designating any behavior that
employs sexualized violence to control women and vulnerable others as “rape.” I have made this
choice because, though describing such acts as “rape” may seem hyperbolic or overly general,
terms like “sexual violence” no longer seems forceful or serious enough17. From a literary
critical perspective, my capacious conception of rape brings more texts into consideration and
frees the critic from some of the vexing and unproductive hermeneutic struggles that sexuality
16
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studies scholars have become mired in when trying to read rape. It allows me to read rape
without locating a particular plot event, solving a riddle, or falling into any kind of symptomatic
or paranoid reading. If the text can be said to represent sexual violation as a structure of gender
oppression, then I assume that rape is there and must be considered. This reconceptualization of
rape brings texts which have thematized sexual violence—but not explicitly represented rape—
like Jane Eyre, The Way We Live Now, and Daniel Deronda, into our critical view.
While there may be many reasons to use the term “sexual assault” in certain contexts (to
avoid being liable to a lawsuit, or because law enforcement has not yet determined which
charges will be filed, for instance), there is no reason that the whole cultural conversation about
rape must deploy the cautious language of the law. In fact, we should probably be suspicious of
the temptation to replace “rape” with the legalistic and euphemistic “sexual assault.” Such
replacements often serve to enforce outmoded ideas about race, gender and violence, or even to
reproduce that racial or gendered violence. For instance, critical race scholars have shown how
the law has historically enacted such violence through euphemizing rape as normative sex.18 This
history compels Saidiya Hartman to “assert” the “provocation” that all sexual encounters
between enslaved women and white men amounted to rape (“Seduction” 541).19 While
Hartman’s provocation is now widely accepted by critical race scholars, it remains necessary in
many other contexts, where it is still a political act to say “rape” when we might say “sexual
violence.” In the case of enslaved women in the United States, for whom rape was a ubiquitous
feature of enslavement (and indeed a brutal mechanism by which control was achieved), to do so
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is to actively deny the erasure not only of specific crimes, but the erasure of legal personhood
that the crime’s repression occasioned.
How would it change our reading of Tess if we applied Hartman’s formulation to this
case (while acknowledging the vast differences between Tess and an enslaved woman)? Despite
these differences, we might use Hartman’s insight to understand that all sex between a rich,
propertied nineteenth-century man and his poor female employee must be, if not sexually
violent, at least profoundly exploitative. (How different is this situation from that of a young
woman starting a career in acting, who was invited to give Harvey Weinstein a back massage in
his hotel room? In both cases the woman’s professional future would hinge on her sexual
cooperation with her employer’s demands. Can we ever call sex under those circumstances
consensual?) Similarly, how would it change our reading of the novel if we applied my
capacious conception of rape? Doing so would make the question of whether Tess was raped
moot because its answer would be obvious; if we no longer have to adjudicate Tess’s
victimhood, we would then have room to think about the novel’s exploration of how that
experience harms her. Sex was literally and socially dangerous for nineteenth-century women;
maternal mortality was high, and pregnancy out of marriage spelled economic destitution as well
as social erasure. And that’s just consensual sex. The threat of rape was particularly damning
because with it came all the consequences of consensual sex as well as the likely erasure of the
victim as a legal subject, since allegations of rape were rarely prosecuted. A wife, for instance,
who was being raped by her husband, might discover that according to the law, she was not a
person who could bring such an allegation—that indeed in some sense she was not a person at
all. Reading this way emphasizes the structural violence to which women were subject, of which
rape is often only the most obvious or culturally legible example.
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Another new way we might read such texts is to borrow a strategy from disability studies.
The dis-abling of what appears on its surface to be indisputably “able” has been a crucial starting
point for Disability Studies. As Lennard J. Davis argued in Enforcing Normalcy, one of the
foundational texts of the field, disability is not a stable, “absolute category with a level or
threshold” but “a historically constructed discourse,” which always exists in relation to historical
constructions of ability (1-2). In Davis’s construction, “disability is not an object—a woman with
a cane—but a social process” in which we are all implicated (2). Following Davis, disability
scholars have asked not how we are able (and thus, how some of us fail to meet an impossible
standard of ability), but how we are all—in some sense—disabled, or as Davis puts it, only ever
“temporarily abled” (1). Similarly, Michael Berube asks why disability, which is “most
assuredly” a “potentially universal condition,” is not generally recognized as such (30 May
1997). Berube locates a psychological conflict as the source of what he terms this “politics of
disavowal:” for most people, he writes, “understanding disability as an integral part of the human
condition… means imagining ourselves in [the place of the disabled ‘other’]—and that may be
too much of a psychological burden for us to bear” (30 May 1997). Similarly, the ruptures
produced by representations of rape, which I have dubbed a form of metalepsis, may be
unwelcome precisely because they force us to imagine ourselves as a raped or sexually
victimized Other. How would normative masculinity have to transform itself in order to imagine
such a possibility? How would literary criticism have to change if most critics were capable of
identifying more fully with both the victimizer and the victim?
What if the new rape studies began with an analogous premise: that most of us have been,
will be, or are victims of rape at some point in our lives? (If current estimates are accurate, it is
certainly true that a huge proportion of the human population will fall into this category at some
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point.) But I’m not exactly speaking literally. Here I favor what I’ve called the “capacious
conception” of rape for a few reasons: because it refuses to locate rape in a particular bodily act
(as the law does), it refuses to yoke rape’s harms to a particular gender, and it understands a
variety of forms of violence as equally serious (rather than creating a hierarchy of sexual assault,
as our current legal conceptions tend to do). Building on this widening definition, what if we
conceived of rape as a broad theoretical category like disability, one which one might be more or
less connected to over time and across circumstance? Most people who are not men, and many,
many men, would thereby find themselves identifying with or as the rape victim.
To do so would powerfully “reframe” (to borrow a term from Carine Mardorossian)
contemporary notions of the victim. As Mardorossian has argued, contemporary culture codes
the victim in numerous burdensome ways: as feminized, subordinate, and incapable of agency.
Tracing the change in the term’s meaning to the “political correctness debates of the 1990s,”
Mardorossian has argued that though “victimization once referred to something tragic or criminal
(outside the self), it is now increasingly used to denote a problem that is intrinsic to the self and
that makes one partly if not wholly responsible for the regrettable experience to which one was
subjected” (30-31). Put simply, the victim is no longer the object of an injury, but an identity;
being recognized as a victim implies one’s weakness and passivity.20 Thus my attempt to
reconceptualize rape capaciously is also an attempt to reframe the victim. For hundreds of years
the “standard for” rape’s “criminality” lay in the subject of its victim: was she chaste, was she
white, was she a citizen (MacKinnon 652)? Was her body violated in ways that the law
recognized as hurtful to women? Did she mark that violation by fighting back in ways that were

20
This is one reason, of course, why people who have been victimized by rape have claimed the status and language
of the survivor, since to do so allows them to claim visibility as sufferers without relinquishing their claim to
agency.
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legible to the law or to her attacker? The capacious conception of rape that I am advocating
avoids all these questions, locating rape not in the body, social location, or gender of the victim,
but in the meaning of the act to that person.
One possible danger of this approach is that it risks avoiding the harms of adjudication
only by broadening the category of “rape” so dramatically that everything becomes recognizable
as rape. I understand that this is a frightening possibility for many, including for those who have
been subject to rape. Does such a broadening risk jeopardizing the already contested status of the
survivor in ways that might reduce her access to legal redress or her rights in general?
Potentially. And yet I am arguing for broadening rape as a conceptual—not legal—category,
much as early disability theorists argued that their work recognized disability as “a social
category of analysis” (Garland-Thomson 1557). As influential disability theorist Rosemary
Garland-Thomson writes, “social categories…embrace a wide range of … experiences, even
while they risk flattening significant differences” (1558). And yet in that very tension lies their
power: “such social—rather than biological—labels accurately capture the single, reductive,
exclusionary social category that conflates and stigmatizes a range of differences according to a
subordinating discourse” (1558). In other words, who does our current understanding of rape
leave out? Whether or not they have identified as the subjects of sexual violence, such violence
has shaped the lives of millions of people throughout history whose experiences were illegible to
their societies, whether because they were enslaved, or children, or male (among many other
reasons).21 The benefit of the capacious account of rape, from a theoretical and ethical—rather

21
In calling people who are subject to rape “the subjects of sexual violence” I borrow Ellen Rooney’s phraseology. I
like this construction because it refuses the rhetoric of both the victim and the survivor, declining to impose either
identity on the subject of sexual violence. See Rooney, “Criticism and the Subject of Sexual Violence.”
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than legal—standpoint, is that it embraces and places in the foreground those whose multiple
marginalization has meant that they have been excluded from anti-rape discourse.
Literature offers us numerous opportunities to read rape in the lives of such figures, who
while fictional, often forcefully represent the conditions of inequality experienced by real
historical people. Of course literature is not so instrumental; it does not exist only to teach us
about the past, or about how to treat each other ethically. But I would argue that we can’t even
begin to explore the formal elements of literary representations of rape until we abandon
adjudication as our primary strategy for reading such representations, precisely because such
adjudications impose legal history on fictional worlds in unexamined ways. As I have suggested,
the recognized “textual mark” of rape in literature—the textual absence—may be far from the
only such “mark” these texts offer us (Rooney 1269). Perhaps because we have focused on
adjudication of a crime (and thereby on the represented experiences of accused characters) we
have simply failed to see the text’s many strategies for representing rape; such as, in the case of
Tess, the multiple linguistic registers on which the text represents Tess’s vulnerability, its mythic
references (which suggest that Tess’s rape is fated or even natural), or even its narrator’s
potential complicity in treating Tess as a seducer who somehow deserves her fate. If my account
is to be trusted, it unsurprising that much of the best recent work on the novel sidesteps the issue
of Tess’s rape entirely; and yet there must be a way to countenance the formal dimensions of
Tess’s rape without deconstructing that rape so thoroughly that it becomes meaningless. It is my
hope that reconceptualizing rape as a “social category” with a history will allow literary critics to
find a middle way between purely aesthetic and rigidly historical approaches to the topic
(Garland Thomson).
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I am by no means arguing that we rid ourselves of rape as a legal category, but rather that
literary scholars need not continue to pursue rape’s legal contours as they are represented in
literature, especially not without realizing that we do so. As in the case of Brett Kavanaugh’s
confirmation hearings, the critical turn to adjudication has served to center debate around
characters who are accused, and hinge meaning on whether their criminality can be proven. This
is as much a fool’s errand in literature as it was at the Kavanaugh’s hearing.. As in the
Kavanaugh hearings, adjudicating a question we can never resolve has distracted us from the
most interesting, challenging questions representations of rape in literature offer. Perhaps we
have done this not only unwittingly in service of the status quo, but also because it is simply
easier, as Michael Berube puts it in the case of disability, to “disavow” our connections to the
subject of sexual violence (30 May 1997). Perhaps we have treated rape as a legal entity
because—despite its contested nature—the law allows us to imagine that it might be theoretically
knowable. As Davis writes, “A concept with…a univalent stranglehold on meaning must contain
with it a dark side of power, control, and fear” (1). Our attempts to reduce rape to a stable
category through our application of legal principles reflect this fear. And yet rape as a “social
category” will forever be in flux. The meaning of rape as an injury will continue to evolve. We
will never map rape’s terrain entirely. Recognizing this, I hope, would open new readings of
Clarissa, Tess, and many other novels, as well as help us grapple with the multiple meanings of
rape in the lives of historical and contemporary people.
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CHAPTER TWO
Truth

“There is always something [Clarissa] prefers to the truth.”22
—Samuel Johnson (1786)
Where does “truth” lie in Clarissa? A connected but slightly different question is, where
does truth lie in Clarissa? These are central questions, as problematic for the reader as they are
for the novel’s characters, the answers to which will determine much of how we interpret the
many accounts of reality that the novel offers. In answer to these questions, this chapter will
argue three things: (1) that the idea that rape is a crime of pathological psychology began to gain
currency in the eighteenth century, (2) that a founding document of this new view of rape is
Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, and (3) that this new trajectory for the rape plot would focus the
novel’s exploration of knowledge and otherness on the event of rape. I will make these claims by
reading Clarissa’s treatment of rape in the context of contemporary novels, as well as by closereading a moment in the novel that condenses its concerns about physical space, mental space,
difference and truth into a crude comparison between Clarissa’s vagina and the skull of a dead
man.

I. The Origins of the Rape-as-Aberration Plot: Or, Was Samuel Richardson a Second Wave
Feminist?
Where did the idea that rape is pathologically motivated (and thus unnatural) come from?
Since the second-wave feminist movement, when Susan Brownmiller’s paradigm-defining
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Quoted in Piozzi (Mrs. Thrale), Anecdotes of the Late Samuel Johnson.
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Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (1975), the idea that rape represents an unnatural
expression of power (rather than a natural expression of sexuality) has enjoyed dominance in
American culture. In defiance of a culture which often treated sexual aggression as a constitutive
element of normative male sexuality, Brownmiller argued that rapists were driven to the crime
because they desired control over women.23 According to Against Our Will, rape was only the
most obvious means by which men controlled women, only one technology by which (to use a
term that Brownmiller helped popularize) the patriarchy operated. Though Brownmiller is often
credited with first describing for a popular audience what would become this distinctive secondwave account of rape, the portrait she presents has a long history. One important origin point for
this idea in the English tradition is found in Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, which in contrast to
other contemporary texts treats rape as a pathological crime, not a normal expression of male
sexuality.
Though much research has documented the legal history of the concept of rape as a crime,
scholars have been less able to explain when rape began to be seen as a moral crime, an act of
sadism, and a violation of another’s personhood. (For instance, Brownmiller’s account might
lead one to believe that in 1975, there was societal no recognition of rape’s immorality.)
Sometimes this history gets characterized as one in which rape began to be recognized as a crime
only when women began to be recognized as people—as literal political subjects—but the actual
story is more nuanced. Rape has been recognized as a capital crime since the classical period.
And yet it is not until the mid-eighteenth-century that literature begins testifying to a
meaningfully changed perception of the act: post-Clarissa, I will argue, rape stops being viewed
as a crime of natural appetite run amuck—akin to stealing food, for instance—and begins to be
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Obviously, this account relies on a heteronormative view of the construction of society throughout history.
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seen as a crime of power and sadism, pathology, and victimization. This change in literary
representations of rape certainly does not happen all at once, but as I will show, post-Clarissa
rape is increasingly depicted as a moral crime motivated by pathological psychology. The focus
of these rape narratives shifts from the woman character’s capacity to deflect or re-inscribe the
meaning of sexual violence (as in Pamela) to the rapist’s psychology (as in Clarissa). As I will
argue later in the chapter, Richardson’s larger exploration of knowledge and truth arises from his
critique of gender relations, most characterized, as I will show, by his depiction of rape.
Rape has long been treated as an anti-social impulse which needs to be controlled by the
government. One paradox of this historical treatment of rape is that many societies have both
acknowledged that rape must be regulated by the state and simultaneously held that the desire to
rape is natural in men. In such societies, the need to regulate rape usually arises not from a belief
that the act is evil, violative, or even necessarily wrong, but that if left unregulated, rape will
cause problems between men. For instance, the Roman origin story famously begins with rape: it
was the rape of the Sabine women, Livy writes, that allowed Roman warriors to elevate their
settlement from a thriving fort-city to a civilization. Though for many years scholars of antiquity
were quick to point out that this was rape in the form of “raptus”—Latin for “kidnapping”—
scholars have more recently recognized that such kidnapping and forced marriage surely
involved rape (in the contemporary sense of forced sex). Indeed, in Livy’s The History of Rome
(Ab Urba Condita—literally “books on the foundation of a city”) this story ends with Romulus
conciliating the Sabine women with both carrot and stick. When the women complained of their
treatment by the Roman men, Romulus reminded them that their rapes would not have been
necessary had their parents not “been too proud to allow intermarriage with” the Romans (41).
Thus the taking of women by force is treated primarily as an act of aggression against other men,
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not as a crime against the women who had been the victims of abduction and rape. The Romans
simply needed women to start their civilization, and since they were denied when they had
peacefully applied for them, they were obliged to use force to acquire them. As recompense,
Romulus promises the Sabine women the “all the privileges of the community,” legally granting
expansive freedoms to citizen women (42). At the very least these stories suggest that rape bears
a meaningful relation to the state-sanctioned forms of sexuality upon which society is (and, in the
logic of such stories, must be) based. Post the rape of the Sabines, after all, Roman civilization
flourishes.
A number of classicists have argued that violence against women—and particularly sexual
violence—is represented in both the myth and history of antiquity as a force which helps initiate
necessary growth.24 The story of the Sabine women is only one example of this pattern, wherein
rape is represented as a sort of birth pain of a great civilization. At its most basic level, the rape
of the Sabine women “depicts the first marriage in the new city as a process of ‘legitimate rape’
for the purpose of procreation” (Beard n.p.). But this and other ‘legitimate rape[s]’ had powerful
political meaning as well. Other examples may be found in the stories of mytho-historical
Roman figures described by Livy, such as Rhea Silvia (impregnated via rape with Romulus and
Remus, who would go on to found Rome) and Lucretia (whose rape inspires the oppressed
Roman men to overthrow their tyrannical King and re-establish democracy). These rapes serve
the purpose of setting the groundwork for necessary changes in the republic; since women are
not equally necessary political actors, their rapes may be unfortunate, but they don’t threaten
democracy. Thus a woman’s rape which inspires a just revolution is treated as a necessary evil.25
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See Beard, SPQR, Baines, “Effacing Rape in Early Modern Representation,” and Witzke “Violence against
Women in Ancient Rome: Ideology versus Reality.”
25
Many Greek myths represent rape as elemental to the organization of the world. These include the tales of
Antiope, Callisto, Europa, Leda, Demeter, Medusa, and Persephone, among others.
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Barbara Baines points out that such rapes are granted importance only when they are “‘troped’ or
metaphorized, rationalized, [and] politicized” in literature, but that these “transform[ations]” into
aesthetic objects ultimately serve “the conflict between men and the privileging of male honor”
(70). Similarly, Serene Witzke has argued that the ubiquitous casual violence against women in
Roman mytho-history should not be viewed as an attempt on the part of Livy and other historians
to discipline women through fear, or even an attempt at verisimilitude, but rather simply as a plot
device which “motivate[s] male action” (253-4). After women have “served [this] purpose…they
disappear from the narrative,” because these stories were never really about them, but about the
formation of a male polity (Witzke 253-4). In other words, rape gains mythic and historical
status not because it is an extreme act of sexual violence, but because it is an act of violence
which occasions the great acts of men.
Similarly, European medieval law situated the meaning of rape in the “relationship or
potential relationship of the raped woman to [a] man” (Baines 71). Punishment fell hardest on
men who raped virgins, because of their status as property which could enrich their male
relatives. In fact, the historical elision between rape and seduction, or as the Medieval Europeans
seem to have thought of it, “abduction and elopement,” can in part be attributed to the legal
reality that, in the Middle Ages, “rape was a crime against property and a threat to the class
structure and thus very much ‘between men,” as Baines puts it (72). If a daughter is
conceptualized as her father’s “movable goods” then it follows that his loss of property would be
the same whether she was raped or consented to an elopement he does not sanction (Bashar 41).
Nazife Bashar and Barbara Baines have argued that this conflation of rape and seduction began
to evolve in the Early Modern period, after which time courts began to draw a distinction
between such crimes with regard to the woman’s consent: women began to be seen as both
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“property…and a person invested with agency” when it came to their ability to assert consent or
non-consent (Baines 73, emphasis mine). In practice this meant that a woman might be blamed
for both her male relatives’ loss of property and her sexual indiscretion.
Theories of conception which link sexual pleasure to procreation date back to antiquity, and
circulated throughout the Renaissance (and sadly, into the present day).26 Many —both medical
professionals and laypeople— believed that conception occurred during or as a result of female
orgasm. Though “pregnancy from rape” would seem to “provi[de] the limiting case for a
women’s conceiving without pleasure or desire,” such cases actually lead to a further refinement
(one might say perversion) of the standard of female consent (Laqueur 161). As Baines explains,
a new theorization of consent emerged in the period, wherein a woman’s body could consent
against the will of her mind (78-79). This explained both the phenomenon of women
experiencing orgasm during rape, and their ability to conceive during rape27. (It also, of course,
must have erected further barriers for women who attempted to bring allegations of rape, because
it introduced the woman’s own body as a potential witness for the defense.) And yet, this
distinction did not resolve the complexity of consent, for the law continued to refine the idea,
making further stipulations for cases in which women were forced to submit to sex (what we
might today call ‘coercion’). In such cases, the law (at least in letter) had begun to imagine that a
woman’s mind and body might both seem to consent (that is, she might perform the actions of a
consenting person) though she might have actually been forced.
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Former Missouri congressional representative Todd Akin famously claimed, in 2012, that access to abortions were
unnecessary for rape victims, because in cases of “legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut the whole
thing down (Alter 17 July 2014).
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For more see Laqueur, Making Sex, Baines, “Effacing Rape in Early Modern Representation,” and Cadden,
Meanings of Sex Difference in the Middle Ages.
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What all these historical accounts of rape have in common is that they treat rape as a crime of
appetite. This is rape in the sense of “raptus” (Latin for “seized”), not only because the victim is
usually spirited away by her assailant but also because the rapist is seized by an appetite too
strong to deny. The legal treatment of rape as a property crime tracks nicely with the idea that it
arises from natural appetites that are out of control. If I steal my neighbor’s bread because I’m
hungry, that makes a certain kind of (perhaps amoral) sense. If I have enough to eat and steal my
neighbor’s bread because I’m greedy, perhaps that makes me a bad person, but it doesn’t make
my desire for bread unnatural (just gluttonous). By this same logic, rape can be and often was
conceived as a crime motivated by natural, but insufficiently regulated, desires.
Garthine Walker has argued that in the eighteenth century ordinary people “situated rape and
other acts of sexual coercion on a spectrum that incorporated inhuman cruelty and wickedness at
one end and ‘unremarkable’ acts of sexual aggression on the other” (11). In other words, there
were actually two spectrums upon which such people might simultaneously locate rape: one of
sex, and one of violence. As Walker explains, “when rape was conceptualized as sex, its
implications were not the same as when it was conceptualized as violence” (11). She describes a
culture which simultaneously coded the figure of the rapist in two contradictory ways: as both an
“everyman” and a bestial monster. According to Walker, “When rape was viewed as the
expression of overwhelming male desire and frustrated passions, it was easily situated on a
spectrum on which it shaded into normal sexual behavior,” (17). People drew a distinction
between this kind of rape—which represented an excessive but fundamentally natural sexual
urge—and another kind of rape, which was characterized by some kind of extremity. Such rapes,
Walker argues, were generally viewed as the product of unnatural, perverse passions and
recognized by both the courts and the press as acts of violence. These included attacks on
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children and old women, as well as gang rapes, sexual torture, and rapes that culminated in
murder. Rape needed to be dramatically distinguished from normative heterosexual sex in order
to be recognized as rape or violence at all. This meant that vast majority of rapes were invisible
as violence.
My interest is in tracing how the kinds of sexual violence which were previously considered
“‘unremarkable’ acts of sexual aggression” come to be represented in literature as pathological
(Walker 11). It should be noted that this category encompassed almost all allegations of rape,
which explains why prosecutions of the crime were so often unsuccessful. Eighteenth-century
jurists regularly failed to recognize brutality in attacks which, by modern standards, would
certainly be considered extremely violent. And yet by the end of the century, though the law had
not meaningfully changed, literature was more likely to represent the rapist’s psychology as
monstrous, even when his crimes would not have met the legal standard for extreme violence.
Richardson’s canon provides an instructive account of this shift, since each of his three major
novels presents a different version of eighteenth-century manhood with regard to sexuality.
One of the incredible things about Clarissa is that she shapes public opinion (both in her
fictional world and in the reader’s world) such that a rape which might have been attributed to
normative male sexuality in another novel is ultimately recognized as a rape engendered by
serious, capital “v” Violence. As Erin Mackie reminds us, in Richardson’s day “elite criminality”
was subject to extreme “exceptionalism” (Boys 46). Mackie points out that it is historically
realistic that both Clarissa and Lovelace believe that he could not have been successfully
prosecuted for rape in the world of the novel, thanks to his high social status (46). For instance,
the kind of violence which Mr. B attempts on Pamela is ultimately reconciled by the novel’s
successful marriage plot. Though many readers were unconvinced by this ending, Richardson
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certainly aimed to reconfigure B’s violence, which seriously frightens Pamela, as normative male
passion of a kind which might—when constrained within marriage—actually be useful,
productive, and even desirable to women. For Richardson’s first readers this strategy failed
because they were unconvinced that Pamela was ever in danger of being raped in the first place.
Such readers see Pamela’s desire for bodily integrity as a pretension to a class-based privilege.
By this logic, Pamela—by withholding sex as long as possible—essentially bargains her way
into a respectable marriage. Her fears of sexual danger are overstrained and artificial; the antiPamela camp reads these fears as affectations which she must adopt in order to broker her
desired marriage (since the very fact that Pamela affects a virtue to threaten lends her the virtue
she needs to marry a man above her station). And yet as Kathleen Lubey points out, the very
same readers who saw Pamela’s fears as affectation often read Clarissa’s as justified (Defoe is a
prime example, as Lubey notes).
Readers accepted Clarissa’s victimhood, I argue, more readily than Pamela’s, not only
because of her elevated class position, or her more convincing narration of her own story, but
also—perhaps counterintuitively—because we get more access to her assailant’s mind. In that he
is a far rounder character, Lovelace is both a more realistic character and a more monstrous one
than Mr. B. His ability to tell his own story gives the reader unprecedented access to the brutality
of a masculine code of conduct which in Mr. B seems little more than ‘everyday’ sexual
violence. In its characterization of Lovelace, Clarissa breaks down what Walker refers to as the
‘everyman’ conception of rape, which circulated widely in “legal manuals, in conduct books, in
ballads, in plays, and in legal testimony” (12). If, as Walker explains, “the ubiquitous view
expressed by moralists” was that the “pleasure of sex, once experienced, were simply too
immense and addictive for men to resist,” then the novel challenges this paradigm by showing
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that Lovelace’s obsession with Clarissa is not about sex (in the sense of sexual gratification) but
about sex as an expression of power. It is not sexual appetite which motivates Lovelace, but rage
and competition, engendered, it seems, by Clarissa’s will to have her own mind and experiences.
As I hope to show, this portrayal of rape operates in contrast to the mainstream expectations of
the sexual culture into which Richardson was writing. A key letter of Lovelace’s, in which he
recounts his rape of Clarissa to Belford, makes this clear.
After raping Clarissa, Lovelace immediately regrets his violence, though not because of the
derangement and distress he has caused her. Rather, the culmination of his wishes has lead him
to a disappointing conclusion:
At times, I cannot help regretting, that I ever attempted her; since not one power of
either Body or Soul could be moved in my favour; and since, to use the expression of
the philosopher, on a much graver occasion, There is no difference to be found
between the skull of king Philip, and that of another man. But people’s extravagant
notions of things alter not facts, Belford: And, when all’s done, Miss Clarissa Harlowe
has but run the fate of a thousand others of her Sex--Only that they did not set such
romantic value upon what they call their Honour; that’s all. (5: 295)
In this dense and disturbing novel, I don’t think there is a more over-determined or disquieting
moment. That Lovelace is surprised and disappointed by his experience of raping Clarissa is the
first issue we must contend with. He makes reference here to his earlier conquests, which reveals
his experience with Clarissa to be a what I’m going to anachronistically call a psychoanalytic
repetition. This disappointment with the once cherished sex object has happened before, when,
upon sexual consummation, he has found “an Angel in imagination dwindled down to a woman
in fact” (6:9-10). Though he can consciously reflect on the way his sexual “enjoyment of the
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finest woman” never compares to the “contrivance, the bustle, the surprizes, and at last the happy
conclusion, of a well-laid plot,” he fails to recognize that this pattern will recur with Clarissa
(6:9-10). Earlier in the text he has elaborated on the ephemerality of sex itself compared with the
psychological battle which precedes it: though he admits that “nature will not be satisfied
without” “fruition,” the pleasure he takes in consummation cannot compare with the joys of
“preparation and expectation” (163). Later he will reflect that “more truly delightful to me [is]
the seduction process [rather] than the crowning act—for that’s a vapour, a bubble” (616)! And
yet by the time he rapes Clarissa he has lost contact with this knowledge of his own tendency to
be disappointed after he completes his intrigues. As he gets closer and closer to the rape, he
grows more obsessed with proving his favorite maxims—that every woman is at heart a rake,
and that a woman once subdued is subdued forever—on Clarissa, despite mountains of evidence
that raping her will not confirm her inner rakishness (and his own half-buried awareness that
there is always disappointment in a completed seduction).

Lovelace’s reference to King Philip's skull, his crude summation of his experience of
raping Clarissa, also requires exploration. Lovelace claims, by way of explaining his
disappointment, that “the skull of King Philip is no different than that of another man.” The
reference relates to the story of the Greek philosopher Diogenes, a founder of Cynic philosophy,
meeting Alexander the Great (son of King Philip) in the afterlife. Such stories, known as “death
dialogues,” usually feature formerly great men after death, as a way of meditating on the
equalizing effect of mortality. This story is thought to have been the basis for Hamlet and
Horatio’s discussion of Yorick’s skull in Shakespeare’s 1602 play, and it crops up throughout the
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, particularly in anti-Catholic religious tracts. The most
famous story about Diogenes, recounted by Fielding in the 1740s and Johnson in the 1750s, has
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him rebuff an offer of riches from Alexander; when the king asks what wish he can grant
Diogenes, the philosopher merely asks him to stop blocking the sunlight in which he is
lying. The repudiation of materialism that Diogenes was famous for is also evident in the
charnel-house story to which Lovelace refers. The Cynic produces the skulls as evidence of the
fact that all human exertion ends in the same way.

On one level, Lovelace invokes the reference because of Clarissa’s supposed
superiority. Like Diogenes reminding Alexander that he is merely human, Lovelace has always
sought to take Clarissa down a few pegs. It’s also, more crucially, about her vagina. Ironically,
Lovelace employs a reference which is usually invoked to critique materiality to dwindle
Clarissa, his Angel in imagination, down to a woman (and less than a woman, merely a vagina),
in fact. This is the devastatingly literal valence of “the skull of king Philip is no different than
that of any other man”: the vagina of Clarissa Harlowe is no different from that of any other
woman. (The term “honour,” as Lovelace uses it, also refers to a woman’s intact hymen.)
Ultimately Clarissa is a disappointment because Lovelace cannot achieve his rape without
knocking her out cold, and thus the pleasure of dominating her will is denied him. Reducing her
to her most base materiality evacuates everything about her that made her a woman he wanted to
dominate. For Lovelace, who as Frances Ferguson famously put it, seeks desperately to
“reduc[e]... psychological states to formal states,” it was never about sex, after all (100). It’s
ironic, and brutally sad, that this moment of sexual explicitness is what reveals that truth.

It is also interesting to consider the implications of Lovelace’s implied synecdoche
here. If King Philip is represented by his skull, all that Clarissa is is represented by her vagina.
Kathleen Lubey has argued that “Richardson strategically elides his heroine’s interiority in order
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to prove the insufficiency of a depth model of psychology” (160). Ramesh Mallipeddi has made
a similar claim, arguing that Clarissa makes the harm of rape incommensurate with attempts to
repair that harm, whether they be legal (like prosecution) or social (like marrying your rapist and
thus socially ‘recovering’ from the violation).28 The King Philip’s skull moment is another in
which the novel reveals the weakness of imagining interiority as a space bounded within the
body, because it reveals the barren literalism of Lovelace’s thinking. He takes the misogynist
synecdoche that woman is vagina literally, to Clarissa’s peril.

All this confusion is treated as internal to Lovelace. It is his psychological, ethical, and
moral problem to struggle with. As Lovelace discovers to his disappointment, Clarissa’s
unconscious body is merely a body; his obsession with penetrating it has left him no closer to
proving his favorite maxims on her, or to understanding her. Ironically, when Lovelace bitterly
compares Clarissa’s unconscious body to the indistinguishable skulls of the dead, he subtly
betrays his desperate wish for contact with Clarissa; despite all his protestations that she is—and
that he must prove her to be—no different from any other woman, his obsession with her is
fueled by his conviction that contact with her would be different than his other liaisons, even
when she is reduced to her most literally material form, that of an unconscious body. Whereas
Diogenes compares the skull of the King and that of the slave to argue for the intrinsic equality
of all actors, Lovelace’s use of the reference betrays his desire to be wrong: he yearns to discover
that Clarissa is actually somehow different from other people.

II. Rape as a Fantasy of Unfettered Contact
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This account of Lovelace’s pathology—and of rape as pathology—all tends towards the
novel’s deeper exploration of how people navigate mental and physical contact and distance.
Relatively early in the novel, when he writes of his “infinite curiosity to find out the subject of
[Clarissa and Anna’s] letters,” Lovelace betrays his complex sense of the body/mind connection:
“It vexes me to the heart to think that she is hourly writing her whole mind on all that passes
between her and be—I under the same roof with her—yet kept at such an awful distance” (463).
What is most “awful” to Lovelace is that physical proximity has not equated to mental
proximity; despite living together, he is no closer to being able to read “her whole mind” than he
was before he imprisoned her. As Ferguson puts it, in moments like these Lovelace reveals an
intense faith in forms: if he can only get physically closer to Clarissa, he seems to think, he will
learn to understand her thoughts (Ferguson 100).

Building on Ferguson, Lubey and others have elucidated the novel’s critique of “depthmodel psychology,” wherein Clarissa’s subjectivity maps onto a figuration of the anatomized
female body (Lubey 160). As Julie Park points out, “the heroine’s heart becomes a muchcontested object of power and desire,” as we continually encounter characters demanding that
Clarissa “bend” her “heart” to their wills (Park 375; Richardson 89). Clarissa continually
declares that she believes she should have a “right to a heart” a phrase which represents her
conviction that she should have the right to choose whom to marry (or not to marry) (Richardson
87). Lovelace wishes to “enter [Clarissa’s] heart,” a phrase which means to him both
understanding her mind and sexually possessing her body (541). But Lovelace is far from the
only character who maps mental and spiritual space onto Clarissa’s physical body, imagining
that one can be conquered through the other. When Clarissa offers supplication to her mother,
she receives this response: “your heart, not your knees, must bend” (89). Similarly, Clarissa
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writes that when her brother James chastises her for her refusal to marry Solmes, he does so by
imaginatively mapping the location of truth in her body: “Oh thou fallen angel, said he, peering
up to my downcast face—such a sweetness here!—and such an obstinacy there, tapping my
neck” (emphasis original 376). The persecution of Clarissa’s family relies on the conviction that
Clarissa knows where her truth resides, and that she must be forced to bring her body and mind
in line with one another. But even Clarissa’s allies fear that her body hides an unacknowledged
truth: Anna Howe, Clarissa’s best friend and staunchest defender, asks her whether her body
doesn’t “throb” in ways that reveal a repressed desire for Lovelace. In so doing she articulates
the belief, shared by many, that Clarissa’s body and mind betray one another, that they are in fact
reducible to one another. Even Clarissa herself seems to ascribe particular power to parts of her
body: as Hina Nazar points out, she “frequent[ly] represent[s]…her heart as an independent
entity, which judges free from interference by her” (85).
As Park, Lubey, and Katherine Binhammer have shown, this anatomizing of Clarissa’s
body only serves to complicate the novel’s account of the connection between body and mind;
the frequent use of synecdoche makes this clear, since we are variously invited to see Clarissa’s
“knees,” “neck” and “honour” (her hymen) as equally able to reveal her internal truth. The most
common of these references is to Clarissa’s “heart,” which becomes overlain with various
contradictory meanings. In some sense Clarissa’s ‘heart’ is reducible to her hymen, to which she
feels she should be able to control access (and her family disagrees). As Park explains, the
hymen was an overdetermined and “precious” body part because it marked virginity, but also
because its intactness gave “a private family a form of commodity, to be sought, stolen or
defended” (Park 376). In another sense, Clarissa’s ‘heart’ is representative of her mind, since she
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exists in a world which unilaterally understands “sexuality to be the master key to female
subjectivity and [thus] define[s] Women entirely in relation to love and sex” (Binhammer 31).

For Katherine Binhammer, Lovelace’s method fails because he overestimates the
epistemological value of the body and sex: we encounter “the limitations of his way of knowing”
when we witness the failure of his epistemology, which holds that the “will to knowledge is the
will to carnal knowledge” (29-30). And yet as Binhammer points out, Clarissa disrupts this
continuum by conceiving of her mind as ungendered, a possibility which neither Lovelace’s
rakish ideology (which “sees love as reducible to sexual desire”) nor her parents’ middle class
ethos (which “sees sexual desire as reducible to love”) can countenance (31). Lubey too
recognizes the epistemological potential of erotic representation in the period, arguing that
eighteenth-century pornography and sentimental fiction share narrative structures which attempt
to “penetrat[e] into consciousness” and thus “suggest…that characters and readers alike arrive at
the most pronounced revelations about the self in moments of erotic extremity” (114).

And yet as both Binhammer and Lubey suggest, Clarissa depicts the failure of linking
epistemology to erotic experience in this way. For Lubey, Clarissa’s “rape cannot be
misinterpreted as an alluring spectacle,” thanks to the intensity of the scenes which surround it,
particularly Clarissa’s ‘mad letters’ (Lubey 133). Lovelace conceives of Clarissa’s subjectivity as
not only dependent on sex, but also as represented by her body in almost literal ways. When he
yearns to understand her mind, and articulates his frustration that physical proximity does not
allow him to do so, he figures Clarissa’s whole self—mind and body—as entirely characterized
by penetrability. What he wants, quite literally, is to deeply penetrate her mind by penetrating
her vagina. The “awful distance” to which he refers is the distance between their two minds,
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which is never conquered despite his physical incursions on her bodily spaces (463). In fact, as
Lovelace learns in horror, he is more likely to break Clarissa’s mind through such incursions
than to make contact with it.

Ironically, by succumbing to drugging her, Lovelace entirely precludes the possibility of
the kind of conquest he wants from Clarissa, which requires a mind to “bend” to his will (89). He
can only possess her body if he obliterates her mind, a discovery which explains the
disappointment he bitterly reveals when he compares both Clarissa’s vagina and the experience
of raping Clarissa to those of any other woman. As Gordon Fulton points out, despite “desir[ing]
a mental and emotional rather than physical conquest of Clarissa,” Lovelace plunges headlong
into a “deeply contradictory” “trial” of her which, if it were to “achieve what his own reflections
on women predict,” would be rendered “commonplace” (141-142).

In its willingness to explore not only the psychology of the victim but that of the rapist,
Clarissa offers a surprisingly contemporary account of sexual violence; more than 250 years
before our contemporary cultural dialogue about marshalling male assistance in the fight against
sexual violence perpetrated by men, Richardson made a radical move: he made men, not women,
the object of inquiry with regard to the causes of sexual violence. In this way he anticipates the
arguments of second-wave feminists, who would locate the difference between sex and rape in
its different motives: rape, as Brownmiller and many after her would hold, is a symptom of
power, not sex. And yet Richardson offers a far more nuanced version of the account of rape
which has come to general acceptance through second-wave theorizations like that of
Brownmiller. For Lovelace, it is not just a desire for power that drives him towards Clarissa, but
a pathetic sense of the limits of his own mind and the alterity of Clarissa’s mind. The novel thus
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imagines rape as a pathological—and tragic—response to otherness, ironically perpetrated by a
character who places complete faith in the power of sex to bridge mental isolation. In this way
Clarissa not only critiques depth-psychology, showing how easily it can be marshalled in service
of rationalizing violation, but also offers haunting testimony to the epistemological limits of sex.
As the rest of this dissertation shows, novelists post-Richardson would continue to utilize rape as
a vexed site for embodying questions of sex, knowledge, and otherness.
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CHAPTER THREE
Experience
For an author who is largely associated with the depiction of marriage, Jane Austen
includes a lot of seduction stories in her novels. We know that she read widely in contemporary
fiction, and that even if she was not first-hand acquainted with the amatory fictions of Manley,
Behn, and Haywood, she was at least familiar with such plots through their influence on
Richardson, Burney, and Edgeworth, as well as through the contemporary sentimental fiction
which she enjoyed satirizing.29 Although Austen made good fun of the fiction of her day, she
was also deeply influenced by the political implications of seduction fiction. The authors she
liked best—Richardson, Burney, and Edgeworth—represented the possibility of female consent
to marriage (and thus sex) as one of the primary expressions of female personhood. Their
experimentations with the seduction form began to elaborate the political terms of what would
become the marriage plot: for instance, if Pamela’s initial resistance to Mr. B articulates her
claim to natural rights despite her low social status, then their ultimate marriage forces him (and
his community) to recognize her as his moral and social equal. Austen was more interested in
the justice of this second trajectory: the way that marriage between emotional and spiritual
equals could revise the shallower equivalences which society endorses. And yet, Austen
persistently includes seduction plots in her novels. I propose that we read these plots as more
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Austen’s “Plan of a Novel, According to Hints from Various Quarters” parodies the plots of such novels: “Where
ever [the heroine] goes, somebody falls in love with her, and she receives repeated offers of Marriage—which she
always refers wholly to her Father, exceedingly angry that he should not be first applied to.—Often carried away by
the anti-hero, but rescued either by her Father or the Hero—often reduced to support herself and her Father by her
Talents, and work for her Bread;—continually cheated and defrauded of her hire, worn down to a Skeleton, and now
and then starved to death” (in Catherine and Other Writings, ed. Margaret Doody 231-2). As Doody notes, “Plan”
makes satirical reference to a number of contemporary novels, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile (1762),
Ann Radcliffe’s The Romance of the Forest (1791), Regina Maria Roche’s The Children of the Abbey (1798), Mary
Bruton’s Self-Control (1810), Frances Burney’s The Wanderer (1814), Mary Hay’s The Victim of Prejudice (1799),
and Sophie Cottin’s Elizabeth; Or Exiles of Siberia (1806), among others. See Doody 360-1.
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than cautionary tales or satires of popular fiction, claiming that—for Austen—the marriage plot
and the seduction plot exist in crucial relation to one another. My analysis of the dialectical
relationship between seduction and marriage plots reveals two things: that Austen, following
Richardson, treats seduction as a site of epistemic inquiry by comparing the forms of knowledge
produced by seduction and courtship; and ultimately, that Austen’s account of the new
gentleman of the Sir Charles Grandison model would profoundly shape the history of the novel
by further alienating plots of sexual violence from normative manhood. Without making sexual
violence their main focus, Austen’s novels subtly advance the Richardsonian rape-as-aberration
plot by describing a new form of manhood that is not sexually rapacious or domineering.

I.

Sex and the Single Girl: How Austen’s Heroines Learn
Austen’s seduction plots have often been read as cautionary tales meant to discipline the

novel’s heroine (as well as its reader) into the conclusion that it is the marriage plot, rather than
the plot of seduction, which she should desire. This interpretation can be traced back to Austen’s
earliest critics, one of whom commented on the “excellent lesson [to] be learned from the
elopement of Lydia” in Pride and Prejudice (qtd. in Irvine 487). In a period in which the novel
form fought for cultural legitimacy, Austen’s novels were generally recognized as both
aesthetically successful and morally unimpeachable. Sidestepping the melodrama of seduction
literature as well as the didacticism of conduct novels, Austen’s works “seemed,” much like
Emma Woodhouse herself, “to unite …the best blessings” of each available tradition (Emma 1).
And yet Austen’s seductions are not merely ornamental to her plots of education, since
they offer portraits of the social realities which attended sexuality for women in the period.
While the seduction side-plot in Sense and Sensibility is uniquely gothic, bearing clear vestiges
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of both the amatory and gothic fictions of the eighteenth century, in general Austen’s seductions
play out in the register of ordinary upper-middle-class life. Even Brandon’s niece, the second
Eliza Williams, ends the novel closeted in a comfortable home with her illegitimate child, a point
which suggests that the novel itself places the first Eliza’s tale of woe in an earlier historical
moment. The first Eliza’s literal destitution has been transformed, in the second generation, into
merely social destitution. Brandon, we know, will provide for Eliza Williams and her child with
Willoughby. Similarly, the fallen Maria Rushworth (formerly Bertram) will be kept in solitary
comfort by her wealthy father. And yet Austen does not make light of the punishment of social
isolation to the seduced woman; in the case of Eliza, herself the child of an abused and
abandoned woman, this exclusion from society is only the most recent injustice she has suffered.
Mansfield Park is less generous to its fallen woman. Though Sir Thomas declares that “as a
daughter” Maria “should be protected by him, and secured in every comfort,” he makes it clear
he will never have social contact with her again (315). In this sense, it is not that Maria is
actually made to socially “disappear” but to, as Paula Marantz Cohen aptly terms it, “wear the
mark of erasure” (79). Though she will have contact with her family, it will only be contact that
underscores her exclusion from the polite social world. Unlike Sense and Sensibility, where
numerous characters treat “poor Eliza” as an object of compassion, Sir Thomas ultimately
declares that “Maria ha[s] destroyed her own character,” and he will not insult other respectable
people by bringing her into their circles (149,150; 315). Mariah’s punishment is surely made
complete by her attendance by Mrs. Norris “in an establishment…in another country—remote
and private, where [they are] shut up together with little society” (315). Ultimately we learn that
the “tempers” of the two women “became their mutual punishment” (315).

69

The other seduction side plots in Austen’s novels are less socially damning for the
characters involved. Pride and Prejudice avoids the dramatic trajectory which the “gossips of
Meryton” predict for Lydia Bennet, wherein after Wickham abandons her, she “come[s] upon the
town” (293). The melodramatic imagination can only plot this story one way, and in it the
woman seduced is invariably abandoned and left to become a sex worker. But that doesn’t
happen to Lydia Bennet. Behavior which might have spelled social annihilation in another novel
is quickly resolved by Darcy’s economic and social power. In fact, Darcy accomplishes almost
the exact resolution (what Lady Catherine calls the “patch[ing]-up” of Lydia’s “an infamous
elopement”) that Edmund Bertram finds so objectionable when proposed by Mary Crawford in
Mansfield Park (338). While Darcy chooses to brave the displeasure of his relatives because he
wants Elizabeth, Edmund Bertram lives by a different code.30
One of Sir Thomas’s myriad sources of pain after Maria’s seduction is that it will
preclude Edmund from marrying the woman he loves, Mary Crawford, a woman who “in every
thing but this despicable brother, would have been so eligible a connection” (307). Even before
Edmund and Mary have had their final meeting, Sir Thomas assumes that the affair of Maria and
Henry “must” “cut off” their attachment (307). Though Edmund seems inclined from the first to
agree, it is Mary’s proposal that the best strategy forward is to try to get Maria and Henry to
marry that he finds most repulsive. Her “last of all, and above all” insult to him is her
“recommend[ation]…[of] a compliance, a compromise, an acquiescence, in the continuance of
the sin, on the chance of a marriage which, thinking as I now thought of her brother, should
rather be prevented than sought” (311). This is the same argument which Lady Catherine makes
against Darcy’s marriage to Elizabeth, and yet in the case of Pride and Prejudice such scruples
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displease others.
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are treated as overwrought, old fashioned, and superficially snobbish. Ultimately, Pride and
Prejudice celebrates individuality, treating the formation of Elizabeth and Darcy’s new family as
a moral and social good, while Mansfield Park achieves narrative closure by casting those
characters who would threaten the pre-existing family’s code with their individuality out. In
both cases the way the novel treats its seduction is an important indices of its larger values.
As these two very different novels demonstrate, Austen quite literally builds her stories of
women achieving the marriages they want on top of stories of women who are seduced. Her
delineation of the marriage plot arises out of the canon of seduction literature, and treats this
literature as a constant reference point. Clara Tuite has argued that seduction plots were
“domesticat[ed]” by their repeated inclusion as subplots in the “polite or bourgeois novel” (65).
For Tuite, this is a literary historical process by which authors who were savvy to readerly tastes
(including Austen, but first Burney and Inchbald) “capitalize[d] on the popular appeal of
romance elements” in their more sedate novels of marriage (65). For both Mary Jean Corbett and
Talia Schaffer, seduction plots offer the heroine a model of marriage which works in contrast to
that which she will ultimately choose. The seducer is the dangerous other who disturbs the
heroine’s familiar world, and is ultimately rejected in favor of what Corbett (thinking
anthropologically) treats as an endogamous choice; Schaffer, thinking in terms of narrative
structure, appoints this ‘familiar suitor’ the “suitor of rational esteem” (Corbett 31-56; Schaffer
42; 37-43). Tuite, Corbett, and Schaffer, among others, have thus shown that Austen’s
representation of seduction would shape the trajectory of the marriage plot, in both ideological
and formal ways.
That said, an understudied element of Austen’s seductions is their function as knowledge
producers: it is not just that the seductions of minor female characters teach heroines what not to
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desire, but also that they set up important comparisons about how experience engenders
knowledge. I argue that Austen imbeds seduction plots in her novels of manners in service of
comparing the different ways of knowing produced by seduction and courtship stories. This is
noteworthy because it works against an extremely long-standing literary and cultural tradition
which (at least through the Enlightenment) treated sex as the primary and most profound route to
female knowledge.31 As Thomas Laqueur famously argued, pre-eighteenth-century theories of
gender treated woman as the lustier, more physical sex. Men were of the mind, while women
were of the body (Making Sex pp.1-24). This gender theory underwrites the multitude of
representations in literature of women discovering knowledge and truth through sex (and often
through sex they haven’t consented to). By contrast, as Susan Morgan has argued, Austen’s
novels represent women as being capable of learning and growing without sexual initiation (351354). That they did this at a period in history when the hierarchical gender ideology described by
Laqueur was beginning to evolve towards a two-sex, or ‘separate spheres’ model of gender
probably only made them more influential.32 Katherine Binhammer makes a similar claim when
she situates Clarissa as the first in a series of novels about women in which the heroine would
struggle to plot a life for herself that is not determined exclusively by her sexuality.33
What I add to these accounts is the claim that through comparing seduction and courtship
plots, Austen allows her heroines to learn from and compare the epistemic logic of seduction
(wherein sexual experience produces accurate knowledge of the world) as well as the epistemic
logic of manners (wherein other people’s presentation of themselves must be seen through and it
is the practice of deciphering this presentation that teaches one how to interpret the world). If in
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See Binhammer, The Seduction Narrative in Britain, chapter one.
32

72

the seduction plot women’s knowledge hinges entirely on sexual initiation, Austen’s marriage
plots allow the heroine access to a displaced form of sexual knowledge (through witnessing
another woman’s seduction) as well as a plot of knowledge that does not rely exclusively on sex.
In so doing, Austen’s seduction side-plots offer the heroine the understanding that she would
have gleaned from being seduced, without the social or emotional costs. The epistemic stakes of
seduction are the same, but unlike the fallen woman, the heroine has not been cast out of the
narrative and can thus use the knowledge she has gained.
This is especially clear in Sense and Sensibility, where Elinor, not Marianne, learns of
Willoughby’s seduction of Eliza from Brandon and later from Willoughby himself. As the
novel’s primary heroine, the figure in whose learning the novel is most invested, Elinor is at least
as much the beneficiary of these insights as Marianne, despite the fact that she has not been as
hurt by Willoughby as her sister has. Elinor’s most profound mental shock comes when she
discovers that despite all appearances to the contrary, her sister is not in fact engaged to Mr.
Willoughby.34 The discovery leaves her in a state of insensibility: she walked “thoughtfully from
the fire to the window, from the window to the fire, without knowing that she received warmth
from one, or discerning objects through the other” (134). This discovery is quickly followed by
Brandon’s gothic account of his cousin’s history, which identifies Willoughby as the villain who
impregnated and abandoned Brandon’s niece Eliza Williams. That Brandon and Willoughby
both make their confessions to Elinor underlines the utility of the scandal plot for Elinor’s
understanding of the world. Indeed, when Elinor first learns that Willoughby has ended his
relationship with Marianne, her first instinct is to apply the newly acquired information to her
own life. We read that Elinor momentarily “forgot the immediate distress of her sister” and fell
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Colonel Brandon similarly describes the “shock” of learning of his beloved cousin’s divorce, which he reports
“threw” him into the “gloom” that marks his personality (146).
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into contemplation of Edward’s “differen[ce]” from Willoughby (130); though Elinor’s moment
of doubt is subtly rendered by Austen, the implication is that—despite realizing how similar
Edward’s behavior has been to the behavior she detests in Willoughby—she immediately,
unthinkingly acquits him of the crime of deceiving her into thinking his heart was free. Though
she believes him lost to her, she is comforted by the fact that he possesses a “very different
mind” from Willoughby’s (130).
And yet, though the novel seems to encourage us to read Elinor as the embodiment of
privileged “sense” while Marianne is that of fallible “sensibility,” by the conclusion the sisters
seem to have, as Eric Lindstrom puts it, “had their ruling passions switched” (1069). Our sense
that Elinor has been rewarded with a passionate marriage, while Marianne has been punished
with a sensible, companionate one, is “surprisingly hard to dislodge,” leading us to forget that in
Austen’s day the term “sensibility” referred not only to an aesthetic tradition but to the ability to
respond to sensations (Lindstrom 1068). Though the text—focalized through Elinor’s
perspective—seems to diminish Marianne’s observational and analytical abilities in contrast to
those of Elinor, it also gives us ample evidence of Elinor’s own propensity to misread reality
when doing so is emotionally rewarding. Until she is told otherwise, Elinor, for all her
perspicacity, is as unable as her sister to deduce the “secrets” which “characterize” the world of
the text (Richardson 225). This is particularly demonstrated by Elinor’s wishful delusion that
Edward’s ring contains a lock of her own hair; though she later assumes that Willoughby could
not have acquired Marianne’s hair without a formal engagement, in her fantasy Elinor is titillated
by the prospect that Edward has surreptitiously stolen her hair and had it woven into a ring.
Knowing what we know of Edward, this seems unlikely for a variety of reasons, and yet Elinor
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not only believes it but excuses the impropriety of the act (though she internally censures her
sister and Willoughby for the very same behavior).
Sense and Sensibility is often read as a transitional novel for Austen, which bears the
marks of her earlier, more playfully formulaic writing. If Northanger Abbey represents a comic
take on the gothic tradition, Sense and Sensibility seems to be a tragi-comic attempt at the
philosophical contrast novel of the 1790s, a form characterized by its stark comparison of
representative characterological types.35 And yet Sense and Sensibility might also be viewed as
transitional in terms of its treatment of its seduction side-plot, which is far darker than any other
in Austen’s canon. In fact, the only other place one might find such a plot (in which a woman is
forced into marriage, abused by her husband, divorced, seduced, abandoned, and then killed by a
wasting disease) is Austen’s early comic writing, wherein such plots are treated with a breezily
vicious absurdity.36 In Sense and Sensibility, however, Brandon’s gothic account of the doomed
Elizas is treated wholly seriously. And yet as I have suggested, though the discovery of the
Willoughby’s seductions profoundly shocks Elinor, and teaches her to see the world more
accurately, it doesn’t revolutionize her understanding in the way displaced seductions do for
Austen’s other heroines. Though all the necessary elements are there, the plot of education
through displaced seduction works less seamlessly in Sense and Sensibility than in Austen’s later

35
Our knowledge that Sense and Sensibility was developed from Austen’s 1790s manuscript “Elinor and Marianne”
supports this conclusion, since, as Lindstrom reminds us, “the French revolutionary resonance of Marianne” marks
the novel’s lineage as a “historically belated novel of ideas” (Lindstrom 1068). Austen’s early writings testify to her
interest in “the simple moral dichotomies of contemporary fiction,” but as Mary Waldron notes, the tone of Sense
and Sensibility attests to the fact that “Austen no longer found” such clichés “merely funny” (62). According to
Waldron, early drafts of Sense and Sensibility were modelled on works of Maria Edgeworth and Jane West which
contrasted the temperaments and fates of two sisters. That said, the finished product subverts readerly expectations
by disrupting the two categories it seems to initially set in opposition (62-3).
36
For instance: in the short parody novel “Jack and Alice,” Jack (“the Hero of this Novel”) is only mentioned once,
because he immediately dies of alcoholism, while the numerous other characters include a woman whose sister, “the
perfidious Sukey” poisons her and is “speedily raised to the Gallows”(22-23; 26).
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novels, and produces a less satisfying denouement, in which Marianne feels sacrificed to the
dour Colonel.
In Emma, for instance, the dialectical relationship between knowledge produced by
seduction and knowledge produced by polite social interaction more effectively aides its
heroine’s understanding. Although their transgression is in a different register, the secret
engagement of Frank Churchill and Jane Fairfax also works to effect an important mental change
in the heroine: Emma’s misguided confidence in her own omniscience is broken, and she can
finally see clearly that—like all others—she cannot see everything. Crucially, however, Emma
suffers an epistemic revelation without an emotional loss. Though she is “horror-struck” by the
discovery of Frank and Jane’s engagement, she assures her friends that she has “escaped” falling
in love with him (259; 261). She objects to his trickery, and to having been his dupe, but finds
that nothing more than her pride is hurt. As she tells Mr. Knightley, “[Frank] has imposed on me,
but he has not injured me” (280). Here, Frank’s crime is that in an attempt to conceal his
seduction of one woman, he pretended to romance another.
It is in the very next chapter that Emma discovers her love for Mr. Knightley, after she
begins to fear that he may love another. When Harriet describes her belief that Mr. Knightley
returns her affections, and the (somewhat convincing) evidence which supports this belief,
Emma responds that she believes “Mr. Knightley…the last man in the world, who would
intentionally give any woman the idea of his feeling for her more than he really does” (268).
Frank Churchill is, obviously, the reference here which remains unnamed. Emma’s conviction
that Mr. Knightley would never knowingly mislead a woman gives force to Harriet’s evidence.
At first Emma’s reaction is described as one of shock and horror. This terror, however, rapidly
produces a form of knowledge Emma has never experienced before:
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…She sat silently meditating, in a fixed attitude, for a few minutes. A few minutes were
sufficient for making her acquainted with her own heart. A mind like her’s, once opening
to suspicion, made rapid progress. She touched—she admitted—she acknowledged the
whole truth. Why was it so much worse that Harriet should be in love with Mr.
Knightley, than with Frank Churchill? Why was the evil so dreadfully increased by
Harriet’s having some hope of a return? It darted through her, with the speed of an arrow,
that Mr. Knightley must marry no one but herself! (267-8)
Emma’s knowledge of her love for Knightley is represented as a discovery which simultaneously
hits her on multiple internal registers: intellectually (“a mind like her’s…made rapid progress”),
emotionally (“she touched—she admitted—she acknowledged”) and physically (“it darted
through her, with the speed of an arrow”). For the first time Emma experiences a form of
knowledge which integrates these different spheres of experiences. This kind of integrated,
embodied knowledge is quite different than the knowledge Emma’s earlier observations
produced, which by this point in the novel we know to be suspect. Thus by the end of the novel
Emma’s early knowledge—her generally accepted ability to “see into everybody’s hearts”—has
been revealed to be projection (265). Austen renders with great subtlety the process by which
Emma’s experiences with displaced seductions (and numerous fantasized courtships) have
finally given her the clarity of perception which she lacked.
The plot of education through displaced seduction works most seamlessly in Pride and
Prejudice, where we find the clearest example of the heroine’s epistemic benefit from another’s
romantic failures. This novel more than once attributes Elizabeth’s self-knowledge to the
revelation of Wickham’s treachery. Each revolution in Elizabeth’s awareness of her feelings is
tied to an act of Wickham’s; these revelations are particularly distressing to Elizabeth because of
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her own earlier attraction to him. After first hearing an account of his attempt to seduce
Georgiana Darcy in Darcy’s letter, Elizabeth gains insight into the foundations of her dislike of
Darcy. She admits that “pleased with the preference of one, and offended by the neglect of the
other,” she has been prejudiced and blind, finally declaring: “Till this moment I never knew
myself” (202). This experience repeats when Darcy happens upon Elizabeth after she has
discovered her own sister’s elopement (an obvious repetition of the almost-elopement of
Georgiana, and one which underlines the lack of family guidance which allowed Lydia to be
seduced where Georgina was not). It is not till this moment that Elizabeth feels sure about her
feelings for Darcy: she now “understand[s] her own wishes; and never had she so honestly felt
that she could have loved him, as now, when all love must be vain” (264). The narration,
focalized through Elizabeth’s mind, takes pains to stress that these discoveries are not merely
romantic but epistemic (“knew”, “understand” and “honestly felt”). Here Austen treats love as a
social force which produces knowledge, a treatment which reflects her sense (following Adam
Smith) that philosophical truths flows from social experience, rather than the other way around.37
It is her discovery of Darcy’s machinations to bring about her sister’s marriage that
finally prompts Elizabeth to more justly rate his moral worth. She now acknowledges that “an
exertion [on his part] of goodness too great to be probable” was “proved…to be true”:
They owed the restoration of Lydia, her character, every thing, to him. Oh! how heartily
did she grieve over every ungracious sensation she had ever encouraged, every saucy
speech she had ever directed towards him. For herself she was humbled; but she was
proud of him. Proud that in a cause of compassion and honour, he had been able to get
the better of himself. (307-8)

37

See Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
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Austen is not insensible to the subtle way in which good deeds and affection act as their own
kind of coercion. As Mary Waldron notes, there is a tradition in the literature which slightly
predates Austen of women characters feeling pressured to marry men once they have become
indebted to them (59-60). This explains Darcy’s wish to conceal from Elizabeth his interference
in bringing about Lydia’s marriage. He is loath to exploit the power that this act might give him
over her. Some of Austen’s heroes, however, are not so scrupulous: at the end of Sense and
Sensibility, for instance, Marianne is figured explicitly as Brandon’s “reward for all” his
goodness (267).38 Indeed, the novels register in myriad ways the psychological complexity of
what is called love. Even Pride and Prejudice, with its triumphant “dream dénouement,”
demonstrates that love as Elizabeth experiences it is contingent on a number of social, emotional,
and economic factors (Tomalin 159). Elizabeth’s experiences of the world, particularly the
education she has received through her contact with Wickham, has helped her more justly value
Darcy’s merits. In this novel, love arises from an education in the ways of the world and the most
valuable forms of knowledge arise from love.
Many readers of Austen have identified her propensity for tying plots of learning to plots
of marriage. As Patrick Fassbender puts it, one standard account of the novels treats them as
being “generally stories about a man correcting a girl’s erring nature…[stories] of a girl who
starts out badly but who, through the ministrations of some warm-hearted moral pedagogue,

38
There are many such moments in Austen’s novels, which testify to the erotic force that the culture invested in the
idea of indebtedness. After Frank Churchill ‘rescues’ Harriet Smith from the gypsies, for instance, Emma finds it
natural to assume that she must in return fall in love with him. Harriet, too, plots her attraction to Mr. Knightley
along the same lines: it is his gallant ‘rescue’ of her, by asking her to dance, that she cites as the origin of her
feelings. Though the novel doesn’t tell us explicitly, it seems likely that it was Frank Churchill, not Mr. Dixon, who
saved Jane from falling in Ireland, and—given what we know about Frank—that this erotic encounter is part of why
Jane consents to an engagement which she feels to be shameful. Emma is a happy novel, and all these instances
reflect its general positivity. But Austen also suggests, if obliquely, the more coercive side of this dynamic, whereby
a man might try to make a woman indebted to him as a way to cudgel her into marrying him. This is why it is so
meaningful that Darcy is secretive about his machinations on Lydia’s behalf—because it suggests his unwillingness
to use this tactic to win Elizabeth.
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returns to the correct path and conveniently falls in love with her teacher” (748). This is not my
argument. As Fassbender shows, such readings generally try to “demystify” the relationship
between love, power, and pedagogy (747). While I do think many of Austen’s novels invite the
reader to question the eroticism produced by various forms of power imbalance, I am more
interested in thinking about how Austen’s heroines come to internalize a system of knowing,
judging, and navigating the world. By contrast, I would argue that very few of Austen’s heroines,
even those who do fall in love with an ostensible ‘teacher’ type (like Emma Woodhouse and
Fanny Price), actually learn how to know and understand the world through these mentors. My
argument is that confrontation with the seductions of others—very often communicated to them
by the man they will come to love—is a primary way that Austen’s protagonists come to
compare and adopt ways of knowing.
For instance, is it really through Darcy’s articulation of a code of appropriate social
behavior that Elizabeth comes to agree with his judgements on Wickham, or even on her own
family? Or is it the shame she feels when she compares her own behavior with that of Georgiana
Darcy, the much younger girl who Wickham has previously attempted to seduce? Austen’s
canon is punctuated by protagonists who are ashamed of their own susceptibility to a seducer.
“How despicably I have acted,” declares Elizabeth Bennet while reading Darcy’s illuminating
letter, “I, who have prided myself on my discernment” (PP 137). After the revelation of Frank
and Jane’s engagement, we read that Emma “was extremely angry with herself. If she could not
have been angry with Frank Churchill too, it would have been dreadful” (Emma 264)
Ironically, Austen’s heroines do learn from sex, just not their own sex. They learn how
to distinguish “passionately lov[ing]” from “rationally and passionately lov[ing]” by observing
the consequences of other women’s choices (MP 435). Although the realm of ‘good’ sex is
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unimaginable—or at least impossible to represent— in the world of the novels, ‘bad’ sex (that is,
sex that is not socially acceptable) is everywhere teaching heroines how to think. It is through the
heroine’s contact with seduction plots, wherein older forms of manhood—rakish, seductive,
driven by desire, and sexually opportunistic—that she comes to understand herself, and then, to
appreciate men who operate differently. As I will show, in Austen’s novels, the best, and most
natural, form of manhood is characterized by its gentleness.
II.

Shaping the New Masculine Ideal, from Sir Charles Grandison to Mr. Darcy
More than a century of popular culture has treated Mr. Darcy of Pride and Prejudice as a

prototypical romantic hero. Not necessarily capital “R” Romantic, although that has been argued,
but certainly little “r” romantic: thanks largely to Austen’s influence on the history of the novel,
Darcy has all the characteristics that we have come to uncritically associate with the male
romantic ideal. Educated, handsome, rich, and worthy, the Darcy figure threatens to meet all the
heroine’s needs, rather than force her to choose between love and money or some such prosaic
conflict. To us, steeped as we are today in such wish-fulfillment plots, it is hard to imagine any
other trajectory for this figure.
Critics have also tended to read Darcy as a fairly straight-forward creature who reinforces
contemporary Patrician values. Readings that have worked against this grain have cast Darcy as
a Gothic or Byronic hero, arguing that he is a darkly charismatic figure in the line of Milton’s
Satan and Richardson’s Lovelace.39 Austen’s contemporaries, however, would have been more
likely to initially recognize him as a descendent of the generally uncharismatic and sexually
entitled upper-class antagonists of the novels Maria Edgeworth and Fanny Burney, not to
mention those of contemporary writers well-known to Austen but less remembered today like
39

See Lutz, The Dangerous Lover, and Harmsel, “The Villain-Hero in Pamela and Pride and Prejudice.”
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Mary Hays, Mary Brunton, and Susan Ferrier. As Devoney Looser shows, this was the legacy
which the character carried for most of the Victorian period.40 At the beginning of the novel at
least, Mr. Darcy seems a boring and snobbish outsider who wants nothing to do with the
neighborhood in which he finds himself. In this way, he is not wholly unlike Mr. B of
Richardson’s Pamela or even Sir Clement Willoughby of Fanny Burney’s Evelina. Darcy does
not scruple to stare openly at women, or to imagine their interest in him where it does not exist,
two traits long associated with the upper-class literary villain. This is particularly true of the
“bold eye” trope; think of Harriet’s observation of Sir Hargrave Pollexfen’s “fre[e]” eyes in Sir
Charles Grandison, or the “persecut[ing]” attentions of Sir Clement (Richardson 54; Burney 72).
This bold-eyed figure also pops up in Austen’s unfinished novel “The Watsons,” as well as in
many other contemporary texts.41
Darcy’s first recorded dialogue is his claim to high sexual standards, his comment that
Elizabeth is “tolerable, but not handsome enough to tempt [him]” (9). This is a sexually coded
insult, not only because it insults Elizabeth’s beauty, but also because it requires that he look
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See Looser, The Making of Jane Austen, chapters one and five.
In Austen’s day, a ‘bold eye’ connoted noticeable, even stylized erotic interest. In contemporary texts, possessors
of ‘bold eyes’ range from sentimental fops who over- perform their interest in a love object, to coercive, abusive
suitors, to outright rapists. Mary Hays’s heroine describes herself as “shrinking from [her tormentor’s] bold eyes”
(The Victim of Prejudice 117). That character later rapes her. At the other end of the spectrum is Elizabeth Hervey’s
satirically-named Lord Pompouston, who on one particular night “had persecuted our heroine more than ordinarily:
his bold eyes had constantly been on the watch to meet hers…He had been very officious in placing her seat, turning
over the leaves of her book, and had hung over her, enraptured, all the while she had been at the instrument”
(Hervey, Louisa 84). In Hervey’s novel, the threat of the “bold eye[d]” Pompouston is his social—rather than
actual—aggression, which he enacts through over-attendance to a woman who is uninterested in him. Similarly, In
The Modern Fine Gentleman (1774), a woman character complains of a man who never declares his love but
continually insinuates it: “His bold eyes, his expressive looks, his sighs, his assiduity; nay, he had the other day the
effrontery, as my hand rested on the back of a chair, while I read a card, to step forward and touch it with his lips”
(25). In this case, she is annoyed because he performs the actions of a declared lover without declaring himself, so
she is socially recognized as the object of his affection but unable to put a stop to those affections through a positive
refusal. All this, as well as Austen’s own use of the reference in The Watsons, suggests that both women and the
wider culture recognized ‘bold eyed’ men as signaling their erotic interest. Whether that interest was perceived as
flattering, appealing, threatening, or arrogant, depended on the man himself. When we first meet Darcy, we have
little way of knowing how to interpret his bold eyes and can only follow Elizabeth’s lead in interpreting them as
arrogant, critical, and insulting.
41
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pointedly at her with a very ‘bold eye’. Once she has caught his eye, he does not expect to take
Elizabeth as a mistress—but then she is a not a servant girl—and he certainly does expect her to
be, against all possible evidence, “wishing, [and] expecting [his] addresses” when he first
proposes (241). Like Pamela’s Mr. B, he is partially attracted to Elizabeth because of her
resistance of him and her refusal to put on the airs of his way of life, what is sneeringly described
by Caroline Bingley as Elizabeth’s “self-sufficiency without fashion” (25). His upper-class
reserve and arrogance are juxtaposed to the humble affability of Mr. Wickham, an apparently
self-made man who seems poised to be the novel’s hero. By the end of the novel, however, the
calculus of goodness has been reversed, and the initially suspect figure, Mr. Darcy, is now the
deserving one. It is the seemingly upwardly mobile man who turns out to possess the sexual and
moral values of the eighteenth-century rake, while the upper-class snob is revealed to crave
equality from his romantic partner. What is more, unlike the rake who stakes his identity on his
rakishness (Lovelace), Wickham exploits the confusion others feel over his identity and class
position, working to seem respectable despite his intention to seduce and swindle.
It is through these kinds of recalculations that Austen leaves one of her most profound
and understudied marks on the history of the novel. In her hands, the ‘gentleman’ becomes an
ideological category, a way of carrying one’s self, perhaps even of exercising one’s power
responsibly, that is not class dependent, and the ‘rake’ is no longer exclusively associated with
the excesses and gratuitous social performances of the upper classes. If the psychological drama
of the eighteenth-century seduction plot is primarily the struggle to value oneself despite external
threats, that of the nineteenth-century marriage plot is to determine the truth behind another’s
self-presentation. It is only in a world where class and birth no longer clearly dictate behavior
that such plots can flourish. By showing how the initially ‘gentle’ figure—the Wickham, the
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Willoughby, the Crawford, or the Churchill—could turn out to be a manipulator, and how the
socially entitled figure could turn out to be a gentleman (that is, not sexually entitled), Austen is
one of the authors who helps shape the new sexual ideal—that would become the Victorian
gentleman—for the era to come.
The general consensus of literary criticism is that the seduction plot—the tale of the
virtuous heroine seduced into a sexual fall—ends with the eighteenth century. Though much
work has been done to disrupt this idea, we still tend to think of plots of explicit sexuality going
‘underground’ during the Victorian period. I argue, however, that Austen paves the way for
nineteenth-century depictions of gender relations by picking up the seduction plot with an
important innovation: instead of focusing on the way seduction clarifies her heroine’s
subjectivity, she uses the rake—the embodiment of the dangers of seduction—to produce, by
contrast, the alternate emergent figure of the gentleman. As I discuss in chapter one, seduction
plots were crucial to describing new ideas about the potential for female subjectivity in the
eighteenth-century; Austen radically revises the seduction plot, however, by using it as a yardstick for male, not female, capacity leading into the nineteenth century. If, in earlier plots, female
characters had to earn their political subjectivity by controlling their passions and being rational,
in Austen’s proto-Victorian plots, male characters have to prove their capacity for sympathy
through respecting women’s contested subjectivity. Where the rake was driven by his desires
and his conviction that women are ‘libertines in disguise,’ the gentleman is sensitive to the ways
the feelings and wishes of women are different than his own. It is not necessarily that he treats
women as equals, but that he embraces the new ideology of gender difference and treats women
with according sensitivity.
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The literary world into which Austen was writing was dominated by the figure of the
libertine or rake. He is the wanton debaucher of women, who makes little distinction between
consensual sex and rape, and who sees little difference between seducing a ladylike virgin and a
world-weary sex worker. The libertine has a long and complex literary history, arising as he does
out of the verse and comedy of the Restoration. Famous literary rakes include Horner of William
Wycherley’s The Country Wife (1675), the Baron of Pope’s The Rape of the Lock (1712), and
Lovelace of Clarissa. In Restoration comedy the rake or libertine is usually positioned as the
hero (whose debauches are represented as comic successes). In seduction fiction, however, this
figure often plays a more structural role: he has little interiority and serves more as a plot
element which confronts the heroine than as a fully formed character. This changes with
Richardson, as I have suggested, who seeks to represent the full interiority of both the libertine
and his victim in Clarissa.
Austen is working in a literary milieu which is subtly different, in which a true libertine
villain would have seemed slightly old-fashioned. Austen overtly rejected dramatic villainy;
indeed, her novels often make fun of the outmoded conventions of earlier novels. In her late
unfinished novel “Sanditon,” she satirizes a character who “felt that he was formed to be a
dangerous Man—quite in the line of the Lovelaces (Manuscripts 364). Evidence from Austen’s
correspondence suggests that she found abduction plots ludicrous, and her early writing (what is
often called the ‘juvenilia’ and Northanger Abbey) finds in them a source for comedy. A
memorable scene in Northanger Abbey parodies the classic abduction/carriage rape scenes of
earlier novels, leaving the heroine ‘trapped’ in a carriage, in danger of nothing besides a boring
day out with a man she does not like. Austen was a harsh critic of the fiction of her day that
relied on sensational plotting, too: in an 1813 letter she described Mary Brunton’s 1811 novel
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Self-Control as “an excellently-meant, elegantly-written Work, without anything of Nature or
Probability in it,” and joked that the heroine’s “passage down the American River, is…the most
natural, possible, every-day thing she ever does” (qtd. in Waldron 1).
Though Richardson is widely known to have been a favorite novelist of hers, Austen was
far more influenced, in terms of her depictions of men, by the novels of Burney than of
Richardson. Burney is also not interested in dramatic villainy, but in the fine gradations that
distinguish male behavior. Consider, for instance, the subtle but important differences between
Richardson’s mid-eighteenth-century libertines (Mr. B, Lovelace, and Pollexfen) who kidnap,
drug, and rape their victims and the villains of the novels of Frances Burney. In the novels of
Burney, who began publishing in 1778, the villainy is on a much smaller scale (think of, for
instance, Sir Clement Willoughby’s repeated attempts to embarrass Evelina into close contact
with him or to scare away her other suitors). Although these figures threaten to ruin the
heroine’s happiness, and often make overtures which today we would consider sexually violent
(or at the very least coercive), they usually do not actually kidnap and rape their victims.
In Evelina, for instance, the eligible peer Lord Orville is contrasted with the wealthy Sir
Clement Willoughby. Both take an immediate interest in Evelina, but the gallantry and decorum
of Orville makes his affection less transparent to Evelina than that of Willoughby. Willoughby
stares, cajoles, and generally harasses Evelina into contact with him; Orville, a model of
manners, is interested but respectfully cautious: he understands that leaving Evelina in his debt
might make her feel bound to him, and wants to respect her wishes before claiming the right to
defend her. As I have suggested, indebtedness to a man operated in the literature of the period as
a “displaced form of seduction” or, perhaps more accurately, coercion (Waldron 59). Mary
Waldron writes that “a common cliché was for a young woman inadvertently to become indebted
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to a man, and thus be obliged to marry him if that is what he wants” (59). As Waldron notes, this
issue creates a major plot point in Burney’s Camilla (1796), as well as in Pride and Prejudice. In
Evelina, Willoughby attempts to take advantage of this cultural convention, continually trying to
place Evelina “inadvertently” in his debt, while the gentlemanly Orville scrupulously avoids
putting her in this constraining position. Orville represents the epitome of ideal Aristocratic
manhood: he is powerful, conscious of the effects of his power on others, and careful not to
exploit this dynamic. Willoughby, on the other hand, represents the model of rakish manhood: he
is fashionable, shallow, and keen to exploit the forms of power to which he has access.
Austen does not pick up on Richardson’s figuration of the rake, but rather on his portrayal of
a new kind of man, whom I call simply the ‘gentleman’. The earliest instantiations of this figure
can be found in representations of the ‘moderate’ or ‘Christian rake,’ a character who appears
occasionally in eighteenth-century novels, letters and cultural ephemera. This is the man who is
both virtuous and rakish, in so far as rakishness is considered to be the defining feature all men
share. By that I mean that even those, like Richardson, who advocated vociferously for the
reclamation of male morals, “accepted” the idea that most men “were bound to take sexual
liberties” (Dabhoiwala 177). It was expected that men would dally sexually at least before
marriage; this was no major hindrance to them being considered honorable members of society
and good husbands. In fact, the abundance of ‘reformed rakes’ in literature implies that women
wanted a man who united sexual experience with an exclusive commitment to his wife after
marriage. As long as a man engaged in non-marital sexual relations with women who were not of
his own class or married, most people were not bothered. Sex with sex workers was generally
accepted, as were affairs with servants and lower-class women (as long as he went on to provide
for them should they bear his children). The upper-classes simply did not see the personhood of
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these women, and thus did not generally worry about how they might be affected by these
liaisons.
Moderate rakishness is a major topic of conversation between Richardson and Lady
Bradshaigh, one of his most important interlocutors. It is also a topic on which Richardson’s
thinking evolved throughout his career. In Pamela (1740) Richardson himself endorses the view
that a man can be acceptably virtuous if he does right by his former mistresses: the novel’s
resolution rests on the heroine accepting a ‘reformed’ rake as her husband and even caring for his
illegitimate daughter from a prior relationship. With Clarissa (1748) Richardson starts to selfconsciously challenge this idea, writing in the novel’s preface that “one of the principle views of
the publication…[is] to caution…against …that dangerous but too commonly received notion,
that a reformed rake makes the best husband” (36). By the time he writes Sir Charles Grandison
(1754) he is “conscious of advocating an extreme view” in depicting Grandison as a virgin
before his marriage (Dabhoiwala 178). What’s more, Richardson aspires to the lofty goal of
making the virginal Grandison into a sex object. He wants Grandison to be as appealing as
Lovelace (a character who was very popular with readers), without having also been sexually
immoral.42
It is through his conversations with Lady Bradshaigh that Richardson arrives at this new
character, who has, we might say, the body of a Lovelace and the soul of a saint. In her letters of
1751, while she read sections of the Grandison manuscript, Lady Bradshaigh attempted to
convince Richardson that the ideal man would unite the “well-bred gaiety” of the rake with the
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In an illuminating paper delivered at on 21 March 2019 at the American Society of Eighteenth-Century Studies
Annual Conference, Rachel Gelvin argued that Richardson’s depiction of Sir Charles Grandison as a virgin
represented “a major turning point for the domestic novel” (1). In so doing, Gelvin argues, Richardson “aligns male
desirability with male chasity in a way that novelistic depictions of courtship for the next 70 years would imitate”
(2).
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virtues of the “sober [man]” (90). If only, she argues, the good man could possess the social
skills of the rake, whose “liberal education” (i.e. experience with women) has fostered “a
genteel, easy, politeness” (90). What is to be desired is “the dress and address of such a man,
without his vices” (90). Bradshaigh laments the reality that virtuous men—those who have
avoided the improper company of women— “are too often formal, and disagreeable in their
manner” (90). She yearns to read about “hero[es]” who are socially accomplished: “not because
[their manner] is that of a rake, but because it is that of a man who has seen the world, and has
had opportunities of improving himself” (93). Richardson takes up the challenge, drawing
Grandison with a “person like Lovelace,” but with a “sinc[erely] devot[ed]” soul (Bradshaigh
115). When Bradshaigh reads his drafts, she writes of imagining Harriet Byron swooning at her
first sight of Grandison in church, where his movie-star good looks offset his spiritual sincerity.
Byron’s swoon sets off Grandison’s blush and thus Bradshaigh’s imagined encounter represents
their mutual recognition of powerful erotic interest (115). Richardson credits Bradshaigh for
inspiring this simultaneously sexy and virtuous character, describing Grandison in his letters to
her as “your good man (your’s he is—he owes the existence he has to you)” (116). Richardson
attempts to “entice his reader to Grandison and thereby also his moral qualities by endowing him
with those natural qualities which had become traditionally associated with vice” (Barker
17). Grandison is so naturally charismatic and bold, indeed, that throughout the novel characters
often mistake him for a rake when they first meet him. To put it in contemporary terms, in this
novel Richardson wants to sell virtue with sex appeal.
And yet, both Richardson and his readers found that Grandison’s Christian paragon was not
easily reconciled with the sexual charisma of the rake. Grandison was less of a commercial
success than his earlier novels, and reviewers and readers alike found the titular character a little
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hard to stomach. One reviewer characterized this response: the novel’s “insinuat[ion] that
[Grandison] still kept his Maidenhead…hurts his character with the ladies” (qtd. in Dabhoiwala
178). Later novelists offered portraits of men who were both attractively urbane and moral, thus
allowing their heroes greater moral wiggle-room. For instance, in Frances Sheridan’s Memoirs of
Miss Sidney Bidulph (1761), the heroine’s refusal to marry the worthy man she loves because he
has previously fathered a child out of wedlock is represented as overstrained. When she first
meets him, Sheridan’s Sidney describes this Orlando Faulkland in terms that jokingly invoke
Richardson’s breathless representations of Grandison. She writes that though she refuses to
“paint” him as a “romantic hero in the glowing colors of romantic exaggeration,” and that “he is
neither like an Adonis nor an Apollo,” “he is the handsomest mortal man that [she] ever saw”
(emphasis mine 17). When Sidney and her mother discover his past and end her engagement
with him, her brother argues that better men than Mr. Faulkland do not exist. To their mother, he
declares:
If you make my sister wait for a husband, till you find a man who never offended in that
way…you had better take a little boy from his nurse, breed him up under your own eye,
and by the time Sidney is a good motherly gentlewoman, you may give her the baby to
make a play-thing of (47).
Here George Bidulph articulates the idea that Lady Bradshaigh had offered to Richardson a
decade earlier, that masculine education necessarily entails some sexual corruption. One cannot
be ‘a man of the world’ without having fallen into some vice; these experiences should not
disqualify eligible men from marrying virtuous women. In fact, for many women, they may be
further attractions.
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Later in the century Frances Burney and Maria Edgeworth would further develop this
emergent masculine figure in contrast to the rake. Novels such as Burney’s Evelina (1778),
Cecilia (1782), and Camilla (1796), and Edgeworth’s Belinda (1801) staged contests between
aristocratic, gentlemanly, moral characters and dangerous seducers. In these novels, however, the
drama lies not in the heroine’s potential seduction, but in the social minefield she must navigate
in order to be able to marry the right man. When we consider this history it is useful to remember
that many contemporary readers of Clarissa interpreted the novel not as a tragic rape plot, but as
a failed marriage plot. If only Clarissa hadn’t been so scrupulous, they thought, she might have
had the perfect husband. In other words, when Richardson was in his prime, a character like
Lovelace was interpreted as an actual possibility for the role of the novel’s hero. In the years just
before Austen started writing novels, however, a new kind of masculine ideal was being
articulated. According to Talia Schaffer, the “fear of anarchic, destructive sexual desire propelled
eighteenth-century [women] writers to try to redirect feeling into a new structure, a different kind
of suitor” (57). Schaffer theorizes that the “suitor of rational esteem” rose as a response to this
fear; here was “a polite, respectful man who safeguarded women instead of threatening them,”
like Lord Orville in Evelina, or Mortimer Delvile of Cecilia (58).
Though Austen was hardly writing in a vacuum, it is only a slight exaggeration to say
that Pride and Prejudice in some sense ‘invented’ a figure that once created, was always
assumed to have already existed: the gentleman as an affective, behavioral category. By that I
mean that Austen’s figuration of the ‘gentlemanlike’ man both built on what came before
(Grandison, Faulkland, Orville) and looked forward, neatly encapsulating not the social location
of the ideal man, but his characteristics. No longer is he defined by a set of experiences, like a
certain kind of education, a particular relation to capital, and a defined position within the class
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hierarchy. (As my analysis of Richardson shows, a ‘gentleman’s education’ was increasingly
seen as potentially corrupting). In Austen’s hands, the ‘gentlemanlike’ becomes a way of being
that is not class or experience bound.
Austen’s invocation of the various verbal forms of ‘gentleman’ in Pride and Prejudice,
particularly the words ‘gentle’ and ‘gentlemanlike,’ is revealing. ‘Gentle’ is one of a few words
used to describe the quality of a man’s speech, particularly to those of a lower social order than
himself or to women. The best mannered men are those who make an effort towards
conversation, regardless of their company. Wickham first impresses Elizabeth by the “agreeable
manner in which he immediately fell into conversation” and the “gentle but very intelligible
gallantry” with which he praises the neighborhood (54). There is, we read, a “captivating
softness” in Wickham’s manners that makes him enjoyable to converse with, even on “the
commonest, dullest, most threadbare topic” (120; 52). ‘Gentlemanlike,’ is the word Austen uses
to describe gentlemanly behavior. In 1710 Richard Steele had argued that the “Appellation of
Gentleman is never to be affixed to a Man’s Circumstances, but to his Behaviour in them,” but
by the time Austen is writing, she acknowledges that in real life, many men who are not
‘gentlemanlike’ are gentleman in the class sense of the term (210). That the novel is concerned
with this distinction is evidenced by the different incidence of the terms ‘gentlemanlike’ and
‘gentleman’; ‘gentlemanlike’ appears only eight times in the novel, whereas ‘gentleman’ appears
more than forty. The term ‘gentlemanlike,’ then, allows her to draw a fine distinction between
class position and behavior.
The term ‘gentlemanlike,’ however, is still vexed by the difficulties inherent in any
attempt to interpret other peoples’ behavior. Mr. Wickham is repeatedly described as
‘gentlemanlike,’ but then, only with regard to his appearance, which suggests that Elizabeth’s
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sexual attraction to him has influenced her evaluation of his behavior. The openness of the term
has its benefits: it can raise those who do not fall into the class category of the gentleman, but in
whom true gentlemanly behavior exists. Whereas men with widely different backgrounds like
Wickham, Collins, and Fitzwilliam are all gentlemen in the class sense, Elizabeth’s uncle Mr.
Gardiner is not. Nonetheless he is one of the very few characters described in the novel as
‘gentlemanlike.’43 The word ‘gentlemanlike’ also serves a major function in the novel’s plot: it is
Elizabeth’s declaration that though he is clearly a gentleman, Darcy is not “gentlemanlike”
which haunts him and inspires his radical change in behavior. Late in the novel, he describes the
effect of this accusation has had on him:
The recollection of what I said, of my conduct, my manners, my expressions during the
whole of it, is now, and has been many months, inexpressibly painful to me. Your
reproof, so well applied, I shall never forget: ‘had you behaved in a more gentlemanlike
manner.’ Those were your words. You know not, you can scarcely conceive, how they
have tortured me;—though it was some time, I confess, before I was reasonable enough
to allow their justice. (240)
The “conduct” about which Darcy later feels so ashamed is his impassioned account of the
“degradation” of family pride which a union between himself and Elizabeth would represent
(125). And yet by the end of the novel he has come to so fully accept Elizabeth’s account of what
constitutes the ‘gentlemanlike’ that he “cannot think of” his previous sentiments of familial pride
“without abhorrence” (239).

43
The Gardiners are, in general, important foils to most of the characters of their generation. As Claudia Johnson
puts it, the “sane Gardiners…serve as [a] have[n] from the fatuity and vitiation rampant elsewhere” in the world of
the novel (Jane Austen: Women, Politics, and the Novel 49).

93

But what does it mean to be ‘gentlemanlike’? The term is meaningfully distinct from
‘manly,’ the term which would come to dominate later Victorian discussions of masculinity. For
the Victorians ‘manliness’ would mean to be industrious, pious, and abstinent. It would mean
that one was firmly socially located in an upper middle-class milieu which implied a certain
history and a particular set of aspirations: such a man would have gone to public schools and
would aspire to father sons, who would presumably attend the same public school and also be
industrious, pious, and abstinent.44 For Austen, the ‘gentlemanlike’ is a more subtle category,
less concretely attached to particular experiences. Though Pride and Prejudice never gives us an
explicit definition, the novel itself is a prolonged meditation on the meaning of the term. As
Elizabeth rejects Darcy’s first proposal, she offers him a portrait of what a gentleman is not,
when she describes his past behavior. She argues that his “manners” have “impress[ed]” on her
“the fullest belief of [his] arrogance, [his] conceit, and [his] selfish disdain of the feelings of
others” (127-8). The appearances of Colonel Fitzwilliam and Mr. Gardiner, each punctuating a
moment in the courtship between Elizabeth and Darcy, also offer insight. Colonel Fitzwilliam is
encountered by Elizabeth at Rosings, during the period right before Darcy’s first proposal. We
might call this the novel’s first, failed courtship plot; though Darcy thinks he is wooing Elizabeth
by calling on her repeatedly only to sit in stony silence, she remains unaware of his interest (and
indeed, grows to dislike him more than ever). Mr. Gardiner becomes an important figure during
what can be thought of as the novel’s second courtship plot, during which Elizabeth travels to
Pemberley and reencounters Darcy.
Fitzwilliam and Gardiner are the only two men the novel unambiguously treats as
gentlemanlike; both are men who think about and attend to the feelings of others. Both, perhaps
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See Tosh, A Man’s Place, and Adams, Dandies and Desert Saints.

94

more importantly, are men who find themselves in fairly unusual positions with regard to class
and capital. Fitzwilliam is the younger son of an earl; born the child of an aristocrat, he will not
inherit his father’s title because of his birth order. Although he and Elizabeth joke about his
privileged life, he also makes it clear to her that his position means that he will not be able to
marry without considering money. In other words, he knows something—if only a comically
little bit—about the way that structural inequalities affect lives. Gardiner, on the other hand, is
not born a gentleman. His father was a small-town attorney, but he has grown into a successful
London merchant. Wealthy, educated, and worldly, he has a thriving business, a happy family
life, and leisure time to spend traveling with his two eldest nieces, in whom he and his wife take
a special, nearly paternal, interest. The Gardiners provide the novel with its only image of happy
conjugality; that they end up being a model for Elizabeth and Darcy’s marriage is made clear by
the novel’s final paragraph, which cozily embeds them in the majestic “shades of Pemberley”
(233):
With the Gardiners, they were always on the most intimate terms. Darcy, as well as
Elizabeth, really loved them; and they were both ever sensible of the warmest gratitude
towards the persons who, by bringing her into Derbyshire, had been the means of uniting
them. (254)
As this passage shows, at the end of the novel it is Darcy’s worldview, not Elizabeth’s, which
has been radically revised. He now excludes Lady Catherine from Pemberley, as punishment for
her “abusive” descriptions of Elizabeth, while welcoming the Gardiners, once considered
shameful because of their mercantile class position (254). If Colonel Fitzwilliam provides a
model of ‘gentlemanlike’ behavior that foils Darcy at his most arrogant (during the Rosings
section of the novel), Mr. Gardiner provides the same model to Darcy when he is attempting to
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revise his prior behavior. In the novel’s second, successful courtship plot, Darcy learns how to
behave not only from Elizabeth (as the standard reading goes), but from her ‘gentlemanlike’
merchant uncle.
What Fitzwilliam and Gardiner really have in common, however, is that they are men
who think about and attend to the feelings of others (and their liminal positions with regard to
capital and power seem to be meaningfully related to this capacity). If, as I argue in Chapter
One, the presence of sexual violence in novels was becoming a way for authors to describe the
(failed) struggle to understand and make contact with the mind of the other, then the true
gentleman—the extreme opposite of the figure who would resort to sexual violence in his
attempt to make contact—is the man who has a sensitivity towards the minds of others, even if
he cannot perfectly understand them. Throughout Austen’s oeuvre her villains are most
characterized not by sexual charisma or manipulations, but by their failure to consider the
feelings and situations of others. This is as true in texts where the rake’s crimes are major (like
Pride and Prejudice, Sense and Sensibility, or Mansfield Park) as those in which they are
comparatively minor (Emma, “The Watsons,” and Northanger Abbey).
For both Richardson and Austen, the status of the gentleman is in dialogue with that of
the rake, but Austen moves further towards alienating sexual aggression from the world of the
gentleman by relegating violence to sub-plots and treating it as a behavior, rather than as the key
to an identity. In so doing she subtly denaturalizes an idea that had been at the core of
eighteenth-century gender ideology (and had been eroticized as such): that sexual aggression and
violence were normal parts of masculinity. By aligning the propensity towards sexual violence
with her villains (who often seem to be heroes in the early pages of her novels), Austen further
denaturalizes the behavior that Richardson had marked as pathological. (Though for Austen, who
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is less interested in perverse psychology, the pathological is represented largely by the anti-social
or disruptive.) By juxtaposing this behavior with that of a new ideal—the gentleman of the Sir
Charles Grandison model—she robs the rake of his sex appeal while also suggesting that the
sexual power dynamics that had long prevailed were old-fashioned. The rake becomes the man
of the past while the gentleman becomes the man of the future, and marriage, not seduction,
becomes the content of the novel.
If, as I have argued, Austen ‘kills’ the rake, he doesn’t stay dead for long. Canonical midVictorian novels like Jane Eyre (1847) and David Copperfield (1849-50) would resuscitate this
figure, but with crucial differences that reflect Austen’s influence. Just as Richardson’s
representation of rape in Clarissa helped cast sexual violence as aberrant rather than natural,
Austen’s treatment of masculinity helped refocus the novel’s erotic energies on the figure of the
gentleman. Despite Charlotte Bronte’s famous dismissal of Austen’s canon as insufficiently
passionate, Jane Eyre’s’ Mr. Rochester embodies the confrontation between the rake and the
gentleman that Austen so often staged; in Jane Eyre, however, these two figures compete within
the soul and body of one character. Thackeray’s Vanity Fair (1847) would call itself “a novel
without a hero,” while actually offering a new kind of character, the anti-hero, to readers.
Though the novel continually teases the possibility that Becky will be vulnerable to rapacious
male sexuality, it always allows her to sidestep that threat unscathed. If earlier seduction
narratives depicted male characters achieving their goal of sexual gratification through
psychological and social manipulation (think of Lord D’Elmont in Haywood’s 1720 Love in
Excess or Beauplaisir in Fantomina), Vanity Fair presents a viciously self-interested woman
achieving her goals (the acquisition of power and money) through sexual manipulation. In this
way the novel radically re-appropriates the rake’s narrative, showing that new social fluidity had
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opened dangerous and exciting possibilities. Trollope, too, would represent rakishness and
gentlemanliness as competing urges within his heroes, giving readers unprecedented access to
the minds of men on the verge of dishonor (think of Johnny Eames’s dalliance with Amelia
Roper or even Plantagenet Palliser’s imagined affair with Lady Dumbello in his 1864 novel The
Small House at Allington, or Paul Montague’s engagement to Mrs. Hurtle in 1875’s The Way We
Live Now).
In other words, the complex representations of men found in Victorian novels are
indebted to the way Austen wrestles the gentleman into prominence. Without figures like Mr.
Darcy, the man who is not what he seems to be, but is also not sexually or socially dangerous,
psychologically realist bourgeois novels cannot flourish. Thus Austen’s refashioning of the
gentleman not only bears on future representations of masculinity and sexual violence, but also
on the shape the realist novel would take. Austen’s novels offered plots that stood in contrast to
the sensational seduction plots of the era of her literary apprenticeship, and even to the
contrivances of Burney and Haywood’s proto-realist novels. Most eighteenth-century women,
for instance, did not have inheritances that were contingent on whether they could get their
husband take their last name, as Burney’s Cecelia does. Most women were not, like Clarissa,
both famous and pilloried for their perfection, simultaneously celebrated at large and ruthlessly
hunted by rapists. Though Austen deeply admired Richardson, Burney, and Haywood for the
acuteness of their psychological insights, she rejected their plots. As Scott wrote in his famous
review of Emma, Austen “draws [her] characters and incidents…more immediately from the
current of ordinary life than was permitted by the former rules of the novel” (qtd. Samuelian 41).
She discovers a terrain to be limned within the normal range of life, where personal
transformations can occur without being attended by great traumas.

98

Both popular culture and literary criticism has long treated the marriage plot as a
conservative, conventional account of women’s possibilities. By situating its rise this way,
however, we see that it actually provided a much more expansive alternative to what had
previously been the only plots written about women: plots of seduction and rape. Austen’s
novels describe the sexual politics of their day without sugarcoating them; as I have shown, she
regularly represents women who suffer heavy consequences for their sexual freedoms, as well as
female characters pestered and cajoled by all manner of obtuse suitors (who range from
ridiculous, like Mr. Collins, to frightening, like the Brandon patriarch who coerces Eliza into
marriage). Crucially, however, Austen’s novels also provide alternatives to such narratives
through the marriage plot. The juxtaposition of the two plots, and the ascendancy of the marriage
plot in comparison to the seduction plot, should not be read as an attempt on Austen’s part to
soften the harsh realities of women’s lives through rosy representations. Rather, Austen’s
marriage plots demonstrate the narrative potential of women’s lives beyond that which is found
in women’s experiences of sexual trauma. Though they are deeply indebted to the rape-asaberration plot, her novels show that there are more stories to tell about women’s lives than
Clarissa’s.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Consent

“Of course I would not ask any young woman to marry a man whom she did not love. Such
marriages are abominable to me.”
—Anthony Trollope, The Last Chronicle of Barset (1867)
This chapter explores representations of consent to love and sex in a group of novels by
Anthony Trollope. When we reconceptualize the ‘event’ of sexual violence, no longer imagining
such violence as temporally discreet or determined by a particular act (like penetration or
physical assault), then we can see that Trollope’s novels thematize consent and sexual violence
in ways that have been largely ignored by literary critics. Applying my capacious conception of
rape to the novels of Anthony Trollope, I show that rape—rather than being an unspoken term in
the Victorian novel—is represented with clarity and frequency in the period. Though I believe
that this pattern holds true for much of Victorian literature, I particularly focus on the novels of
Anthony Trollope because they offer a nuanced and sustained portrayal of the vexed problem of
consent for women as well as because this aspect of Trollope’s novels remains understudied. I
avoid, for instance, reading these themes in the work of other major Victorian novelists, like
Dickens and Eliot, because so much illuminating work on these authors has already been done.45

45
For book length accounts of these themes in the novels of other major Victorian novelists, see: Kelly Hager,
Dickens and the Rise of Divorce: The Failed-Marriage Plot and the Novel Tradition, Lisa Surridge, Bleak Houses:
Marital Violence in Victorian Fiction, Marlene Tromp, The Private Rod: Marital Violence, Sensation, and the Law
in Victorian Britain, and Suzanne Rintoul, Intimate Violence and Victorian Print Culture. Articles on the topic
include: Doreen Thierauf’s, “Daniel Deronda, Marital Rape, and the End of Reproduction,” Emily Rena-Dozier,
“Gothic Criticisms: Wuthering Heights and Nineteenth-Century Literary History”, Judith E. Pike, “‘My name was
Isabella Linton’: Coverture, Domestic Violence, and Mrs. Heathcliff’s Narrative in Wuthering Heights,” Andrew
Dowling, “‘The Other Side of Silence’: Matrimonial Conflict and the Divorce Court in George Eliot’s Fiction,”
Simon During, “The Strange Case of Monomania: Patriarchy in Literature, Murder in Middlemarch, Drowning in
Daniel Deronda,” Jill Matus, “Historicizing Trauma: The Genealogy of Public Shock in Daniel Deronda,” Heather
Nelson, “‘Nothing That She Could Allege Against Him in Judicious or Judicial Ears’: ‘Consensual’ Marital Abuse
in Victorian Literature,” Susan Ostrov Weisser, “Gwendolyn’s Hidden Wound: Sexual Possibilities and
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Furthermore, my focus on Trollope is intended to emphasize the pervasiveness of themes of
violence against women in the period’s literature, by highlighting representations of that violence
in the canon of a writer whose association with the “usual” register of upper-middle class life
remains dominant (James 100). As I will show, Trollope represents extreme, sustained, and
pervasive violence against women as the very structure of such life.
Trollope makes the impossibility of authentic consent for women a central problem
occasioned by the violence which structures women’s’ experiences. I will argue that Trollope
uses sexual violence (or the threat of such violence) in three primary ways. 46 The first is by
accumulating a mass of detail about the ways in which male sexual abuses of power concretely
shape and indeed condition women’s lives. Though little scholarly work has been done on the
topic, Trollope’s novels abound with generations of women whose lives have been constrained
by their experiences of sexual violence as a function of male power. Thus I am interested in
Trollope’s portrayal of rape and sexual violence as structural, even political, phenomena rather
than as individual, psychologically motivated ‘events’. In some of his novels, sexual violence is
represented as a mark of sexual passion that must be negotiated into a marriage contract by the
characters involved. Through readings of climactic ‘love’ scenes in his novels, I show that what
these novels treat as ‘real’ love is often represented by Trollope as an erotic force which
overwhelms consent. Thus the ‘happy’ marriages that achieve narrative closure are, in Trollope,
very often circumscribed in deeply troubling ways. The final, and connected, strategy by which

Impossibilities in Daniel Deronda,” Ellie Cope’s “Undoing a ‘Symmetrical Existence:’ Boldwood’s Monomania in
Far from the Madding Crowd.”
46
From a personal perspective, there is likely to be a (perhaps vast) difference between the meaning of threatened
sexual assault and that of a completed sexual assault to its victim. If we think about rape as a structure in our culture,
however, there may be little difference between the harm of a threat or a completed assault in terms of how these
acts oppress their victims. In this chapter, since I want to think about how rape is represented as a structural and
social issue in the novels of Anthony Trollope, I consider threatened rape and completed rape to be equally
meaningful.
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Trollope treats sexual violence is by enlisting the reader in a textual erotics that requires a
heroine to submit to an unwished-for marriage for the sake of narrative closure. Trollope’s
narratives often rely on the reader’s shared desire for a female character’s consent. I call this
strategy, by which Trollope enlists the reader into the coercive force he applies to female
characters, narrative coercion. By comparing Trollope’s representation of two persistently nonconsenting characters, Lily Dale and Ruby Ruggles, I show how Trollope’s narratives condition
the reader to endorse the increasingly oppressive, even brutal, coercion these characters face, as
well as consider why the narrative of The Way We Live Now entails Ruby’s submission to
marriage, while Lily Dale of the Barset series is allowed to remain single.

I. Problems of Representation
Victorian propriety would seem to make studying rape in the literature of the period
difficult, since sexual violence was among many topics that the Victorians generally thought it
improper to be explicit about. In this case, it might seem that the only option open to the literary
critic or historian is to read like a detective, pulling apart euphemism and metaphor to reveal
hidden truths. And yet, as Eve Sedgwick, Sharon Marcus, and others have shown, such
“paranoid” or “symptomatic” styles of reading occlude many of the text’s possibilities (Touching
Feeling 123; Between Women 74). As both point out, queer theory and sexuality studies have
been particularly indebted to paranoid/symptomatic readings precisely because scholars working
in these fields so often reconstruct history from textual objects which were never meant to record
anything (indeed we often work on people whose stories were actively suppressed by the
dominant culture). This is doubly true for scholars of queer and sexuality studies in the Victorian
era, who must also contend with the euphemisms and circumlocutions which Victorian propriety
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demanded when sex was discussed. As Marcus puts it, “symptomatic reading is an excellent
method for excavating what societies refuse to acknowledge,” and thus would seem an ideal
strategy for reading the Victorian novel (75).
Sedgwick offers a similar account of the utility of paranoid reading: it is not that paranoid
reading is never warranted, but that it is not always necessary. For Sedgwick, the danger is in
only approaching the text as an antagonist to its surface. In this model, the reader is a Freudian
analyst (rather than say, a Kleinian one) and the text an analysand which presents a surface that
must be plumbed. Whatever can be discovered as concealed by the text’s surface is privileged,
while the content of that surface is dismissed as resistance, obfuscation, or denial. As Sedgwick
shows, this kind of reading places “extraordinary” faith in the “efficacy of knowledge…in the
form of exposure,” privileging what can be exposed to exist under the text’s surface over what is
readily interpretable (Touching Feeling 138). Put another way, paranoid/symptomatic reading is
unnecessarily—and uncritically—psychoanalytic; without meaning to, it often treats what is
hidden or simply not immediately available in the text as its unconscious truth.
Marcus describes what she terms symptomatic reading in similar, though less affectively
loaded terms:
Symptomatic reading proposes a surface/depth model of interpretation in which the true
meaning of the text must lie in what it does not say, which becomes a clue to what it
cannot say. The text’s gaps, silences, disruptions, and exclusions become symptoms of
the absent cause that gives the text its form. (emphasis mine 74)
Thus for Marcus the danger of such reading is its tendency to occlude important elements of
texts which do not reward suspicion. Perhaps, Marcus argues, there are other ways of
conceptualizing the text’s surface rather than as a set of symptoms; in Between Women, for
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instance, Marcus shows that critics had long ignored explicit representations of same-sex desire
in Victorian fiction precisely because they treated such representations as merely the symptoms
of a repressive heterosexual culture. In fact, “Victorians neither repressed female friendships nor
policed them as rigidly as they did heterosexual relations” (75). As this example suggests,
paranoid/symptomatic reading is only useful when the text’s organizing logic is repression. In
the case of the female marriage plot on which Marcus focuses, assuming a logic of repression
meant missing what the text never sought to conceal: representations of female marriage.
The first century of criticism of the Victorian novel indeed held that repression was the
period’s organizing logic. Historians and literary critics alike argued that the ‘disappearance’ of
intimate violence from Victorian texts could be traced to the period’s prohibitions about what
could be said and known about certain topics, chiefly sex and violence (making sexual violence
doubly unspeakable and un-representable). At least since Steven Marcus’s The Other Victorians
(1966), however, scholars have recognized that the Victorian period—stereotypically
characterized as profoundly sexually repressive—possessed various robust sexual
countercultures.47 This is evident not only in contemporary texts that were designed to be
explicitly sexually stimulating (like the pornography Stephen Marcus examines), but also in
numerous texts which long went unrecognized as testaments to sexual subculture because their
sexual content was not obviously geared towards heterosexual men. For instance, Sharon Marcus
has shown that the sexuality of the fashion-plate, which fetishized the female body for the
pleasure of female consumers, remained illegible to heterosexual culture, while Catherine
Robson has described the undercurrent of pedophilic desire which informed the innumerable
commercial objects which idealized and eroticized the body of the little girl. Suzanne Rintoul has
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For more recent accounts of Victorian sexual subculture, see Lutz’s Pleasure Bound: Victorian Sex Rebels and the
New Eroticism and Hoare, England’s Lost Eden: Adventures in a Victorian Utopia.
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shown that the periodical press, which rigidly policed the boundaries of propriety,
simultaneously supplied its middle-class readers with voyeuristic pleasure in sensational
accounts of the brutal rapes of lower-class women, which can be found in nearly every Victorian
newspaper.48
The silence of Victorian novelists on the topic of intimate violence is usually attributed to
the influence of the culture’s strict commitment to gender ideology and to its class-based
prejudices. The idealization, infantilization, and de-sexualization of upper-class women reached
its apex in the middle of the century. It was middle- and upper-class wives, not their lower-class
counterparts, who were revered as domestic angels, too rarified to be sullied by any form of
violence (even the figurative violence to which literature might subject them). Furthermore, the
gender ideology of the ‘separate spheres’, which consigned women to domesticity, also entailed
the stark separation of the domestic world of women and the public world of men. Lisa Surridge
argues that this divide contributed to the difficulty of identifying wife abuse among the upperclasses. One of the reasons, indeed, that upper-class Victorians feared the lower-class household,
was that they imagined it to be a space where numerous people lived and worked in shared
spaces, where economic pressure meant that the divisions of upper-class family life could not be
upheld.
According to Surridge and Rintoul, this is one reason why social reformers identified the
abuse of women as a problem within the lower-classes but failed to do so among the upperclasses. Rintoul describes a culture that was extremely “anxi[ous] about the nature and effects of
exposure” and ardently committed to “protecting the distinction between public and private

48
See Marcus, Between Women, Robson, Men in Wonderland, and Rintoul, Intimate Violence. As detailed by
Robson in Men in Wonderland, the coded eroticism of the periodical press’s accounts of sexual violence would
merge with the culture’s eroticization of the little girl in W.D. Stead’s The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon.
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life”(1). Further complicating this fear was the Victorian sensitivity to “what [the culture]
identified as the negative effects of language, particularly where women and children were
concerned” (Stevenson 234). Though social reform movements hoped to utilize sensationalist
press accounts of sexual abuse to drum up political will for reform, many feared that the dangers
of representing such abuses outweighed the benefits of exposing them. Lewis Carroll famously
articulated this sentiment when he wrote an open letter to the St. James Gazette in 1885 in
response to “The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon.” In what many biographers now regard as
an embarrassing projection of his own sexual guilt, Carroll argues that Stead’s account will
foment prurient desires in respectable people, rather than enrage them into taking action against
such crimes.49 By this account, any explication of sexual violence has the paradoxical effect of
increasing its likelihood.
Marlene Tromp’s influential account holds that it is not that intimate violence cannot be
represented by Victorian novelists, but that it must aesthetically go underground in order to be
represented. Following Helena Michie’s account of the metaphorical displacement of
representations of women’s bodies in Victorian fiction, Tromp argues that depictions of marital
violence are displaced into the genre fiction of the period. Novelists used the sensational register
in order to describe forms of violence that were “eschewed in what was considered moral,
didactive high literature” (Tromp 3). The surreptitious political agenda of sensation fiction is
thus to intervene in the “midst of [the culture’s] growing concern about codes of behavior in
marriage” without every appearing to do so (3). Similarly, Nancy Henry’s provocative essay
“The Romola Code,” reveals the novel’s subtle intervention in debates about sex between men.
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There may well have been topics which the majority of Victorian novelists would not
describe explicitly, though I want to resist the temptation to treat this claim as obvious, because
to do so requires a paranoid/symptomatic approach, the necessity of which I want to denaturalize. As Sedgwick and Marcus argue, paranoid/symptomatic reading simultaneously
pathologizes and privileges concealment, locating Truth in whatever looks to us like it has been
hidden. It is easy to be a paranoid reader of Victorian literature, precisely because “the
respectability imperative [which] permeated…Victorian society” reads to us as an elaborate
concealment (Stevenson “Crimes of Moral Outrage” 233).
But what if Victorian euphemisms for sexual and intimate violence were not so much
repressive as decorative? That is, what if they never actually concealed or denied the reality that
sexual violence was a widespread social problem, but rather served to package those realities in
socially acceptable terms? As Marcus points out with regard to female marriage, we modern
readers are likely to assume that Victorians in same-sex romances felt compelled to hide that
fact, but the historical record shows that this was not necessarily true. As a corrective to a
symptomatic form of reading which can lead us into the anachronistic projection of our own
culture on the text, Marcus (with Stephen Best) proposes the concept of “surface reading,” which
privileges what is “evident, perceptible, [and] apprehensible in texts,” treating the text’s surface
as “what insists on being looked at rather than” what might be “see[n] through (9). Nineteenthcentury scholars seem particularly interested in the question of whether a text’s representations
are explicit or coded (and thus necessitate either surface or suspicious/symptomatic reading
practices), but I would argue that this preoccupation is misplaced (or at least that our conviction
that this question specially relates to Victorian literature is misplaced). All literature of previous
eras and even much of our own is remote to us in various ways; our euphemisms for sex will
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sound as strange to future generations as those of the Victorians do to us.50 Thus, my
methodology here has been to ‘just historicize,’ or to put it in even less critically-loaded terms,
‘just contextualize.’
I’m less interested in establishing whether Victorian sexual violence is represented
explicitly or implicitly, as it seems to me that these terms are so historically contingent as to
almost be rendered meaningless. It is not an insight to say that a representation which may have
seemed graphically explicit to a Victorian reader—whether it employed metaphor or not—may
seem implicit and coded to a modern one. Thus rather than establishing a code through which to
read Victorian sexual violence, I take it on faith that representations of sexual violence were
evident to Victorian readers, and only seek to reveal those to contemporary readers (and also to
mark places where we post-Freudians read implications that Victorian readers might not
have). Here even the term “coded” is misleading, because what seems a code to us was very
likely a clear representational system to them. As Kim Stevenson argues, though the Victorian
papers which reported on cases of sexual assault used “anodyne language…to disguise the
precise nature of the assault committed…it is evident that…the recipient audience, …clearly
understood and decoded” these representations (“Crimes of Moral Outrage” 233). My reading of
Trollope’s novels relies on the conviction that what appears coded and mysterious to modern
readers was probably easily recognized as sexual violence by Trollope’s early readers, a claim I
make by contextualizing the Victorian discourse around such violence.

II. Just Contextualize
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England has a long history of ambivalence about the possibility that a man can rape his
wife. Amazingly enough, it was only in 1990 that the country officially reversed its infamous
‘Marital Rape Exemption’, which declared that it was simply impossible for a man to rape his
wife because consenting to marriage meant that one had consented to all future sexual contact.51
This issue had been vexing British culture for far longer than the late date of the MRE’s reversal
would suggest, however, and the specter of sexual cruelty—almost never explicitly named but
always implied—haunts Victorian Divorce Court cases and Victorian novels (especially genre
fiction, as Tromp has argued, but also realist novels). Indeed, during the period in which
Anthony Trollope was writing, English courts significantly broadened their understanding of the
behavior that constituted grounds for divorce to an acknowledgement that forced sex in a failing
marriage could be unjust, immoral, and even illegal. Unsurprisingly, British realist fiction of the
period reflected the anxieties provoked by these changes.
The last major revision of English legal precedence regarding divorce had occurred in
1790 with Evans v. Evans, a ruling which found that “bodily injury that was ‘menaced’ [by a
husband was on] equal footing to that which was ‘actual’” (Dowling 325).52 In other words, a
woman whose husband threatened to physically injure her was as capable of acquiring legal
separation (significantly not what would later come to be termed “absolute divorce”) as one
whose husband had done her physical harm. This new precedent certainly widened (at least
legal) protections for women, but it also opened a paradox: what happens when your husband
threatens to kill you unless you submit to sex with him? In such a case, he might be legally
51

See Hasday, “Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape,” Ryan, “The Sex Right: A Legal History of
the Marital Rape Exemption,” and “To Have and to Hold: the Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth
Amendment,” Harvard Law Review, vol. 99, no. 6, 1986, pp. 1255-1273.
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According to Andrew Dowling, it was with this case that “a consideration of ‘mental feelings’ … entered into
official legal discourse” (325). This posed a new problem, though, since mental feelings can only be deduced
through words or actions: such menace “could only be expressed through words that obviously threatened ‘bodily
injury’” (325).
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responsible for ‘menacing’ you but not for raping you, since in consenting to marriage you had
consented to sexual contact.53 It was a cultural and legal expectation that women submit to sex
with their husbands; indeed, husbands in ‘failing’ marriages were often encouraged to try to
make the relationship ‘succeed’ through forced or at least coerced sex.54 It was not till 1870 that
legal precedent changed again dramatically, when Kelly v Kelly “established for the first time
that to find cruelty it was not necessary to find [or threaten] physical violence” (Dowling 326).
In the century between Evans v. Evans and Kelly v. Kelly, the standard for what amounted
to legal “cruelty” evolved, as judges increasingly began to recognize that a husband might be
legally cruel if the demands he made on his wife were unreasonable. Thus divorce court judges
transitioned from treating husbands as unquestionable patriarchs to (somewhat) more frequently
interrogating their behavior and mental stability. (Trollope’s 1869 novel He Knew He Was Right
deals with this question of husbandly mental instability). A “reasonable” husband was
increasingly defined as a husband who exhibited restraint when it came to the exercise of his
patriarchal powers. According to A. James Hammerton, this was “a man who was unwilling to
exercise powers that remained his by right,” like forcing his wife to have sex with him (270).
A decade before Kelly v. Kelly, the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 had recognized the
necessity of absolute divorce (as opposed to the legal separation which had previously been
offered), but only men could divorce on grounds of adultery alone. Women seeking divorce had
to prove “adultery plus a compounding offense such as cruelty, desertion, incest, or bigamy”
(Hammerton 271). As “more and more wives brought [the complaint of cruelty] before the
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Preventing rape in marriage seems to be one reason why literary commentators spanning back to Richardson
regularly cautioned parents against forcing children to marry against their wishes. Since the woman was later to
unilaterally consent, it was thought that she should not be ‘forced into a marriage she didn’t like.’ Over time that
phrase itself became a euphemism for sexual repulsion.
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This expectation plays a part in a turn of the century novel, Galsworthy’s The Man of Property (1906), which
explicitly depicts a husband raping his wife in an ostensible bid to ‘save’ their marriage.
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courts,” the term ‘cruelty’ itself became a byword for a number of husbandly crimes which were
not accommodated by the more distinct categories of “desertion, incest, or bigamy” (Dowling
326; Hammerton 271). In this period, “cruelty” very often came to mean abuse which was
sustained—rather than temporally discreet—and sexual.
As Doreen Thierauf points out in a recent essay on Daniel Deronda, novelists writing
during this period of marriage reform were keenly aware of contemporary debates about both the
dangers of marital rape and the legal quandary in which women who were victims found
themselves. Of Deronda, a novel which takes place “within the pre-1870 [Kelly v. Kelly] legal
context,” Thierauf points out that “Grandcourt’s careful abstention from non-sexual physical
violence” means that Gwendolyn cannot “accuse him of a legal crime” (252). Similarly, Heather
Nelson points out that sexual violence was, in Victorian marriages before Kelly v. Kelly, in some
sense ‘consensual,’ since when women consented to marriage they were consenting to sex for
life. Before the establishment of divorce courts, separations, annulments, and divorces were
managed by ecclesiastical courts which generally “equate[d] legal cruelty with extreme [acts of]
violence” (Hammerton 273). This could mean anything from “a series of life-threatening violent
acts including blows that would endangers the wife’s life,” to forced sex while the husband was
suffering from venereal disease, the denial of needed doctor’s services, and verbal abuse, but as
Junko Akamatsu shows, such courts were generally much more interested in the plaintiff’s
ability to prove “adultery” than “cruelty” (Akamatsu 22; 28-29). Thus as Akamatsu
demonstrates, female plaintiffs often strategically used the charge of “cruelty” to strengthen their
accusations of adultery. One important difference between the eighteenth-century courts and
those of the nineteenth-century is the increasing use of “cruelty” as a descriptor of behavior that
was sustained over time, rather than as discreet “violent acts” (Hammerton 273). Victorian courts
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were more likely to treat cruelty as a state of being, rather than as an (or a series of) time-bound
events. For instance, nineteenth-century complains of cruelty might sound more like: ‘my
husband berates me in front of my children, and regularly uses me violently,’ as opposed to
eighteenth-century complaints, which were more likely to be constructed as: ‘my husband flew at
me on three particular occasions’). Even early nineteenth-century legal courts treated divorce
cases as “mere domestic quarrels” which rarely warranted the attention of the court, while midand late-Victorian courts treated accusations of “cruelty” in marriage as a far more serious crime
(Hammerton 273).
Despite the increasing recognition that sustained abuse took place in marriages, however,
the law continued to endorse a patriarchal view of marriage, within which husbands were
justified in correcting their wives’ disobedience. Any refusal of compliance on the part of a wife
might be seen as just cause for a husband’s anger (and occasional violence). This lead to what
Hammerton calls “ritualized sexual antagonism” between married couples, in which husbands
“went to extreme lengths to enforce obedience from their wives” (276). In the case of Curtis v.
Curtis (1858), for instance, though Curtis had stopped beating his wife (as he had done earlier in
their marriage), he was found to be legally cruel because he emotionally and mentally abused her
by humiliating her in front of her children and servants, refused to allow her to see guests, and
demanded many times a day that she ask for his forgiveness (Hammerton 285-287). In such
cases, the question before judges increasingly became one of a husband’s reasonableness; while
his right to patriarchal authority was not questioned, his abilities and qualifications as a patriarch
might be. A husband who was sexually demanding without providing his wife with the material
necessities of middle-class life, for instance, might be deemed legally ‘unreasonable.’ Victorian
husbands who felt they had a right and indeed a responsibility to be patriarchs might often feel
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provoked by a wife’s refusal of submission, in both matters great and small. Post-mid-century,
courts increasingly weighed in on the appropriateness of these husbandly demands. If he was
found to be unreasonably expressing his patriarchal imperative, then the court often sided with
the wife (see Hammerton 277).
Another element of the evolving conception of the marital cruelty was the nineteenthcentury legal recognition that such cruelty produced harm to its victims. In the precedent-setting
case of Kelly v. Kelly, “it was not the nature of James Kelly’s actions—physically nonviolent—
that was important but their consequences, and that judgement was what constituted the legal
importance of the case as a landmark for the concept of matrimonial cruelty” (Hammerton 288).
Though he didn’t beat his wife, James Kelly was found to have produced an “injury to [her]
health” through mental cruelty (qtd. in Dowling 327). As Dowling puts it, Kelly v. Kelly
established “‘injury to health’ as a physical fact; mental cruelty was admitted, but it had to have
physical symptoms” (327). Though the requirement that plaintiffs present the physical
manifestations of mental abuse surely posed a hindrance to prosecution in some cases, it also
offered a surprisingly contemporary rubric for determining whether abuse had occurred in
centering harm to the victim as a key marker of the crime.
In both Curtis v. Curtis and Kelly v. Kelly, the presiding justices seemed most offended
by the husband’s failure to recognize his wife’s deserved position in the home and society. For
Joanna Bourke, however, the existence of the Martial Rape Exemption is proof enough that
wives used “evidence of physical assault to [legally] punish sexually abusive husbands” (421).
Because “forced sex was legal,” plaintiffs recurred “to the law of assault and battery” instead
(421). Bourke argues that mid-century feminists and evolutionary theorists offered two potent
challenges to the legality of marital rape. The first, made by feminists, compared wives to slaves,

113

“ty[ing the debate] to broader campaigns against the slavery of African-Americans and against
the white slave trade associated with prostitution” (423). The second saw forced sex within
marriage as beneath the sophistication of human mammals, a degeneracy of “earlier life forms”
(423). As Bourke shows, a tradition of late-century polemical, religious, and conduct-literature
worked to campaign against marital rape, the presence of which proves at the very least that
Victorians were anxious about the issue.55 Thus in the very existence of agitation against marital
rape, Bourke reads the ubiquity of the act. Bourke argues that by the end of the century, though
“marital rape continued to take place, … it was less readily tolerated and significantly more
private—a guilty secret” (427).
In the nineteenth-century periodical press, the term most associated with rape was
“outrage”. As Robin Barrow and Kim Stevenson argue, the press of the period used salacious
accounts of sexual violence as a means of titillation, a discursive strategy which Barrow links to
contemporary pornography which eroticized rape. The term “outrage” was utilized as a synonym
for sexual assault across genres in the period, by newspaper columnists, novelists, and
pornographers, as well as by the law. Because martial rape was not a crime according to the law,
it does not appear frequently in divorce records via the language of the “outrage.” When
newspapers wanted to write of domestic abuse, they called it “wife torture,” often reporting with
sadistic glee on new species of “the gay science of wife torture,” such as the case of a man who
trapped his wife and then set a vicious dog on her or the man who put his “wife’s legs on a coke
fire” (The Birmingham Daily Post 27 September 1871; The Belfast News-Letter 30 June 1854).56
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Bourke makes reference to many contemporary texts which militate against marital rape, including B.O. Flower’s
poem “Prostitution in the Marriage Bond” (1895), in which the author describes wives as “adult doll[s]” who are
“captured…[in the] savage grips” of their husbands and “stripped…as slave[s]” (59), as well as Mona Caird’s The
Morality of Marriage and Other Essays on the Status and Destiny of Women (1897) and Nicholas Francis Cooke’s
1890 religious tract, “Satan in Society.”
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The Birmingham Daily Post commented wryly on the lightness of perpetrator’s sentence, as well as on the reality
that his brief incarceration would protect his wife “from a repetition of her painful experiment, if she survives it, for
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As Frances Power Cobbe memorably pointed out in her 1878 essay “Wife Torture in England,”
middle-class people were likely to “read of the beatings, burnings, kicking, and ‘cloggings’ of
poor women well-nigh every morning in their newspapers without once setting their teeth and
saying, “This must be stopped” (56)!
In their accounts of divorce proceedings, which first brought marital discord among the
upper-classes into general view, both periodicals and legal records generally marked sexual
violation through allusion and displacement. Though the occasional report referenced husbands
“outraging the delicate susceptibilities of [their] cultured lad[ies] by every means of assault,”
most treated the matter more elliptically (The Pall Mall Gazette 5 Dec. 1890). As James
Hammerton puts it,
The fact that so many assaults [reported in divorce records] were described as having
taken place in bed, with no explanation of precipitating arguments, suggests an obvious
sexual battleground, where women might resist but run a high risk of becoming physical
victims…Much the same applies to similar charges of husbands’ breaking down doors to
force their wives to return to their own bed after they had sought refuge with a relative.
(Cruelty 164-165)
In such accounts, women report husbands who “rus[h] upstairs and [break] down” bedroom
doors, (The Dundee Courier 24 Nov. 1858). They tell of needing to restrict their movements to
the “kitchen” and sleep in “the servant’s room” in order to avoid their husband’s violence
(Dundee Courier). There are sexually suggestive accounts of physical abuse, such as one in
which a wife lists among her husband’s abuses that he has “bit her lips and pulled her nose,

a period of twelve months, at the insignificant risk of starvation or the workhouse, in the absence of her lawful
breadwinner and protector. Such are some of the prizes in the marriage lottery. Ladies, who will speculate?” (27
Sept. 1871)
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saying that he would wring it off her face” and another in which a wife is found to be suffering
from a “pelvic abscess” which leads the justice to declare her suit “a bad case of cruelty” (The
Manchester Times 5 May 1860; Leicester Chronicle 10 May 1890). They report verbal abuses
which clearly connote attempts at sexual degradation as well as make reference to sexually lewd
and abusive acts. One wife reports that her husband called her a “dirty slut,” as well as a number
of other names which the reporter refuses to repeat (Dundee Courier). Another employs the
contemporary rhetorical codes of sexual violence to make reference to the abuses she has
suffered: his abuse was “gross and systematic,” behavior which included “striking her and
abusing her in the grossest manner” (Manchester Times). “‘Gross’, in Victorian parlance”
explains Rosemarie Morgan, “denoted, with an aspect of vulgarity, sexual luxuriance” (166).
Thus when accusers utilized the term, they were pointing out that their husbands went far beyond
the appropriate sexual usage of their wives. Others utilize the language of the “outrage” to
describe other, sexually suggestive but indistinctly defined abuses. For instance, one judge
chastises a plaintiff’s “conduct when his wife was ill, in refusing to allow her to take her child to
the south with her, [as] an outrage” (Dundee Courier & Argus 2 March 1895). In his declaration
that “a husband in a case of illness was bound to make some sacrifices,” this judge draws on
contemporary discourses of masculine restraint in response to female fragility.
Victorian women bringing charges of cruelty also represented the sexual violence to
which they were subject through displacement. As Victoria Bates has shown, complainants in
Victorian rape cases often described themselves as having been rendered “insensible” by the
violence to which they were subject (458). Some outright fainted in the courtroom when giving
testimony of their assaults. Similarly, Joanna Bourke argues that unconsciousness can often be
read as a sign of a sexual trauma too terrible to name, while Marlene Tromp and Doreen Thierauf
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have shown that we can often read female ‘hysteria’ as a mark of such trauma.57 Perhaps it is
more accurate, then, to say that charges of martial cruelty, given the normative conditions of
marriage in the period, almost always connoted some form of sexual violation or abuse (whether
completed or threatened).
The separation of Euphemia Chalmers Gray and John Ruskin provides us another
window into the reality that marital rape was not only common in the Victorian era, but that the
culture recognized marital “cruelty” as a euphemism for sexual violence. As one of the very few
separations in the century which involved a public accusation of sexual cruelty, though cruelty of
an unusual kind, this case is the exception that proves the rule. The history of and scandal
caused by Gray and Ruskin’s failed marriage testifies to the sexual culture of mid-Victorian
England, in which middle-class people saw regular sex as a feature of normative marriage. This
case—the separation of John Ruskin and Euphemia (“Effie”) Gray, —though not a divorce but
an annulment—was one of the most discussed and scandalous separations of the period. While
historians are divided on the truth of the famous legend about the cause of the separation (that
Ruskin found Effie’s pubic hair so revolting that he refused to consummate their marriage), most
agree that by 1853 both John and Effie were yearning for a separation from one another. When
John wrote to his father in 1853 of his marital disappointments, he made reference to having
recently read Thackery’s The Newcomes and wrote that the novel had “forc[ed]” a “grievous”
realization on him: “the utter unchangeableness of people” (qtd. in Hilton 195). In the same
letter he writes wistfully of the love stories of Richardson and Edgeworth, favorites of his youth,
wishing that he had realized sooner that their novels’ fictional paragons were just that—fictions.
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See Bourke, “Sexual Violence,” Tromp, The Private Rod, and Thierauf, “Tending to Old Stories.”
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By the time she was contemplating separating from John, Effie viewed herself as a victim
of John’s ‘cruelty.’ In the letter to her father which begged him to help her get the marriage
annulled, she focused on John’s cruelty as constituted by his refusal to have sex with her. By her
account, he had denied her of a family and a settled place in society by doing so. She recounted
her experience of his verbal abuse, his gas-lighting, and her belief that he had tried to entrap her
in an adulterous affair for which he could divorce her. Despite all this, however, by her own
account, the greatest cruelty that she suffered at his hands was that she is denied sexual contact,
not that he was cruelly sexual. Her friend and supporter Lady Eastlake would write a scathing
review of Ruskin’s work for the Quarterly Review in 1856, (only a year after the annulment) in
which she accused Ruskin of intellectual and moral failings that tracked with her perception of
his marital cruelty. The review faults Ruskin for his emotional coldness, “his insults to all who
are most sensitive,” and implicitly refers to the charge of impotence that had been made against
him during the annulment trial by calling him “premature[ly] old” (Broomfield 85). She even
goes so far as to write that “art is a thing which… appeals more to the heart, the seat of emotion,
than to the head, the seat of thought, and is, therefore, more dreamt and raved about than
reasoned about” (Broomfield 85). The anatomical double-entendre (“seat”) is contrived to
suggest the living, breathing, desiring body: the very thing which Ruskin had supposedly
rejected in his wife.
Apparently, the Ruskin/Gray annulment was the scandal of the 1854 season. If Millais’s
account is to be trusted (and he was hardly an impartial observer), “all London [was]…in arms
over the affair” (Boserwell Collection, MA 1338). What concerns me is not what actually
happened between Ruskin and Gray, but rather the way the Gray camp (which included Effie,
her lawyer father, Lady Eastlake, and Millais) argued Effie’s case by accusing Ruskin of cruelty
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that was sexual, but not of sexual cruelty. For me this strategy suggests the strange position
which sexual cruelty occupied in Victorian divorce discourse. The Grays were able to accuse
Ruskin of cruelty that was sexual because that cruelty was constituted by the absence of
sex. Had Ruskin been sexually abusive to his wife, he would have merely been accused of
cruelty, and jurists would have had to infer the rest. This suggests that among the class of people
about whom Trollope wrote, “cruelty” was a capacious term which implied sexual coercion or
violence.

III. Sexual Cruelty and Violence in the Novels of Anthony Trollope
A surprisingly small amount of criticism has been devoted to Trollope’s representation of
violence against women, despite the multitude of references to such violence throughout his
oeuvre. By “violence against women” I simply mean male power that hurts women, which
Trollope depicts as endemic to the fictional worlds he describes. Numerous examples of such
violence—both large and small—appear in his canon. Dr. Thorne begins with the titular
character’s brother drugging and raping a lower-class young woman who then bears his child,
Mary Thorne. In that novel, Roger Scatcherd drunkenly abuses his wife, and his son Louis
follows his example, frightening his mother with his violence and making unwanted sexual
overtures to Mary Thorne. And yet Dr. Thorne is also keen to register the smaller ways in which
the gendered social order hurts women, as in its representation of Frank Gresham as “rather a
despot to his sisters” (115). Barchester Towers features Signora Neroni, who prior to the start of
the novel has been disabled by a fall occasioned by her husband’s violence. A side plot of The
Eustace Diamonds revolves around Lucinda Roanoke’s passionate disgust for her intended
husband, which ultimately drives her insane. As Lisa Surridge has argued, Trollope’s depiction
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of Louis Trevelyan in He Knew He Was Right, engages with contemporary divorce reform by
“unambiguously depict[ing] [a] husband’s false accusation of adultery as constituting
psychological violence within a marriage” (166). Earl de Courcy, a minor but structurally
important character in the Barset series, emotionally abuses his wife so severely that the proud
woman ultimately leaves him. The entitlement of male characters and the ease with which that
entitlement becomes abuse is not so much a theme in Trollope as a ubiquitous context, a
backdrop which almost all of his novels share.
In the rest of this chapter I will argue that Trollope’s engages with the specter of sexual
cruelty and thus violence both by depicting such violence as a ubiquitous experience of women
and by a exerting narrative force on certain characters that replicates this violence. I begin with
an examination of Trollope’s satirical condition of England novel, The Way We Live Now (1875),
and then move to look at particular moments in a few other novels, including Can You Forgive
Her? (1864), The Small House at Allington (1862), and The Last Chronicle of Barset (1867).
Trollope’s career-long interest in representing violence against women has quite remarkably
gone almost completely unstudied.58
The Way We Live Now treats violence against women as a constitutive element of the
condition of England that it seeks to criticize. As Monika Smith puts it, “a significant proportion
of female characters in The Way We Live Now have not only been socially and economically
dispossessed, but subjected to physical assault” (19). These characters include Lady Carbury,
Ruby Ruggles, Marie Melmotte, and Mrs. Hurtle (the very different class and social positions of
these characters is reflective of Trollope’s sense of the pervasiveness of such violence). In
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particular, women in this novel (and in Trollope’s canon in general) are subjected to violence
when they refuse their consent to have their assets used against them by their male relatives
(Lady Carbury and Marie Melmotte), when they refuse to consent to a guardian-sanctioned
marriage (Marie Melmotte and Ruby Ruggles), or when they refuse a sexual overture (Ruby
Ruggles and Mrs. Hurtle). There are also the many forms of emotional abuse against women that
the novel depicts. There is Lord Nidderdale, whose female relatives find it “for the most
part,…impossible to live with him,” thanks to the “very cross” and “most disagreeable words” he
regularly speaks to them (641). There is Marie Melmotte, whose whole personality is shaped by
the fact that “she had never known” “tenderness, care, [or] real solicitude for her well-being,”
and thus “had come to regard the unevenness of her life, vacillating between knocks and knickknacks, with a blow one day and a jewel the next, as the condition of things which was natural to
her” (693-4). Her father “vacilla[tes]” between hitting her and rewarding her with presents when
either suits him. There is Georgiana Longstaffe, whose family refuses to speak to her when she
consents to a marriage of which they do not approve. There is Hetta Carbury, who because of her
brother’s reckless spending faces a choice between poverty and an unwelcome marriage. There is
Madame Melmotte, who is represented as a victim of various kinds of domestic violence,
including economic endangerment, emotional abuse, and physical assault. When her husband
dies we read that she is shocked, but not pained by his death, as “the man … had been her
merciless tyrant for years, …a very incarnation of cruel power” (693).
That women characters must submit to the wills of their male relations is “rigorously
inculcated, rigorously coerced, or when, the effects of socialization and the pressures of
intimidation fail, enforced by violent means” in the novel (Smith 19).59 For example, the novel’s
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repeated again and again in the ‘now’ of the novel’s title” (19).
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first few pages depict Lady Carbury being unwillingly kissed by a man whom she knows can
help her career. Though we read that “she would have preferred not to have been kissed…what
did it matter” (10)? Here Lady Carbury’s strangely dissociative response is represented as, from
her point of view, merely pragmatic. As the narrator reports, ventriloquizing her thoughts, it is
just a function of her position as a lady of slim economic means and without the protection of a
husband: “when struggles have to be made and hard work done, there will be little accidents. The
lady who uses a street cab must encounter mud and dust which her richer neighbor, who has a
private carriage, will escape” (10).
The next chapter explains Lady Carbury’s traumatic personal history, and its portrait of
gender relations will lay the groundwork for much of what will come in the novel (as well as
explain what has already happened). The widow of a man who abused her so severely that she
eventually left him, Lady Carbury has ample reason to believe that her desires don’t matter (“she
would have preferred not to have been kissed…[but] what did it matter?”). Her husband was
sexually jealous and she had been “scolded, watched, beaten, and sworn at by [him] till she was
at last driven out of her house by the violence of his ill-usage” (17). When she leaves, her
husband and his friends “slander” her with unfounded rumors of her infidelity and though she
ultimately returns to him her “name …for the remainder of her life [is] unjustly tarnished”
(15;17).60 The crowning indignity is that her return to her husband is perceived by the world at
large as an admission of her guilt, rather than his: “people were never tired of reminding others
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that [she] had run away from her husband, and had been taken back again by the kind-hearted old
gentleman” (17).
In the passage which describes the history of Lady Carbury’s marriage, the narrator
repeatedly seeks to defend Lady Carbury by declaring that she had “done her duty” to her
husband. Though she did not marry for love she “had understood her position and had
determined to do her duty,” and she had “endeavored to do her duty, knowing that in accepting
her position she was bound to take the good and bad together” (16; 17). The exact phrase
appears four times in less than three pages, a repetition which suggests Trollope’s attempt to
capture a snippet of Lady Carbury’s voice in the narration. Here the free indirect discourse
suggests her sense of having been betrayed by a contract her side of which she had fulfilled:
though she had done her duty to her husband (that is, had sex with him, been faithful to him, had
his children, and obeyed him), she is abused, defamed, and ultimately left in what she considers
poverty after his death. Throughout the novel Trollope continues to employ the euphemism “do
her duty” to describe the hardships of non-consensual (or unenthusiastically consented-to) sex in
marriage, applying the phrase only to Lady Carbury, Ruby Ruggles (who marries extremely
unenthusiastically), and Henrietta Carbury, as she considers marrying her cousin merely because
of his moral worth (“It might, perhaps, be her duty to give herself to him without loving him, –
because he was so good”). That women characters in the novel feel constrained into sexual
relationships as a function of their ‘duty’ is concerning enough, but with Lady Carbury and Ruby
Ruggles this takes on a doubly dark meaning, since both women are also subject to physical
assault. As the narrator ominously puts it: Lady Carbury “was a woman who could do her duty
and endure without complaint” (38).
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Some readers might dispute my categorization of Lady Carbury’s history as one of rape,
feeling that she had made her own bed, so to speak, by marrying a man she didn’t love for the
sake of a position. As I have already argued, it is worth asking again why we continue to focus
our criticism on adjudicating blame, a habit of mind which usually ends up overemphasizing the
guilt of female characters and underemphasizing that of male characters. We do not know that
Lord Carbury raped his wife (according to our modern definition of the term—by his culture’s
definition, he most certainly did not), but we do know how she felt about his treatment. He hurt
her to the point that she “r[an] from her husband’s house” “almost in fear of her life” (546).61 He
was “abundantly” “cruel” to her (15). If we want to try to imagine these character’s sex lives,
given the world of the novel, we might say that no sex under such conditions can really be
consensual; but as I have already suggested, we don’t need to go that far towards envisioning the
reality of a fictional universe in order to know that Lady Carbury has suffered, and that the
suffering has been sexual. If we treat rape as a theoretical category in which violence is used to
uphold gender inequality, then we can amply see rape in the treatment that she receives from her
husband. Furthermore, if we focus on the meaning of her experience, we can easily identify her
as a victim of serious spousal abuse and intimate violence, a pattern that the novel demonstrates
is “now” recurring in the behavior of her son.62
The novel’s characterization of Lady Carbury also defends her against the charge of
avarice or worldliness in her marital choices, offering us numerous examples which show that,
for women, the ‘choice’ to marry is always conditioned by various social and economic
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pressures. For instance, though Georgiana Longstaffe is far from a favored character in The Way
We Live Now, the narrator earnestly presents the very real predicament she will be in if she
cannot marry: given her brother’s previous behavior to her, her fears of “what would become of
[her] when [her brother] was master of everything” are presented as real and justified. Ruby
Ruggles faces a choice between going into service and marrying John Crumb, and those, like
Roger Carbury, who want her to marry Crumb hope to use the starkness of this comparison to
convince her that she should marry. Though Hetta Carbury never considers marrying her cousin
Roger for the sake of “liv[ing] comfortably,” her mother makes it clear to her that she cannot rely
on her support if she remains unmarried, and Hetta momentarily declares that she will have to
get a job in order to “earn [her] bread” (635). That earning her bread never occurs to Georgiana
Longestaffe is indicative of her lack of character, but also of a society which trains women that
their destinies lie exclusively in marriage. These are just a few of many instances of women
characters who are threatened with a choice between genuine economic and social precarity and
an unwelcome marriage in Trollope’s novels, and they make clear that whatever choice might be
made was, in some sense, hardly a choice at all. Under such circumstances, we might consider
what the difference would be, to a wife in an unwelcome marriage, between sexual violence and
forced sexual compliance? Though the law might recognize a difference between the two, there
would perhaps be little difference to the woman who suffers. And yet in the world about which
Trollope writes, it is only literal physical force which is recognized as shameful on the part of
men; that women should be beholden to men for their economic and literal safety is part of the
explicit design of the social institution of marriage, and it circumscribes the meaning of ‘consent’
to the point that it is almost unrecognizable.
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For instance, late in the novel, Lady Carbury contemplates leaving England to care for
her wastrel son, who is impoverishing and shaming himself and his family in London. Though
she is determined to go, she reflects that “there seemed to be a cruelty in this beyond all the
cruelties that she had hitherto endured,” beyond the cruelty that caused her to run from her
husband (546). That men like Felix Carbury feel a right to depend on the self-sacrifice of their
female relatives is clear in all realms of life; when we know that his mother and sister’s poverty
means nothing to him, we may imagine how little his father concerned himself with the needs or
pleasures of his wife. All the forms of violence that women are subject to are depicted as of a
piece with one another. This is especially true in the case of Felix, who bullies his mother and
sister, tries to rape Ruby, and abandons Marie, but it is also true of many of the other male
characters in the novel, particularly those who are represented in relation to female relatives, like
Melmotte and the Longestaffe men. The continued attention which Trollope pays to the
economic and social precarity of women, and the ways in which men benefit from such
precarity, has the effect of revealing the sexual threat that lies in almost all relationships between
men and women in the world he depicts. This is as true in welcome love scenes as in unwelcome
ones.
For instance, when the dashing and likeable Major Grantley first proposes to Grace
Crawley in The Last Chronicle of Barset, his proposal fails not because she doesn’t love him, but
because she doesn’t think it right to engage herself to him. Her father has been accused of a
serious crime (theft), and the fate of her already impoverished family hangs in the balance of that
accusation. Instead of taking solace in Grantley’s faithfulness, Grace denies herself the pleasure
of an engagement to the man she loves. The pathos of the scene—and even the meaning of her

126

sacrifice—is complicated, however, by the way her would-be lover responds. He “hold[s] her by
the arm,” restraining her from leaving the room. (332). A heated debate ensues:
"What you have said will make me say what I certainly should never have
said without it. I declare that we are engaged."
"No, we are not," said Grace.
"You have told me that you loved me."
"I never told you so."
"There are other ways of speaking than the voice; and I will boast to you,
though to no one else, that you have told me so. I believe you love me. I shall hold myself
as engaged to you, and I shall think you false if I hear that you listen to another man.
Now, good-by, Grace;—my own Grace."
"No, I am not your own," she said, through her tears.
"You are my own, my very own. God bless you, dear, dear, dearest Grace.
You shall hear from me in a day or two, and shall see me as soon as this horrid trial is
over." Then he took her in his arms before she could escape from him, and kissed her
forehead and her lips, while she struggled in his arms. After that he left the room and the
house as quickly as he could, and was seen no more of by the Dales upon that occasion.
(332-3)
Grace and Grantley’s discussion about their feelings for each other quickly becomes a dialogue
on the meaning of consent and the forces which condition it. First, Grantley bypasses Grace’s
explicit non-consent, grabbing her arm and making his declaration. Even the grammatical
structure of his statement “I declare that we are engaged” emphasizes its own absurdity, since the
verb “engaged” demands a plural subject that Grantley’s “I” cannot produce. His justification for
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speaking for her in this way is that she has “told” him that she loves him; when she disputes this
claim, he argues that she has in fact communicated the fact of her love through means other than
“speaking” with her “voice.”63 Thanks to the novel’s narration, the reader, of course, knows that
he is right; Grace is desperately in love with him. Despite this fact, Grantley’s conclusion that he
knows more about her desires than she does (or than she’s willing to say) is troubling. He makes
a series of mental jumps wherein her (assumed) love for him implies her consent to marry him,
and that (assumed) consent negates the need for other forms of consent. Because he believes her
to love him and thus be engaged to him, he has a right to violate the norms of politeness by
calling her his “own Grace,” and kissing her without her consent, “while,” we read, “she
struggled in his arms”.
After Grantley leaves, Grace reflects on the indignity that has been offered to her (I
might say “that she has suffered,” but the question of whether she suffers under his transgression
or enjoys it is one the text leaves open). The next scene finds Grace crying “almost
hysterically…utterly dismayed and frightened by her lover’s impetuosity” (333). We quickly
learn that though she intellectually rebels from it, Grace is already emotionally trapped within
the logic of possession that Grantley has articulated, wherein she becomes his simply by loving
him.64 We learn that she had gone into the meeting with Grantley “especially resolved that she
would not confess to any love for him,” having sensed, it seems, that such a confession would
entitle him to her as a wife (333). She feels both angry and complicit: “Surely she had the power
to refuse the man if she pleased. And yet she felt as she lay there weeping that she did in truth
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That Grantley believes himself capable of speaking for a woman who loves him demonstrates how thoroughly he
accepts the gendered Victorian conception of marriage. A married woman, his behavior suggests, has no need to
speak, because her husband will speak for her.
64
This is also, incidentally, the logic of love which Lily Dale subscribes to, wherein she cannot free herself from
Crosbie simply because he has abandoned her.
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belong to him as part of his goods” (333). Here Trollope’s narrator emphasizes the meaning of
Grace’s love as a material transaction: it is not just that in loving Grantley, Grace belongs to him,
but that she “belong[s] to him as part of his goods.” Had she any money (which she does not),
loving him would transfer that property to him. For women falling in love becomes, in essence, a
transaction in which goods are transferred. This happens without the consent of the giver, who is
herself also the object given. The moment at which she loves—not the moment she consents—is
the moment of transformation, after which her negotiations must turn to contracting marriage
with the man she loves.
And yet, as she ruminates on the “insult” of his kiss without her consent, desire begins
to color her response (333). “She believed that she ought to be very angry with him” and yet she
is touched (and indeed turned on) by his show of physical force, which she quickly translates
into a demonstration of his love for her. It is precisely in the very force that propriety should
protect her from—“he had taken her roughly in his arms,…[and] had forced a kiss from her”—
that his desire is communicated (334). Though he has “done that to her which nothing could
justify,” she reciprocates his desire, and thus the meaning of his transgression is revised (334).
Curiously, however, she does not do this by minimizing his transgression. Rather, she
exaggerates its seriousness, elevating it to a sin: “He could never so sin again, that was certain;
and she would keep all knowledge and memory of the sin for her own purposes” (334). If in the
first half of the sentence we hear Grace echoing the strictures of propriety, the second half takes
a delighted, masturbatory turn: in treating the kiss as a “sin,” Grace has engineered a prohibition
that will continue to kindle her desire, of which she can “keep all knowledge and memory…for
her own purposes.”
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This scene is difficult for a few reasons. For one thing, it explicitly treats sexual
violation as erotic; though we are told that Grace loves Grantly long before this scene, this is the
first moment in the text that finds her actively thinking about, and longing for, that love in its
physical form. It is the prohibition against force—and Grantly’s transgression of that
prohibition—that convinces Grace of the intensity of his love, and it is also that prohibition
which turns her on: “Was it not a thousand pities that she should be driven to deny anything to a
lover who so richly deserved everything that could be given him?” Grace thinks, as she furtively
kisses the spot on her hand where he has kissed her (334). Because he loves her enough to marry
her despite her circumstances, she feels compelled to give him “everything,” and it is only
propriety which restrains her. We read numerous times that Lily Dale feels sexually unrestrained
during her engagement, believing that Crosbie “had then been to her almost as her husband”
(622).65 Grace, by contrast, seems to take gratification in the prohibition of sexual contact she
must hold to if she refuses to become engaged to Grantly.
And yet what looks like an eroticization of sexual violation to modern readers may be
more complex in this scene, and in the novel in general. It seems that for Grace, what is
transgressive—and thus erotic—about Grantley’s behavior is not that he has violated her
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Though the full passage suggests that most girls would not have behaved as Lily did, the narrator seems to find no
fault with her warmth. He attributes Lily’s sexual freedom not to wantonness but to her complete faith in her lover:
He had then been to her almost as her husband. She had trusted him entirely, and had thrown herself into
his arms with full reliance. There is often much reticence on the part of a woman towards a man to whom
she is engaged, something also of shamefacedness occasionally. There exists a shadow of a doubt, at least
of that hesitation which shows that in spite of vows the woman knows that a change may come, and that
provision for such possible steps backward should always be within her reach. But Lily had cast all such
caution to the winds. She had given herself to the man entirely, and had determined that she would sink or
swim, stand or fall, live or die, by him and his truth (622).
Though the implication that “she had given herself to the man entirely” is obviously sexual, it is unclear whether
Trollope intends the reader to imagine that Lily and Crosbie had sex (I would say not, though I can’t prove it).
What’s meaningful here, however, is not whether or not they had sex, but that Lily had consented to him entirely.
Given the way the novel compares their romances, it seems likely, in fact, that Grace—were she able to engage
herself to Grantley—would feel similarly unrestrained.
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personal autonomy, but that he has overridden her consent with enough confidence to “force” a
kiss (334). Though Grace seems to articulate a nascent proto-feminism in her belief that “surely
she had the power to refuse the man if she pleased,” she immediately undermines this idea with
the conviction that nevertheless “she did in truth belong to him as part of his goods” (333). Grace
has a belief, however faint, in her own right to self-determine, but she also has a competing
belief that a desirous woman has always already consented, just by desiring. In a world where
women cannot with propriety truly consent—where showing enthusiastic consent, as we today
call it, would be totally improper—female sexual desire is damning. Grace is trapped within
Grantly’s patriarchal logic before he ever articulates it: it is not just that in loving him she has
transferred to him the ability to speak for her, but that in wanting him, she has irrevocably
consented to all his wishes.
Post-Freudians generally accept the amorality of sexual desire. For Trollope’s women,
by contrast, such desire implies its own morality. Grace feels contractually and morally bound to
Grantly because she desires him. Ironically, desire is so taboo, so mystified, that women who
recognize it, like Grace and Lily, grant it a kind of metaphysical power. Despite wanting to and
believing that she has a right to refuse him, Grace is also convinced of her desire’s meaning,
which is so powerful as to her override her other rights and wishes. As Daniel Wright argues,
among Trollope’s women, “the body trumps logic” (1123). Thus when Grantly overrides her
consent, reinterpreting her clear ‘no’ as a ‘yes’ and “forc[ing]” a kiss, he has in some sense
relieved her of her trouble. Though she believes she should be offended, his force is lent extra
erotic power because it answers her desire without forcing her to acknowledge and act on that
desire, which is coded as unladylike and dangerous. If consenting is unladylike, and women are
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only allowed to express their affirmative consent by withholding their ‘no’, then being forced by
a desired man is erotic because it allows Grace to be sexual without consenting at all.66
If all this makes us slightly more comfortable with Grantly’s “force,” the scene still
evidences a terrifying—and seemingly widely accepted—conviction that a woman’s sexual
desires can a) be faithfully read from her behavior and b) that those desires constitute evidence
of her heart’s truth. As I discuss in my reading of Clarissa, this style of reading desire—which
Clarissa and many other novels present as a dominant mode in the cultures they depict—
severely limits possibilities for women. In resuscitating contra, minority positions on such
questions that have been lost to history, scholars like Katherine Binhammer and Talia Schaffer
have shown that the “nineteenth-century ideal of passive and desexed femininity … [was not] the
inevitable outcome of a gender ideology in flux during the eighteenth century” (Binhammer
860). Binhammer argues, for instance, that Clarissa’s central conflict with her community is
occasioned by her commitment to narrating a plot for herself that refuses to concede that her only
means of self-knowledge is through sexual desire. As her interlocuters (as well as generations of
critics and readers) push her to “betra[y] a [sexual] truth that [she] does not consent to,” Clarissa
constructs her story so as to show that “women’s knowledge is not always reducible to carnality
or the absence of it” (861-2). In Binhammer’s account, this is one of the “modes of knowing”
that the novel entertains, but one which modern readers have trouble recognizing because it
“fail[ed] to become dominant” (861). Similarly, Schaffer argues that historians of the novel have
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Though she does not make this argument explicit, one conclusion suggested by Deborah Lutz’s The Dangerous
Lover, a full-length account of this figure in nineteenth-century literature as well as contemporary erotic fiction, is
that the appeal of overridden consent lies in the way it allows one to “encounter [her] own absence” (ix). As Lutz
writes, “Rilke imagines this aching state: my life without me. This flight from immediacy takes us swiftly
elsewhere—to pure intensity, to abandon, to, irrevocably, the other. The gesture of desire, of yearning, is one of
surrender; it grasps nothingness greedily” (ix). As I hope to show by contextualizing the codes of conduct under
which young women were allowed to consent in the period, this kind of abandonment of the self might have been
one of very few options available to women who wanted to act on their sexual desires. Thus I locate the appeal of
Grace’s fantasy of non-consent in her historical position, rather than in a universal state (like “longing”).
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lost sight of a literary plot that was in active circulation during the second half of the nineteenthcentury, in which marriage is favorably represented as a vocational choice for women. None of
this particularly matters for Grace Crawley, who shares Grantly’s conviction that her sexual
desires unproblematically equate to the truth of her experience. She wants Grantly and feels
convinced that she should be his wife; the hindrances in her way are not internal, but external
(the accusation made against her father). When her father is cleared of this crime, there is no
longer any obstacle in the way, and the narrative brings her sexual truth (her desire for Grantly)
into pleasing symmetry with her reality (they marry). And yet, if desiring a man binds one to
him, it follows that for many women that desire will be experienced as profoundly oppressive or
even counter to their real wishes.67 This mode of reading female desire precludes the possibility
of a woman choosing not to marry despite sexual attraction, or for reasons other than romantic
love, as Trollope’s Can You Forgive Her? shows.
This novel presents us with a heroine who does not want to be defined by her sexual
desires. Though she has experienced romantic love and (it seems) sexual passion, she yearns to
define herself not by that love, but by action in a wider field of social life. Despite ruminating
about who she should marry for hundreds of pages, Alice Vavasor actually always knows quite
clearly what she wants: “what she would wish to do with [her life] if she were a free agent” was
“political maneuvering” (90). Alice is not a radical feminist; we read that she does not believe in
a literal profession for herself or that she should be allowed to vote. Rather, she sees marriage to
a political man as her way of achieving a career. As Schaffer puts it, “Alice’s marriage plans are
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We are encouraged to read the Grantly/Grace proposal scene as one in which the lady’s hesitation is overwrought;
a similar scene occurs later between Lily Dale and Johnny Eames, with the one difference being that in this case we
know (from the narrator) that Lily does not desperately love Johnny. As I shall discuss later in the chapter, the two
scenes present an interesting contrast to one another, since the behavior of the two women characters is identical, but
the way the narrative characterizes that behavior is different.
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indeed motivated by desire,” but this desire is “vocational,” “not erotic” (15). Adding force to
Schaffer’s argument is the fact that the narrative represents Alice’s desire for work through erotic
imagery: “her mind had become filled with some undefined idea of the importance to her of her
own life…she had filled herself, or had been filled by her cousins, with an undefined ambition
that made her restless without giving her any real food for her mind” (89-90). Like Dorothea
Brooke of Middlemarch, her tragedy lies in the ultimate reality that she cannot fulfill her
ambition, or at least not in the way she imagines. Unlike Dorothea, however, Alice’s
reconciliation of her political ambition and her marital future is coerced. The force of her future
husband’s wishes cannot finally be resisted. Though by the end of the novel Alice has conceded
her errors in judgement, Trollope still represents her final acceptance of John Grey as forced.
Why? What does Trollope achieve by disrupting the smooth surface of his conclusion with John
Grey’s force?
Perhaps it would be better to say that Grey ultimately forces Alice not to consent to
marriage, but to stop refusing to consent to it, as the book begins after they are already engaged,
and much of its plot revolves around her attempts to slink out of the engagement. Early in the
novel she asks him not to rush her into an early marriage, arguing that marriage is a far greater
“change in life” for women than for men, and will be even more so for her since her marriage
will entail her leaving London (85). And yet, her rational account of the different situations of
men and women with regard to marriage is undercut by the pathos she later betrays when she
describes her future marriage in ghoulish terms: “I must change everything. It will be to me as
though I were passing through a grave to a new world” (85). It is George Vavasor, Alice’s
dangerous cousin, that the novel generally associates with Lucifer; here, however, we have John
Grey positioned as the repressive Hades who would keep Alice in the underworld. Unlike Grace
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Crawley, who fantasizes about being carried away by the man she loves, Alice truly hesitates
before the threshold of this “change” (86). Here Grey’s force is not pleasurably erotic, but
oppressive and genuinely frightening. Alice tells her fiancé point blank that she fears marriage to
him will “mak[e] her mad” (86).
Later, when Alice tries to end their engagement, Grey fulfills this pathologizing
impulse, treating her as a sick child:
He had purposed to be firm,—to yield to her in nothing, resolving to treat all that she
might say as the hallucination of a sickened imagination,—as the effect of absolute want
of health,—for which some change in her mode of life would be the best cure. She might
bid him begone in what language she would. He knew well that such was her intention.
But he would not allow a word coming from her in such a way to disturb arrangements
made for the happiness of their joint lives. As a loving husband would treat a wife, who,
in some exceptional moment of a melancholy malady, should declare herself unable to
remain longer in her home, so he would treat her. As for accepting what she might as his
dismissal, he would as soon think of taking the fruit-trees from the southern wall because
the sun sometimes shines from the north. He could not treat either his interests or hers so
lightly as that” (94-95).
Grey’s patriarchal logic unfolds with frightening alacrity into a carceral account of marriage for
women. First, he will “yield to her in nothing” because she is sick. Then, because she is sick,
“some change in her mode of life,” the kind which marrying a country gentleman would provide,
is required. He, it seems, is the rest cure which her condition calls for. Next, the narrator
concedes that it is not only concern for her, but concern for himself, that motivates him: he has
already made “arrangements…for the happiness of their joint lives,” which he won’t disrupt.
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Finally, he draws on a social justification for his behavior: wives who “declare [themselves]
unable to remain … in [their] homes” do not deserve anger, but sympathy. Like a child whose
parents indulge her wish to run away from home for a day, a distressed wife must be respected in
her distress (not, that is, in her choices). He will “grant her no such pardon,” and his firmness, he
believes, will cure her (96). The culture’s prohibition on women’s enthusiastic consent is paired,
dangerously, with the assumption that expressed non-consent cannot be taken seriously, whether
because it is proper for women to pretend to refuse at first, or because female ambitions beyond
marriage are coded as deranged. Ultimately, the passage is a case study in the way that male
feelings become enshrined in and as the logic of the cultural order.68
John Grey is tall and physically imposing, made more so, it seems to Alice Vavasor, by
his “beauty” (105). When we read that “it was the beauty of his mouth,—beauty which
comprised firmness within it that made Alice afraid of him” we understand that part of his power
over her lies in her attraction to him; though Grey is persistent—I argue coercive—in his pursuit
of Alice, she is susceptible to that coercion at least partly because it plays on her own desire for
him (105). The problem is not that Alice is desexed but that she is, as Talia Schaffer argues,
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The passage is made even more frightening by the actual history of men in the period institutionalizing wives who
were non-compliant, unhappy, or simply no longer desired. The recent discovery of a letter which details Dickens’s
attempt to institutionalize his unwanted wife after he had started an affair, attests to the reality that even men of
benevolent public character might make use of the numerous structures entrenched in their society to control their
wives. John Bowen, who made the discovery, writes that “we already knew of the existence of a letter in which
Dickens said that his wife suffered from a mental disorder. People had wondered before if he was just suggesting
that or trying to frighten her” (“Letters” 20 Feb 2019). In the recently unearthed letter, Catherine Dickens’s neighbor
Edward Dutton Cook writes that:
[Catherine Dickens] discovered at last that she had outgrown his liking. She had borne ten children and had
lost many of her good looks, was growing old, in fact. He even tried to shut her up in a lunatic asylum, poor
thing! But bad as the law is in regard to proof of insanity he could not quite wrest it to his purpose.
(“Letters” 20 Feb 2019)
See also Elaine Showalter, “Victorian Women and Insanity,” and Andrew Scull, Psychiatry and its Discontents.

136

more desirous of a vocation than she is of marriage. Though her family and friends can’t seem to
understand it (indeed they pathologize it), her attraction to Grey takes a backseat to her
“undefined idea of the importance to her of her own life” (89). What’s more, Alice chafes at the
Victorian ideology which would expect her to submit entirely to her husband. Part of her
attachment to her cousin George lies in her conviction of his failings; somehow, it seems, it
would be easier to submit to man of whom she knows herself to be the better. Though John
Grey’s power arises from his perfection, it is also one of the major sources of Alice’s trepidation.
Like his mouth, his whole self is possessed with a “beauty which comprised firmness,” a
frightening degree of perfection and an implicit (and intimidating) confidence in himself. Alice is
all doubt, having been educated by a misogynist culture. John Grey, on the other hand, is all
confidence.
It is George Vavasor, of course, on whose potential for violence the novel keeps an
obvious watchful eye. As Sharon Marcus has forcefully argued, George embodies the fears
conservatives harbored about reform to marriage law: “he is living proof of the primitive
violence that conservatives warned would result if divorce were to make marriage more like a
contract” (“Contracting” 313). And yet one way that John Grey’s violence operates is through a
comparison to the violence of George Vavasor, which is—unlike that of John—literal,
embodied, and obviously threatening to his female relatives. John doesn’t break anyone’s arm
when he is displeased, but the force of his conviction that Alice must marry him may be just as
frightening, especially given her explicit fear that it will make her “mad,” and his willingness to
pathologize her rejection (86). With totally different manners, John achieves a more thorough
control over the women in his life than the violent George:
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No man could be more gracious in word and manner than John Grey; no man more
chivalrous in his carriage towards a woman; but he always spoke and acted as though
there could be no question that his manner of life was to be adopted, without a word or
thought of doubting, by his wife. When two came together, why should not each yield
something, and each claim something? This she meant to say to him…; but now that he
was with her she could not say it. (27)
This is only one of many moments in which Alice finds that her ability to communicate is
impeded by the force of John’s confidence. As Claire Jarvis point out, Alice tries to control
access to herself in small, symbolic ways throughout the novel, “repeated[ly] threat[ening] to
‘leave the room’ or ‘part’ from those who cross her” (75). “Alice,” she writes, “threatens Kate
and George Vavasor, Lady Glencora, Plantagenet Palliser, and John Grey (among others) with
her removal from their sight” (75). And yet at the end of the book, when John proposes to her
for the final time, Alice feels compelled to follow him despite her reservations. He leads the way
through the city of Lucerne, and we read that Alice “certainly would have gone without question
in any direction that he might have lead her” (537). When he tells her, “We will go in here for a
few minutes…it is the prettiest spot about Lucerne, and we don’t know when we may see it
again,” she silently follows him (537).
The whole scene is suffused with the sense that Alice is awed before John’s power. As
he proposes, she is overwhelmed by the how “accurately” he has “read her heart,” overwhelmed
by his “power” to do so (538). As he grows frustrated with her claim that she can never forgive
herself for jilting him, he uses his body to enforce his arguments: “he got up, and standing before
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her, looked down upon her” (538).69 Following the same logic articulated by Major Grantly in
The Last Chronicle, John makes his final stand in even more oppressive terms:
If you love me, after what has passed, I have a right to demand your hand. My happiness
requires it, and I have a right to expect your compliance. I do demand it. If you love me,
Alice, I tell you that you dare not refuse me. If you do so, you will fail hereafter to
reconcile it to your conscience before God. (539-40)
The chill of the passage arrives most forcefully in the end: “If you love me, … I tell you that you
dare not refuse me.” Though John argues that Alice will be judged by God if she does so, it is
clear that this threat merely displaces his own power over her. He is already assuming the role of
complete patriarch, wherein his word is law; he subscribes, quite obviously, not to the view of
marriage which Alice repeatedly favors—wherein husband and wife are partners—but to a
patriarchal logic in which the father is both King and God in miniature. She will be judged by
him if she jilts him again, which in this case is equivalent to being judged by God (“she had
always felt that to yield to him would be to confess the omnipotence of his power. She knew now
that she must yield to him,—that his power over her was omnipotent”). John’s locution also
bears an unpleasant resemblance to George Vavasor’s words as he grabs his sister’s throat, as if
to strangle her: “Are you prepared to do me that justice? Think before you answer me, for by
G—d, if I cannot have justice among you, I will have revenge” (406). Unlike Kate Vavasor, who
defies her brother at her own peril, Alice shrinks “silent beneath [John’s] gaze, with her eyes
turned upon the tombstones beneath her feet” (540). “Of course,” we read, “she had no choice

69
In a previous scene, Alice has chastised her father for the same strategy of physical intimidation. When he wants
to scold her for consenting to marry George Vavasor, she tells him that it is frightening for him to stand up and look
down at her.
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but to yield. He, possessed of a power and force infinitely greater than hers, had left her with no
alternative but to be happy” (540).
Unlike Grace Crawley, who experiences both frustration and satisfaction at having her
consent overridden, Alice’s ‘happiness’ doesn’t arrive in a rush of tears that is both terrible and
pleasurable. Rather, as the chapter swiftly comes to a close, we are deluged by images of
imprisonment and encroachment. “She was pressed by him,” we read, “as in some countries the
prisoner is pressed by the judge” (540). “Further antagonism to him was impossible” (540). She
finds herself unable to speak, even as she knows she will consent. In her silence, his power—as
yet unembodied—expands into the physical compression of her space and her body:
He stood over her, waiting for her answer. Then slowly he sat down beside her, and
gradually he put his arm round her waist. She shrank back from, back against the
stonework of the embrasure, but she could not shrink away from his grasp. She put up her
hand to impede his, but his hand, like his character and his words, was full of power. It
would not be impeded. (540)
This is, quite clearly, a rape scene. Already trapped within a “stonework…embrasure,” Alice
finds that neither her verbal consent nor any mark of enthusiasm is necessary from her. Unlike
that of George, John’s violence is not spasmodic and unpredictable but measured and inevitable.
But it is still, unmistakably, violence. We only miss the violence of this scene, indeed, when we
refuse to center our readings on the represented experiences of Alice, who remains awestruck
and even paralyzed with fear throughout. In the space of three sentences, we have three images
of him “press[ing]” her and her continued attempts to ‘shrink’ from him. She is represented not
so much as a woman consenting to a wished-for marriage but as a frightened animal in a literal
corner.
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The scene ends with John overriding Alice’s consent entirely through the traditional
metaphor of conquest, which as we have seen harkens back to representations of sexual assault
and romance to antiquity:
“Alice,” he said, as he pressed her close with his arm, “the battles is over
now, and I have won it.”
“You win everything,—always,” she said, whispering to him, as she still
shrank from his embrace.
“In winning you I have won everything.” Then he put his face over hers and
pressed his lips to hers. I wonder whether he was made happier when he knew that no
other touch had profaned those lips since last he had pressed them? (540)
Sharon Marcus has argued that Can You Forgive Her? employs anthropological plots in its
figuration of marriage, rehearsing conservative fears about what might happen if marriage were
allowed to devolve into contract. Indeed we can see here that John’s final ‘taking’ of Alice is a
metaphorical marriage by capture, as described by McClennan in Primitive Marriage (1865). As
Marcus puts it, Can You Forgive Her? rationalizes its ‘capture’ of a would-be autonomous
woman by “graf[ting] violence onto an ethics of guilt and forgiveness” such that “compulsory
marriage becomes a matter of conscience” for Alice (319-320). For Marcus this all tends towards
Trollope’s conservative account of the marriage plot, wherein the hierarchy of patriarchal
marriage is ultimately safer (for women) than the equality of contractual marriage. Marcus
observes that “John’s gentle force comes to seem necessary in order to preserve Trollope’s
conservative ideal of innovation without revolution,” but that the novel also “exposes the
arduous work required to make Alice’s wishes coincide with John’s and the narrator’s” and thus
“does not fully naturalize hierarchical marriage” (320; 324). In the end, because we have spent

141

so much time in Alice’s mind, we are not as reconciled to her marriage as we might be, as we
are, for instance, to the marriage of Marianne Dashwood in Sense and Sensibility. The narrative
closure that the ending purports to effect has shown its seams.
Marcus’s insight into the text’s reliance on anthropological plots of marriage also
elucidates the nature of the discomfort it leaves us with in regard to sex. In his claim that “in
winning you I have won everything,” John echoes the logic of patriarchal marriage, wherein a
woman had consented to all future sexual contact by consenting to marriage. As jurist Matthew
Hale famously wrote, a husband could not rape his wife because, in forming “their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband
which she cannot retract” (Hale, qtd. in Pracher 717). Hale’s articulation of the sexual
implications of marriage contains a paradox, of course, since it simultaneously articulates both a
hierarchical view of marriage (as a bond which can never be broken) and a contractual view of
marriage. (In reality, of course, marriage for much of the Victorian period was essentially a
contract for men and an unbreakable bond for women.) When Alice finally concedes that she has
lost “the battle” to John Grey, she is subscribing to—or is simply overpowered by—his view of
marriage; putting aside her long held belief that marriage is a partnership in which each should
give and take, she accepts (silently, seemingly terrified) that marriage for her will now mean
something else, in which her husband “wins everything” (540). Just as Alice’s verbal consent is
overridden in the proposal scene, her bodily integrity breaks down and becomes, we might say,
part of “the goods” of John Grey (The Last Chronicle 333).
Interestingly enough, for all his primal violence, it is George Vavasor who at least
tacitly respects Alice’s sexual boundaries during their engagement. Trollope pointedly reminds
us of this in the last sentence of the proposal chapter, by remarking that no one had kissed
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Alice’s lips in the time since she and John had last been together. In fact when George “come[s]
to her” as an “accepted lover,” Alice is “panic-stricken,” associating his desire to show her
“affection” with “peril.” It quickly becomes clear that she has conceived of her engagement to
George as a vocational partnership which “absolutely forbade…[the] symptom[s] of young love”
to the degree that she conceives of his visit as a “cruelty not to be forgiven” (247). Here too, she
finds herself struggling to speak, uncomfortably physically enclosed: he “clenched [her hand]
within his own, and she felt that she was his prisoner” (247). And yet, though it leads to a fight,
George understands her behavior. He can see and interpret that she “shrink[s] from [him] with
palpable bodily suffering” (249). He is “struck … forcibly” by the “very sad” “tone of her
voice,” and grows angry when he realizes that he has not actually won her affection back from
John Grey.70 That the narrator is far more alive to Alice’s suffering in this scene than in the final
proposal scene makes sense, since Trollope clearly wants to reconcile us to that marriage and not
to this one. And yet, the reminder of George in the very last sentence of the chapter in which
John Grey ‘claims’ Alice for his wife, suggests a latent discomfort with John’s “gentle force”
(Marcus 320). The novel may well suggest that male power will (or even should) inevitably
overpower women, but if it does so, it never forgets that women have feelings about this process.
In so doing it subtly suggests that compulsory heterosexuality must necessarily be attended by
sexual violence. In other words, Alice will experience the violence of a force that constrains and
overrides her agency no matter who she marries; the work of the novel is in getting her married
to the man whose love she is frightened to accept rather than whose physical “caresses” repulse
her (263).

70
This reading should not be mistaken for a defense of George, who is certainly inclined to use his masculine power
for sadism, and who declares to himself that he will “punish” Alice for her coldness to him once they are married, by
hurting her in some way that would then be protected by law (raping her, imprisoning her, beating her, etc).
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Conclusion: Compulsory marriage, sexual violence, and narrative closure
If all this is not disturbing enough, Trollope goes further towards his exploration of
structural violence by utilizing what I think of as narrative coercion, wherein all the forces of the
story come to—by the end of the novel—demand a woman character’s consent. For instance, by
the end of Can You Forgive Her? all the novel’s valued characters have come to believe that
John Grey is the right choice for Alice, and all are working in a confederacy against her in
pursuit of achieving the match. When she tells Glencora Palliser that she is being made “very
unhappy” by this pressure, Glencora responds by explaining that this is exactly the point: “I wish
I could break you down with unhappiness…so that he might find you less stiff, and hard, and
unmanageable” (536).71 After learning of Alice’s consent, Glencora tellingly jokes that if Alice
jilts him again she should “join” with their relatives “in putting [Alice] into a madhouse” (536).
By the end of the novel, even Kate Vavasor agrees that Alice should marry John Grey. The
narrator finally describes Alice as “happy, very happy; but … still disposed to regard her lover as
Fate, and her happiness as an enforced necessity” (544). That the novel’s source of
omniscience—its narrator—makes this claim should strike us at lightly comical, since it draws
attention to the narrator’s own ability to dispose of the character as he sees fit. This is one small
example of the strikingly Trollopian version of free indirect discourse that Marcus describes in
the novel, which “strives for the transparency associated with psychological fiction,” while
eschewing the “irony usually attributed” to the practice by “constantly supplement[ing]” the
“seamless ventriloquism of [the] characters’ thoughts with obtrusive narrative comments” (322-

71
Glencora, too, was subject to pressure in her choice of marriage partner, a choice which she never really gets over.
Though she becomes reconciled to her marriage, it’s never an easy relationship, as the rest of the Palliser series
details.
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3). Here we see Alice attributing to Fate what is really her own doing, and the narrator refusing
to concur with her account. (Of course this is made doubly ironic by the fact that we might
consider the narrator as the closest thing to Fate that a psychologically realist novel may
possess.)
Can You Forgive Her? takes the conscription of women into heterosexual marriage as its
topic, constantly making the reader aware of the ways in which its conclusion is occasioned by
this kind of narrative coercion, wherein the novel cannot achieve resolution without a woman
character’s consent. Can You Forgive Her? thus takes narrative coercion as a central problem.
Trollope’s other novels are as deeply invested in narrativizing coercion, if less explicit about it.
In fact, in The Small House at Allington and The Last Chronicle of Barset, for instance, the
reader is conscripted into joining in on the coercion of the woman character in question. If Can
You Forgive Her? forces Alice into marriage, at least it suggests that she marries a man who will
make her happy. As Alice reflects again and again throughout the novel, it is not that she doesn’t
love John Grey, but that she fears living with him as his wife. In the Barset series, by contrast,
we are presented with Lily Dale, a young woman who after being jilted by one lover will not
accept a second, despite the fact that everyone in her community wants her to marry him, her
own belief that she would probably be happier if she were able to marry him, and that narrative
closure seems to demand that she consent. The difference, it seems, is that while Alice loves
John Grey, Lily does not quite love Johnny Eames, at least not the in way she loved Adolphus
Crosbie.
That said, the reader is never quite sure why Lily rejects Johnny, and the narrator
withholds his complete omniscience on the topic, simultaneously keeping pace with Lily’s
changing feelings for both men and reflecting on Lily’s prospects by the “obtrusive narrative
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comments” to which Marcus refers (Marcus 323). For instance, as Johnny tries for the last time
to convince her to marry him, we get a characteristically obtrusive (and withholding) narrator at
a crucial moment:
“Try to say yes,” [said Johnny.] “Look round at me with one look that may only half
mean it;—that may tell me that it shall not positively be no for ever.” I think she almost
tried to turn her face to him; but be that as it may, she kept her eyes steadily fixed upon
the window-pane. (emphasis mine, 906).
“I think she almost tried to turn her face to him,” is a strange phrase when offered by a seemingly
omniscient narrator, precisely because it asserts the perspective—and thus personhood—of the
narrator over his ability to read the minds to which he purports to have access. Strange textual
moments like this one make us reread what we might have previously taken for exposition as
Lily’s free indirect discourse, further complicating our ability to understand Lily’s mind, despite
the ample access we have to it. Individual textual moments suggest psychological truths that are
undone by later narration (which, perhaps paradoxically, has the effect of producing a
psychologically realist account of indecision). “It was simply this,” the narrator informs us, “she
had fallen in love with [Crosbie], and had never fallen in love with [Johnny]” (900)! And yet a
few chapters later the narrator describes her response to his entreaties this way:
Had he not moved her?
I think he had so far moved her now, that she ceased to think of [his flirtations with
another woman]…I think that all his sins on that score were at this moment forgiven him.
He had told her now what to him would be green and beautiful, and she did not find
herself able to disbelieve him. She had banished [the other woman] out of her mind, but
in doing so she had admitted other reminiscences into it. And then,—was she in a
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moment to be talked out of the resolution of years, and was she to give up herself, not
because she loved, but because the man who talked to her talked so well that he deserved
a reward? … A picture of green lovely things could be delicious to her eyes as to his; but
even for such a picture as that the price might be too dear! (908)
Here the narrator initially asserts his own perspective (“I think he had so far moved her…”), only
to pull back into an impersonal, descriptive account of her mental process (“she did not find
herself able to disbelieve him….but… she had admitted other reminiscences” into her mind).
The narrator then recedes again, allowing Lily’s voice to invade his account (“was she in a
moment to be talked out of the resolution of years…?”). These slight narratorial shifts in register
not only depict the vagaries of Lily’s mental experience with regard to John, but they also bely
the narrator’s difficulty in bringing his account of events into accordance with Lily’s own. This
process succeeds in Can You Forgive Her?, even if in the process of doing so the narrative
reveals its own struggles to accomplish closure. But in The Last Chronicle of Barset, Lily Dale
remains unmarried. She cannot be coerced into marriage, even by the narrator himself.
One interesting element of the Lily Dale story is that in the years between the
publication of The Small House at Allington and that of The Last Chronicle of Barset, Trollope
reported receiving large amounts of fan mail which pleaded with him to marry Lily Dale to
Johnny Eames. Though the letters to which he refers do not survive, Trollope claims to “have
been continually honoured with letters, the purpose of which has always been to beg me to marry
Lily Dale to Johnny Eames” (Autobiography 203). Trollope’s autobiography treats the character
of Lily Dale with slight derision, and it is hard to assess how earnest he is being here. That said,
contemporary periodicals do evidence a widespread interest in the fates of the characters among
the reading public. In 1864 Punch printed a satirical mock ‘final exam’ for ladies, which
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included questions meant to skewer womanly reading habits like, “In what way did Lady
Audley’s husband get out of the well, and was that lady justified in putting him in?” and “Name
the intimate friends of Mr. Lovelace, and the relations of Clarissa Harlowe” (87). Among the
fifteen questions readers would have found this: “Whom do you consider Lily Dale ought to
marry?” (87). A review of The Small House from the same year expressed frustration with the
novel’s inability to conclude its marriage plot: “it remains to be seen whether Mr. Trollope will
leave the young lady to the life of single-blessedness to which she herself inclines, or whether
the story which ends so unsatisfactorily is meant to be continued” (“Belles Lettres” 251-2).
Readers certainly were surprised by Trollope’s ultimate unwillingness to unite the
characters. For instance, in 1867, The Light Blue, a student newspaper at Cambridge University,
reviewed the first seven weeks of The Last Chronicle during its serialization, and confidently
declared that though “the ultimate fate of Lily Dale has been a trial to the susceptible hearts of
novel readers…, we trust that now both they, and Lily, and Johnny Eames, will be made happy”
(119). Later in the same year, John Morley would write, in an essay on contemporary literature,
that The Last Chronicle was met with “cries against the injustice of an author who could leave so
charming a heroine in such a pitiful plight” from an “outraged public” (“Studies in Conduct”
190). It seems as if by the end of the decade the case of Lily Dale had become something of a
touchstone with regard to readerly displeasure and a standing joke: Sir Arthur Help’s Realmah
(1868) directs satire at a woman character who finds that she can no longer “be friendly” with
Trollope after he has allowed Lily to “become an old maid” (26).
Indeed, Trollope encourages his readers to react this way through the quality of his
narration. His narrator quite evidently wants Lily to marry Johnny Eames, and the novels are
structured so that as they progress more and more characters join Johnny’s team, and plead his
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case for him with Lily. Like Alice Vavasor, Lily comes to be viewed as obstinate by other
characters, the narrator, and readers. And though the narrative doesn’t ultimately force her to
marry, it also doesn’t seem to quite forgive her for not doing so. Simultaneously Trollope seems
not to forgive the reader for wanting her to marry so badly, despite the elements of the novel’s
construction which encourage that desire. Our final image of Lily seems to arise from both these
frustrations, simultaneously drawing the curtain on Lily’s story and leaving the reader without
perfect clarity:
On the next day Lily Dale went down to the Small House at Allington, and so she
passes out of our sight. I can only ask the reader to believe that she was in earnest, and
express my own opinion, in this last word that I shall ever write respecting her, that she
will live and die as Lily Dale. (911)
The reassertion of the narrator’s personhood—and thus limited range of knowledge—in this final
moment goes further than simply disrupting the expected conclusion of the marriage plot by
refusing to tell us for sure what happens at all. The annoyance which Trollope purports to feel
towards Lily in his autobiography is here quite evident; the narrator seems to be washing his
hands of her, unable to do more than “ask the reader to believe that she was in earnest” (911). In
the end we are left neither with a clear understanding of what—in the fictional world of the
novel—happens to the characters, or what would have been best for them.
The considerable narrative pressure exerted on Lily Dale in order to force her to marry
ultimately fails in these novels. In the novel we began by considering, however, this narrative
force achieves its stated goals in the case of Ruby Ruggles, the lower-class woman who is
beaten, threatened with rape, and ultimately forced to choose between servitude and an
unwelcome marriage. The Way We Live Now figures Ruby’s sexual initiation with John Crumb,
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the man she unwillingly marries, as a necessary education. After one night with her oafish new
husband, she has resolved to try her best to be a good wife, and when we encounter her again a
few months later, she positively declares that she was foolish in her initial refusal. Like Lily,
Ruby had been pressured into her marriage by a multitude of economic and social forces: not
only does her grandfather cast her out of his home for refusing the marriage, but she is also urged
by Roger Carbury, her aunt, and Mrs. Hurtle, all of whom use all their powers to unite her to
John Crumb. The novel makes it quite clear how circumscribed Ruby’s options are in such a
situation, and when Ruby finally concedes to marry John Crumb, she remarks to her aunt that
“there ain’t much to choose between” her abusive grandfather and John Crumb. “What one
says,” she observes, “is all spite, and the other man says nothing at all” (709).72 Interestingly, the
narrator of The Way We Live Now does not withhold his omniscience in this case, never giving
us a moment in which to doubt whether Ruby will or should comply with the force being exerted
on her. Despite her repeated articulations of unwillingness to John Crumb, the narrator never
seems to worry—as he does in the case of Lily Dale—what she will decide.
It thus appears that Trollope is more comfortable with the force which the society he
depicts exerts on lower-class women than on their upper-class counterparts, a conclusion which
we can also draw from the fact that it is Ruby who experiences the most extreme, and the most
frequently represented abuse. The Way We Live Now carefully delineates a variety of forms of
abuse of women, and it does so in harsher terms than Trollope’s earlier novels, but it nonetheless
struggles to imagine a different world. The two women characters who have money but who do
not conform to the English social code of the “lady”—Marie Melmotte and Mrs. Hurtle—are

72
Funnily enough, this is the same complaint which Alexandrina Crosbie, in The Small House at Allington, makes
against her husband, and her justification for ultimately leaving him. Alexandrina’s mother, who is perpetually
verbally abused by her husband Earl de Courcy, can’t understand the complaint.
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dispatched to America at the novel’s conclusion, while Ruby is safest—the novel seems to
think—in a marriage that is respectable, if not based on mutual respect. In their thorough-going
representation of the constriction of women’s choices and the abuses women suffer, and in their
inability to smooth these tensions seamlessly into the marriage plot, Trollope’s novels offer us a
portrait of a world that is not only suffused with, but actually structured on, women’s sexual
subjugation.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Harm
“Was there ever any domination that didn’t appear natural to those who possessed it?”
—John Stuart Mill, On the Subjection of Women (7)
What are the harms of rape? How are those harms similar to the harms of marriage? This
chapter argues that two novels by Thomas Hardy, one early and one late in the span of his career,
respond to these questions. Modern readers are (one hopes) unlikely to think of rape and
marriage as obviously related to one another. Hardy’s first readers, however, were far more
likely to see commonalities between the two, particularly in the ways they might harm women
socially and economically. Through reading Hardy’s 1874 novel Far from the Madding Crowd, I
show that Hardy presents the harms of marriage as continuous with the harms of rape. As the
novel demonstrates, the Victorian institution of marriage was no protection against sexual
violence; in fact, it was likely to make women more vulnerable than ever to such violence. I then
turn to Hardy’s penultimate novel, Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891-2), which takes the harms of
rape as a central concern. Having made his point about the ways in which coverture can act as a
cover for sexual exploitation, Hardy makes a broader point in Tess about the way power relations
of all kinds (male/female, rich/poor, master/servant) simultaneously amplify the harms of rape
and increase its likelihood.
But first, what is “harm”? It is notoriously difficult to define harm, and philosophers have
generally theorized the term only in service of broader arguments. The first sustained articulation
of harm in philosophy and ethics arises, perhaps not coincidentally, from Hardy’s contemporary
John Stuart Mill, who in 1859’s On Liberty, treated harm to others as the one viable reason to
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restrict individual freedom.73 Mill would go on to qualify this account in Utilitarianism (1861),
where he argues that his philosophy, which he also terms “the Greatest Happiness Principle”
“holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, [and] wrong as they
tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (U 10). In outlining this theory, he describes harms
(he also uses the term “injuries”) as produced by the moment at which an individual’s good
becomes hurtful to others: utilitarianism “tolerates and approves…[individual] desires, up to the
point beyond which they would be more injurious to the general happiness than promotive of it”
(U 57). What Mill means by “harm” continues to be disputed by critics, but it is clear that his
notion of harm works in relation to what many today think of as “rights,” which Mill describes as
things “which society ought to defend me in terms of the possession of” (U 80). Mill makes a
further distinction between “harm” and “offense,” arguing essentially that there is a threshold of
harm under which power has no regulatory responsibility: “the acts of an individual may be
hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going the length of
violating any of their constituted rights”(On Liberty 57).
This description of harm would go on to shape standards of legal criminality, as well as
to provide justification for the continued expansion of “the ever-widening circle of liberal
inclusiveness,” which in the Victorian era “could not logically exclude women from liberal
subjecthood [for] much longer” (Psomaides “Plot” 56). And yet to define harm chiefly as the
deprivation of rights is to miss an opportunity to produce a phenomenology of harm. What is
difficult about doing so, of course, is that any such account would necessarily be individualized,
perhaps to the degree that no stable account of “harm” would ever be possible. (This is why, for
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Mill: “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (57).
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instance, the restorative justice movement defines harm in such broad—even vague—terms.)74 In
fact one reason to construe harm as a legal category (i.e. as the deprivation of ‘rights’) is because
to do so universalizes the concept, turning it into something which can be responded to by the
law. Though we may understand that state-mandated punishment doesn’t always (or even
usually) redress harm itself, we are apt to treat such punishment as the best bad option. If we
can’t actually redress harm, then we can at least attempt to prevent it in the future, or dole out a
punishment which does harm to the perpetrator in (theoretically) equal degree to the harm they
have done to others.
This chapter entertains the possibility that harm, in an ethical—not a legal—sense, is a
usefully unstable category, that what constitutes a “harm” in one context and as experienced by
one person may not be harm in another moment to another person. I am not alone in believing
that this is especially true when we consider the harms of rape, since rape is—as I have hoped to
show—a quintessentially subjective experience. (Obviously, all experiences are perceived
subjectively. But the point I want to make here is that rape is an event in which we tend to
recognize the essentially subjective nature of experience far more easily than we do in other
cases, for reasons I have already explained.) It is, as we have seen, an event which is likely to
mean extremely different things to different people (so much so that its status as ‘rape’ is
frequently contested). Similarly, the harm of rape is individualized and context-bound. What
does rape mean, for instance, to a woman who experiences it in a culture that sees rape as a
normative expression of male sexuality? What one historical moment calls “rape” another may
call “bad sex,” and still another call “marriage”. And yet, rape is also seems to be a

74
Theorists of restorative justice generally define “harm” extremely capaciously. The first principle of restorative
justice is usually described as the idea that “crime causes harm and justice should focus on repairing that harm”
(“What is restorative justice?”).
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transhistorical event, which has been ubiquitous throughout almost all human communities.
Harm provides me with a broad umbrella term by which to address events which affect women
in nebulous, often legally illegible ways, as well as those events which are obviously violent,
traumatic, and harmful.
My reading of Hardy suggests that he sought to delineate the harms which intimate
relationships posed to women without privileging either an individual or a world-historical
account of such harms, without, we might say, resolving the tension between the reality that rape
is subjectively experienced and that it is also a real social force. As I will argue, both Far from
the Madding Crowd and Tess of the d’Urbervilles treat sexual violence as an individual,
particularized, historically-specific harm and as a structure of oppression around which women’s
lives have been organized for centuries.

I. Far from the Madding Crowd and the Harms of Marriage: “four heavy gold bracelets and
several lockets and rings.”
Far from the Madding Crowd chronicles the history of Bathsheba Everdene, a capable
young woman who has inherited a large farm from her uncle. In the course of the novel she has
three very different suitors: Gabriel Oak, a down-on-his-luck but talented shepherd, Sergeant
Troy, a seductive and capricious soldier, and Mr. Boldwood, a gentleman farmer, long believed
by their community to be a confirmed bachelor. This early novel of Hardy’s complicates the
marriage plot by adding a third suitor; though Gabriel is always represented as the right man for
Bathsheba, the novel takes pains to depict the very different varieties of wrongness represented
by Troy and Boldwood. It is through Bathsheba’s relationships with these two figures that we
can read the novel’s analysis of harm to women in intimate relationships. As the novel shows,
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wives are harmed not only by their husband’s legally sanctioned violence, but by the legal
structures which organize relationships between the sexes. Indeed, one way to read the novel’s
conclusion is to say that Bathsheba’s other suitors are eliminated because of their likelihood to
do her harm; it is only Gabriel who the novel trusts to wield a husband’s frighteningly expansive
powers without abusing them.
Despite its title, Far from the Madding Crowd positively crowds its heroine with suitors,
all of whom, despite their meaningful differences, desire possession of her. That the generally
lovable Gabriel is not totally excepted from this desire speaks to Hardy’s sense of the way
gender and culture work together to shape human behavior. Indeed, after Boldwood’s first
proposal to Bathsheba, the narrator reflects that:
Boldwood as means to marriage was unexceptionable: [Bathsheba] esteemed and liked
him, yet she did not want him. It appears that ordinary men take wives because
possession is not possible without marriage, and that ordinary women accept husbands
because marriage is not possible without possession;75 with totally differing aims the
method is the same on both sides. But the understood incentive on the woman’s part was
wanting here. Besides, Bathsheba’s position as absolute mistress of a farm and house was
a novel one, and the novelty had not yet begun to wear off (117)
Here the narrator moves from a close description of Bathsheba’s feelings to a general reflection
on the motives of “ordinary” people in marriage, and then back again. The passage seems to treat
“possession” as a synonym for sexual fulfillment: men offer the protections of marriage so that
they can sexually possess another, while women allow themselves to be sexually possessed
because they desire the protections offered by marriage. Not only does the passage suggest
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Interestingly, in his 1912 edition of the novel, Hardy changed “possession” here to “men” (Far 369).
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Bathsheba’s iconoclasm with regard to her society’s mores about marriage, it also associates her
with a form of desire that is generally accepted—the narrator tells us—to be more common in
men than women. Indeed, Bathsheba’s objection to marriage from the start is that she doesn’t
sexually desire Boldwood; he has everything she could desire from a social perspective, but she
doesn’t “want him” (emphasis mine). Marriage has no intrinsic appeal to her without sexual
passion, especially given her “absolute” power over herself as the owner of the farm.
This passage is also about deconstructing a contemporary ideology of gender difference,
which would hold that women are at most sexually responsive to their partners’ desires, but not
desirous on their own accounts.76 The narrator draws a subtle distinction between what “ordinary
men” do and what “it appears” such men do, calling into the question the correctness of a gender
ideology which would expect women to only “respect” and “like” their husbands, rather than
passionately desire them (Far 308). While Gabriel and Boldwood seem at moments to accept
this Victorian conception of sexual difference, Troy acknowledges it as a fiction and uses that
knowledge to manipulate others, as when he tells Bathsheba that he cannot be counted on to
remain interested in her unless she marries him at once. The wager he makes in this moment is
that by provoking her sexual jealousy, he will win her, and he is correct. But Bathsheba’s other
suitors are not so savvy. Gabriel, when he proposes early in the novel, articulates an orthodox
view of female sexuality, when he tells Bathsheba that though she doesn’t love him, he is
“content to be liked” (28). Boldwood too begs Bathsheba to marry him repeatedly, despite
knowing that she does not love him. He goes on to be haunted and enraged by Bathsheba’s
capacity for sexual desire with Troy. “You are not,” he declares, after he has learned of her
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This was a widely held belief, among scientists and laypeople, in the period. See William Acton, The Functions
and Disorders of the Reproductive Organs, who wrote that “the majority of women (happily for them) are not very
much troubled by sexual feelings of any kind” (1857).
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relationship with Troy, “the cold woman you would have me believe…It isn’t because you have
no feeling in you that you don’t love me” (179). He believes that Bathsheba would have married
him without a passionate attachment if she had never met Troy (though her initial refusal of
Gabriel for the same reason casts doubt on his conviction).
Bathsheba’s ability to sexually “wan[t]” Troy is meaningfully distinguished, however,
from the “possession” that the narrator tells us most men desire, which seems to suggest not just
the fulfillment of sexual desire but the total absorption—even annihilation—of the other.
Boldwood, with his closest full of gowns for a woman to whom he has yet to become engaged,
offers us an extreme example of this form of desire. As if to prove Susan Beegel’s point that
there is an inherent “morbidity [in this] other-annihilating, self-consuming love,” we read that
each package in his closet “was labelled ‘Bathsheba Boldwood’” (Beegel 111; Hardy 338).
Despite Bathsheba’s continued refusal to consent to a marriage, and her insistence that any such
marriage could only take place seven years after her husband’s disappearance, when she would
be a widow in the eyes of the law, Boldwood has already overwritten her identity with a new one
formed by their marriage: Bathsheba Boldwood. His fantasy of possession is so extreme that he
labels each gift for his desired wife with “a date…six years in advance” when he hopes their
marriage will finally take place (338). We read that “above all [the other things] there was a case
of jewelry containing four heavy gold bracelets and several lockets and rings,” an image which
suggests the carceral element of Boldwood’s fantasy marriage (337). In fact, as my discussion of
coverture will show, “four heavy gold bracelets and several lockets and rings” offer a fitting
metaphor for the institution, which essentially required that women purchase financial and social
security through a total abnegation of their legal rights to self-determination. Here we see Hardy
drawing a distinction between natural desire (“wanting”) and that desire when it is perverted by
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societal forces (“possession”). As John Kucich puts it, the two are never separable for Hardy,
who “insis[ts] that…the social axis is an inextricable part of [his characters’] desire” (223).
“Possession” in this novel is sexual desire conditioned, even deformed by, the rules of society,
which demand that sex be attended by the overdetermined contract of coverture; because she is a
woman who has no legal opportunity to possess another, Bathsheba alone, it seems, can “want”.
Her suitors, on the other hand, whose only socially acceptable option for sexual fulfillment is
through the contract of marriage, desire “possession” of her.
Another implication of the “ordinary men” passage is that it rehearses the logic by which
coverture was rationalized by those who defended it during the 1850s, as agitation increased to
reform the laws pertaining to married women’s ability to own property and sue for divorce.
Coverture essentially required that women pass all their property (including future earnings) to
their husbands by subsuming the wife’s legal identity into that of her husband once she was
married. Summarizing the law in 1854, feminist Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon wrote that
A man and wife are one person in law; the wife loses all her rights as a single woman,
and her existence is entirely absorbed in that of her husband. He is civilly responsible for
her acts; she lives under his protection and cover, and her condition is called coverture.
A Woman’s body belongs to her husband; she is in his custody, and he can enforce his
right by writ of habeas corpus. (qtd in Surridge 88)
As Bodichon’s description suggests, coverture had vast implications (not just economic and
civic, but social and sexual as well). It gave husbands the ability to enforce their ‘conjugal rights’
through ‘reasonable’ means, which technically included imprisonment and beating. As I discuss
in chapter four, this meant that though it was increasingly seen as wrong (and increasingly
recognized in court as illegal) to abuse your wife, you might force her to have sex with you
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through beating, restricting her access to her children, or any other means, as long as your means
of correcting her behavior were not ‘cruel’. As critics like Bodichon and Frances Power Cobbe
showed, this made wives the legal equivalent of “criminals, idiots…and minors” (3). It also
placed enormous faith in the capability of patriarchs to be absolute rulers without being abusive.
The doctrine of coverture has a long and fascinating history, and its Victorian
instantiation arises from both ecclesiastical and contract law. Coverture served the traditional
aims of the ecclesiastical marriage courts by imposing economic barriers to separation and
consolidating economic power in patriarchs. But the issue was overdetermined by the everincreasing Victorian interest in contracts: coverture was imagined simultaneously as a sacred
covenant with God and a legally enforceable contract. Marriage as a sacrament had been
imagined to absorb the man and woman into ‘one flesh’ for hundreds of years; the relatively new
contractual marriage (established by 1753’s Hardwicke Act) was imagined to provide women
with safety after they had capitulated to male desire. It is not that one form of marriage neatly
replaced the other, but that marriage as an institution became more conceptually layered, even
overdetermined: on top of the sacrament, there was now a contract. The Victorians understood
that this evolving meaning of marriage was fraught by contradictions: the long-held common law
practice of coverture was in obvious conflict with the basic premises of contract law (as John
Stuart Mill argued in On the Subjection of Women). How, for instance, could marriage be an
enforceable agreement between two parties, if they became one legal entity by making such an
agreement? In the course of the nineteenth-century three major reforms were made with regard to
gender and marriage law, all of which were to some degree trying to negotiate the paradox
between the sacramental and legal conceptions of marriage, and all of which turned on the issue
of women’s rights within marriage.
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The first, the 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act created a new secular divorce court, in which
men could sue for divorce on grounds of adultery and women on grounds of adultery and cruelty.
Though absolute divorces were still rare, women could sue for legal separation on grounds of
cruelty, adultery or desertion, which meant that women in abusive marriages had more options
(though in such cases they would not have the right to take their children with them in a
separation, or to financial support). Furthermore, the law defined legal cruelty in narrow terms as
extreme and sustained physical abuse. By 1870, the Married Women’s Property Act meant that
women were entitled to keep some of their earnings made during marriage. As Doreen Thierauf
points out, “after 1870, the Divorce Court would allow for cases of extreme emotional and
psychological cruelty” to be tried as ‘legal cruelty’ (“Daniel Deronda” 252). In 1882, the
Married Women’s Property Act was reformed, allowing women to keep their property and
manage it themselves. Though critics debate when Far From the Madding Crowd is supposed to
have taken place, Hardy wrote the novel shortly after the 1870 reform, and questions of both a
wife’s right to her property and earnings, and her right to be protected from emotional abuse, are
clearly at the front of his mind.77
As I have already suggested, one of the assumptions which Victorian marriage relied on
(and which Hardy references in the ‘ordinary men’ passage)—that women were not sexually
desirous—is explicitly contradicted by Hardy’s presentation of his heroine in Far from the
Madding Crowd. The novel also deals a blow to the paternalism which undergirded the logic of
coverture as protection: Bathsheba avoids marrying initially because she wants control of her
property, and when she finally marries because she wants to have sex, she almost loses
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Because of a character named Boldwood who briefly appears in The Mayor of Casterbridge, and who seems to be
the Boldwood of Far, critics have struggled to date the action of Far in historical time. As Rosemarie Morgan
explains, critics have “variously [set it] at 1840, the 1860s, and the early 1870s” (164). See Morgan 164-5.
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everything to a husband who is unskilled at and uninterested in farm management. Troy is
obviously an extreme example of the perils of marriage for women: he turns from a besotted
admirer to an abuser in only a few weeks, and then fakes his own death shortly after that. That
said, the novel suggests that Troy might have done as much damage to Bathsheba’s business
even if he had been less villainous. The problem is not just his villainy, but that the institution of
marriage gives him total control over his wife’s economic and social concerns. Had Bathsheba’s
husband merely been a bad farmer, he still could have put her livelihood in peril. Thus the
narrator’s brief aside about the state of marriage in the world of the novel (“it appears that
ordinary men…”) offers a critique of the paternalist rationale which continued to treat women’s
rights as a threat to their safety and happiness.
Victorian feminists were quick to make all these points. Writers such as Frances Power
Cobbe, Caroline Norton, Mona Caird, and Eliza Lynn offered nuanced accounts of the ways in
which coverture constrained women into abusive marriages by draining them of their economic
power, and even increased the likelihood of abuse by codifying and granting legal support to an
uneven power dynamic between husbands and wives. My reading of Far from the Madding
Crowd is equally interested, however, in the justifications its supporters made against reforms to
coverture intended to empower wives. The claims such anti-reform pundits made usefully map
the culture’s anxieties about women, sex, and property. One such anxiety was that overturning
coverture would upset a balance in power that benefited both members of a (heterosexual)
couple: as a contemporary newspaper put it, the right to “complete dominion over [his wife’s]
property” under coverture was meant to be balanced by a husband’s responsibility to “give [his
wife his] full support and protection” (“The Married Women’s Property Bill” 14 July 1857). “If
her goods were his goods, her debts were his debts…if she acted the Amazon, he must
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compensate the assaulted” (14 July 1857).78 (It is worth noting that this characterization
overstates the protections of coverture for women who committed serious crimes: women who
were accused of treason or murder had to stand for themselves, whether they were married or
not.) And in Bathsheba’s case, of course, she is the one who ends up responsible for her
husband’s debts and indiscretions, a fact which reveals that coverture depended entirely on male
excellence to work, as conservatives intended.
This paternalistic account of the benefits of coverture obviously rests on the stability of
one basic assumption: that women are less capable than men. Indeed, in a book length response
to Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism, in which he took particular umbrage with Mill’s proto-feminism,
influential jurist James Fitzjames Stephen attributed marital unhappiness not to inequality
between the sexes, but to women who misunderstood their own comparative weakness:79
“The real reason,” Stephen writes, that marriages succeed “is that people know their
respective places, and act accordingly. The power exists and is exercised, but as the right
to exercise is undisputed, and as its exercise is unresisted, it acts smoothly, and the
parties concerned are seldom unpleasantly reminded of its existence” (emphasis mine
230-1).
Here power remaining nonviolent relies on the subject of that power remaining “unresist[ing].”
In fact, Stephen naturalizes male dominance to the degree that coverture comes to look like a
regulation on men: “Let us suppose,” he writes, “that men and women are made as equal as the
law can make them.” In such a state, men would feel no need to offer gallantry to female
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The one reference in Far to Bathsheba behaving like an Amazon is made by Bathsheba’s servant Liddy, who
worries that her mistress will “harry” and “storm at” her, a characterization which leaves Bathsheba “somewhat
seriously alarmed by this Amazonian picture of herself” (174).
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Incidentally, lawyer and legal theorist James Fitzjames Stephen was the brother of Leslie Stephen, Hardy’s editor
at The Cornhill Magazine.
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weakness. “The result would be that women would become men’s slaves and drudges, that they
would be made to feel their weakness and to accept its consequences to the very utmost” (237).
Transforming marriage into a pure contract would likely cause male “force [to] assert itself a
hundred times more harshly” than it had previously done (237). The threat implied by this
characterization is clear. Women, in Stephen’s account, will always be subordinate to men, and
coverture is the form of subordination they are more likely to prefer than absolute domination.
(Obviously this argument mirrors those made by contemporary advocates of slavery, who argued
that enslavement was in enslaved peoples’ best interests for similar reasons).
Similarly, Hardy’s narrator’s claim that “it appears ordinary men take wives because
possession is not possible without marriage, and that ordinary women accept husbands because
marriage is not possible without possession” rehearses a less obvious form of harmful
paternalism embedded into coverture: the idea that it protected both men and women from male
rapaciousness by channeling male sexual energy into marriage. As Hardy’s summary of the
institution suggests, coverture, from its beginnings, was partially ideologically constructed as a
restraint on men. By incumbering men with wives, it ensured that they would take responsibility
for their sexual conduct while also offering them a consolation for the encumbrance of a wife in
the control of her assets (or so the thinking went).80 This idea—that marriage is a “remedy
against sin”—is articulated in the Church of England marriage service: the second goal of
marriage is to protect “such persons as have not the gift of continency” from sin by marrying
them, thus allowing them to “keep themselves undefiled” (399). It was also in wide circulation in
the early modern period and early eighteenth-century, when, as Garthine Walker and Faramerz
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For instance, during the social purity campaigns of the end of the century, activists argued that the epidemic of
prostitution was due to the lack of feminine influence on unmarried men: “Josephine Butler was clear that the
common factor which linked the unacceptable conduct of the sailor, the soldier and the university student was the
lack of improving (and feminine) domestic influence” (Tosh 154).
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Dabhoiwala argue, cultural commentators treated rape as a ubiquitous threat to women and
marriage as a guard against it (see Walker 12-13 and Dabhoiwala 112). And though the 1870s
and 80s saw increasing agitation over women’s rights within marriage, these decades also saw
social purity campaigns which attributed high rates of sex work and disease to the decline of
domesticity: it was their wives, feminists including Josephine Butler argued, who satisfied men
and thus routed them away from sex workers or same-sex liaisons (Tosh 154). By these accounts
coverture is an implicit guard not only against sexual promiscuity but also against the harm of
rape. The term “coverture” itself is often traced back to Blackstone’s seminal Commentary on
the Laws of England (1765), in which the jurist writes that wives live “under [the] wing,
protection, and cover” of their husbands (430); but Margreta de Grazia points out that “it appears
that coverture was first used in medieval law—French to refer to the baron’s sexually ‘covering’
of the feme’s body: his ‘topping’ or ‘mounting’ her” (297). Thus the protectionist impulse
expressed by coverture has always also been overlaid by a sexually possessive or even
threatening one.
As Far from the Madding Crowd demonstrates, however, women do desire, and they
don’t unilaterally need protection from male rapaciousness. In Bathsheba’s case, it is not strictly
her suitor’s sexual rapaciousness which she must fear, but the way their desire to sexually
possess her is overlain by their desires for other forms of possession. In fact, the heroine of Far
from the Madding Crowd is equally threatened by male acquisitiveness and rapaciousness:
Troy’s desire to gamble her money, Boldwood’s obsession with uniting their farms and safely
ensconcing her in domesticity, and perhaps even Gabriel’s ambition to rise in the world all might
be read as threats to her self-possession (Rosemarie Morgan reads Gabriel this way, as equally
desirous of Bathsheba’s body and her farm). It is too simplistic to say that this desire is either
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sexual or non-sexual. In fact, the novel shows the way sexual desire is necessarily
overdetermined by other forms of desire, since sexual “possession [was] not possible without
marriage,” and marriage itself implied the transfer of assets, debts, and civic identity (114).
Coverture, it seems, protects women when they are undesiring (“it appears that…women accept
husbands because marriage is not possible without possession”). Since the novel shows that
women do desire, however, it also shows that coverture doesn’t actually protect women at all,
but rather traps them in a web of those who would exploit their desires.
The novel’s most obvious explication of this danger lies in the figure of Troy, who wins
Bathsheba first through flattery, then through a kind of emotional extortion (telling her that she
can’t count on his faithfulness unless she marries him instantly). As Susan Beegel puts it, Troy’s
initial self-presentation as an ardent lover is revealed to be a simple seduction strategy: “[he] is a
false front of words and red uniform, a cardboard cut out of a Byronic hero” (111). Once they are
married, he immediately takes charge of her body, her movements, and her property. His sexual
possessiveness, which initially attracts Bathsheba, quickly wanes and is replaced by a desire to
control her assets and “do anything” he likes with her (203). He attends the corn market in her
stead, despite his unfamiliarity with the business of farming. When she tries to refuse him
gambling money, he confidently asserts his right not only to the money, but to force Bathsheba
to accompany him to the races. When she complains he suggests that he never would have
married her “had [he] known what a chicken-hearted creature [she was] under all [her] boldness”
(227). Though the narrative never explicitly describes his physical abuse, it metaphorically
registers (at the very least) his threats of such violence. For instance, after she challenges his
account of his acquaintance with Fanny Robbin, he “complete[s]” his chastisement “by a smart
cut of the whip round [the horse] Poppet’s flank, which caus[es] the animal to start forward at a
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wild pace” and ends his conversation with Bathsheba (229). Soon after, when she half-jokes that
she has “a right to grumble a little if [she] pay[s]” for Troy’s lifestyle, he outright threatens her
(236). “Fun is all very well,” he tells her, “but don’t go too far, or you may have cause to regret
something” (236). In light of such moments, Bathsheba’s offhand remark from a few chapters
prior, that she “may die soon” takes on new meaning (221). It is not just that young wives find
themselves likely to become pregnant, facing all the attendant dangers of that experience, but
that they are entirely at the mercy of their husbands, who may choose to impregnate them or beat
them, as the mood strikes.
Thus the figure of Troy seems to represent everything that a Victorian wife might be
justified in fearing when she married. Not only does he use Bathsheba’s sexual desire for him
against her, trapping her in a marriage he has little investment in, but he financially exploits her,
physically threatens her, and finally abandons her. In the figure of Boldwood, however, we are
also offered an acute account of the dangers of marriage, particularly those that might attend a
marriage in which, as Bathsheba puts it, “love is wanting” (311). Troy is sexually appealing, but
financially and socially ruinous, not to mention abusive. Boldwood, on the other hand, is
sexually frightening.
All three men observe Bathsheba unnoticed at various moments, and for both Boldwood
and Gabriel this observation takes on an obsessiveness that almost amounts to surveillance. As
Julie Grossman has argued, however, Boldwood’s observations of Bathsheba are anatomized to a
frightening degree (621-623). While Gabriel “perceives her in evocative and poetic terms” (she
falls into position on her horse with the “glide…of a kingfisher” and the “noiselessness…of a
hawk”), Boldwood practically takes an inventory of her physical body (Grossman 621; Hardy
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102). When he finally notices her, after receiving her ill-conceived Valentine, he perceives her in
anatomical and material parts:
He saw her black hair, her correct facial curves and profile, and the roundness of her chin
and throat. He saw then the side of her eyelids, eyes and lashes, and the shape of her ear.
Next he noticed her figure, her skirt, and the very soles of her shoes. (102)
The narrator attributes this curiously clinical style of observation to Boldwood’s intense
repression. He is not actually quiet and reserved as he appears, but has worked to achieve a
“perfect balance [between]…enormous antagonistic forces” (105). His feelings are so strong, we
read, that “if an emotion possessed him at all, it ruled him: a feeling not mastering him was
entirely latent” (105). Contrary to his appearance as an even-tempered man, he is “a hotbed of
tropic intensity” (104)
Indeed our first image of him in his own home suggests the profound depths of his sexual
possessiveness:
Inside the blue door [of his stables], open half way down, were to be seen at this time the
buttocks and tails of half a dozen warm and contented horses standing in their stalls; and
thus viewed presenting alternations of roan and bay in shapes like a Moorish arch, the tail
being a streak down the midst of each…
Pacing up and down at the heels of the animals was Farmer Boldwood himself. This
place was his almonry and cloister in one: here after looking to the feeding of his fourfooted dependents, the celibate would walk and meditate of an evening till the moon’s
rays streamed in through the cobwebbed windows or total darkness enveloped the scene.
(104-5)
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Though it may be hard for Hardy’s modern readers to recognize, that this scene is alive with
sexual innuendo was registered by Leslie Stephen, Hardy’s editor at the Cornhill Magazine, who
replaced the “buttocks and tails” of the horses with “backs and tails” in the serialized version
(Hardy 368).81 The horse was a profoundly resonant sexual symbol in the literature of the
period, which Stephen clearly recognized.82 Here, a few pages after the narrator’s sterile account
of Boldwood’s observation of Bathsheba, we get a rich sensory description of the horses in his
barn, whose hind-quarters (which are all that Boldwood can see from his position) call forth an
aesthetic comparison to architecture. It is worth noting that when Gabriel first sees Bathsheba
she engenders one such response in him (though his reference points are from the natural, rather
than man-made, world) and when Troy first meets Bathsheba he thanks her “for the sight of such
a beautiful face,” similarly treating her beauty as if it is an aesthetic wonder (143). In both cases
Bathsheba registers the sexual desire that being observed by these men indicates. That Boldwood
has a curiously cerebral response to her beauty should strike us as doubly meaningful when we
read about the way he luxuriates over “buttocks and tails” of his horses (104).
In contrast, this passage represents Boldwood as luxuriating in his “four-footed
dependents” precisely because they are dependent on him: “this place was his almonry and
cloister in one” (105). Historically, almonries were places where religious orders officially
distributed their alms; cloisters, by contrast, were literally segregated walkways within
monasteries or cathedrals meant to allow the members of a given religious order to separate
themselves from the lay world as they moved throughout the building. Thus the stables are both
81

It is well known that Hardy generally felt Stephen’s censorship to be misguided, but capitulated for the sake of
getting the novel published in Cornhill. See Jones, “‘A Good Hand at A Serial’.”
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As Doreen Thierauf puts it, by the 1870s it was a “hackneyed” representational devise to “displac[e]” a husband’s
acts of “violence from a wife’s battered body to that of abused domestic animals, usually dogs or horses, [a practice
which] acknowledg[ed] implicitly a wife’s social and legal position to be as degraded (and degrading) as a pet’s.
(258). Lisa Surridge also shows, in “Dogs’/Bodies, Women’s Bodies,” that narratives of domestic violence relied
heavily on the comparison between wives and domestic animals.
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the place where he goes to officially distribute his beneficence (in the form of feeding his horses)
and his most sacred, private place. That the narrator’s analogy for Boldwood’s sanctuary
combines the public and private spaces of the Church suggests the curious inwardness of
Boldwood’s domestic life, the degree to which he sees himself and his dependents as forming a
closed loop separated from the rest of the world. That the text refers to him as “the celibate” only
emphasizes the degree of sexual control he has in the stables, where he certainly superintends the
husbandry of the animals. The scene in the stables thus foreshadows the domestic life Boldwood
desires with Bathsheba, where, as Beegel argues, he “wants to lock her away from the rest of the
world to be placed on a pedestal, ornamented, and worshipped” (111). He imagines a similar
future for himself and Bathsheba, where she can farm as a hobby, no longer actually circulating
in the commercial world.
What’s more, the narrator’s account of Boldwood’s personality as composed of enormous
antagonistic forces” reflects the Victorian conception of monomania: “a localized but profound
break in the unity of the psyche” (Hardy 105; During 86). As the name suggests, monomania was
diagnosed when a person became fixated on, and showed an irrational attachment to one object.
Helen Goodman explains that the theory of monomania, developed by Frenchman Jane-Etienne
Esquirol and elaborated by Englishman J.C. Prichard, described it as “a form of insanity which
only showed itself when the patient thought or spoke about one particular subject” (53). This was
not global insanity. In fact, the clinical classification relied on the fact that the person was
generally considered to be sane. Victorian thinkers drew a distinction between “moral insanity”
and monomania: “whereas the morally insane tended to retain their intellectual faculties, despite
the alteration of their temperament, monomaniacs tended to lose all reason on the subject of their
obsession” (Goodman 54). It was thus possible that monomaniacs “could…remain in the
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community, undetected until a particular subject was broached” (Goodman 54). Lennard J. Davis
notes that monomania was often seen as a disease that was a byproduct of over-civilization (70).
Boldwood, “the celibate,” is nothing if not dangerously repressed, as the conclusion of the novel
shows.
The text registers the threats which Boldwood poses to Bathsheba—the threat of rape if
she marries him and murder if she doesn’t—in multiple ways. (Whether it locates the source of
that threat in Boldwood’s mental illness, or simply in his normative masculinity, is an open
question.) The most obvious proof of the threat he possess to her lies in the text’s representation
of his most profound moment of bliss, when he catches Bathsheba after she faints in the
Cornmarket after hearing the report that Troy has drowned:
A darkness came into her eyes, and she fell.
But not to the ground. A gloomy man who had been observing her from under the
portico of the old corn-exchange when she passed through the group without, stepped
quickly to her side at the moment of her exclamation and caught her in his arms as she
sank down….
[On learning the report of Troy’s death] a strange fire lighted up Boldwood’s eye
and his face flashed with the suppressed excitement of an unutterable thought.
Everybody’s glance was now centered on him and the unconscious Bathsheba. He lifted
her body off the ground and smoothed down the folds of her dress as a child might have
taken a storm-beaten bird and arranged its ruffled plumes, and bore her along the
pavement to the Three Choughs Inn. Here he passed with her under the archway into a
private room, and by the time he had deposited—so lothly—the precious burden upon a
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sofa, Bathsheba had opened her eyes, and remembering all that had occurred murmured
“I want to go home!”
Boldwood left the room. He stood for a moment in the passage to recover his
senses. The experience had been too much for his consciousness to keep up with, and
now that he had grasped it it had gone again. For those few heavenly golden moments she
had been in his arms. What did it matter about her not knowing it? –she had been close to
his breast; he had been close to hers. (286-287)
This scene has a number of distressing implications. The most important for my purposes is that
of the physical pleasure Boldwood takes in contact with Bathsheba’s inert, unconscious body. In
a revealing moment of free indirect discourse, it becomes clear that what makes this moment
blissful is not just proximity to Bathsheba’s body, but Boldwood’s complete control over it;
indeed, the very first narrative thought which Boldwood has after “recover[ing] his senses” is the
revealing “what did it matter about her not knowing it?” His pleasure in possession is so intense
that it doesn’t require Bathsheba to have any agency to be complete (this presents a stark
comparison to Gabriel Oak, who finally proposes using the explicit language of consent: “If I
only knew…[that] you would allow me to love you and win you and marry you after all”)
(emphasis mine 347).
The scene also tells the symbolic story of a kind of mythic marriage between Boldwood
and Bathsheba, as the “unutterable idea” which lights up his face is clearly that all hindrances
have been removed to their union (286). The very moment after that idea blossoms within him,
we read that “everybody’s glance was now centered on [Boldwood] and the unconscious
Bathsheba,” as if all the minds present have the same idea, and all turn simultaneously to witness
Boldwood claiming his bride (286). Passing under the archway of an inn whose name calls up
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the image of a murder of crows (The Three Choughs Inn), he carries the “precious burden” that
Bathsheba represents (286). This representation accords with a view of coverture which seems
consistent with Boldwood’s behavior, wherein the wife is a cherished being who needs constant
management and stewardship by her husband.
That Boldwood’s happiest moment requires Bathsheba’s unconsciousness suggests what
Susan Beegal has called “the essential morbidity of the Victorian male’s sentimental womanworship,” as well as highlights Boldwood’s potential as a frightening mythic figure (111). As
Beegel argues, “the marriage Boldwood offers [Bathsheba] is one of entombment, of
suffocation” (110). The mythic iconography of the scene—which casts Boldwood as Hades
carrying Bathsheba into the underworld flanked by birds of carrion—certainly supports this
reading. Boldwood is the “gloomy man” whose face lights up with a “strange fire,” and whose
contact with his beloved leaves her “pale and unwell” (286-7).83 Beegal reminds us that
“Boldwood proposes …by promising her that she will never have to step outdoors again” (111).
This promise not only totally mistakes Bathsheba’s temperamental love of outdoor work, but
affirms Boldwood’s role as one who, like Hades, would deprive his beloved of contact with the
verdure and fertility of the natural world. He essentially misunderstands how suited she is to be a
steward of the earth, not recognizing either the mythic potential she holds as a
Persephone/Demeter figure or her simple suitedness to the job of farming. Even Bathsheba’s
frightened declaration upon waking—“I want to go home”—echoes Persephone’s experience of
being stuck in the Underworld, longing for release. As Beegal puts it, a marriage with Boldwood
would be “a living death for Bathsheba” (111). That his crowning moment is one in which he
possesses her, but she is unconscious, reflects this characterization. This characterization is
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It also seems worth noting that the serialized version of Far calls the inn the “Kings Arms”. It is not till the threevolume edition that Hardy rechristens it the “Three Choughs.”
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cemented, however, by the final scene between Boldwood and Bathsheba, where he forces an
engagement ring onto her finger while she cries.
The violence of this scene, too, is initiated by Bathsheba’s attempt to flee Boldwood’s
house, which causes him to stop her and urge her to promise to marry him. In response
Bathsheba declares herself a “changed” and “unhappy woman,” to which Boldwood responds
coolly, “you are a very beautiful woman” (328). Again we see that he is unperturbed by her
sense of herself as emotionally dead; we read that she looks back at her “past” as if “over a great
gulf, as if she were a dead person” (289). And yet her “passionless” affect does not disturb
Boldwood, but seems to inflame his desire (328). Boldwood disingenuously argues that their
engagement will be “a mere business compact…between two people who are beyond the
influence of passion” (328). Though Boldwood “knew how false this picture was as regarded
himself,” the phrase succeeds in conjuring for the reader the curious quality of his passion, which
is both intense and continually associated with images of death. Indeed the chapter in which this
scene falls bears an ominous epigraph from Horace: “the battle commences: in an instant comes
swift death or joyful victory” (Hardy 389). Though one way to read this epigraph is in relation to
Boldwood’s murder of Troy, we can also see that this scene is a kind of symbolic murder attempt
on Bathsheba. The myth of Hades and Persephone is a fitting analog here, too, because it
symbolically condenses sex, marriage, and death into one act. Bathsheba finally accepts the ring
having been “fairly beaten into non-resistance,” after which she reclaims the hand which
Boldwood had been “clasp[ing] in both his own” (329). Boldwood registers Bathsheba’s distress
but is unperturbed by it, calmly declaring “I am happy now,” despite leaving her sobbing. Like
the myth it references, the scene quite obviously represents a metaphorical rape.
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In particular it is a marital rape scene, since Bathsheba’s main dilemma lies in her sense
that she “owe[s]” Boldwood her consent (328). When he makes his argument in favor of her
consenting, she admits “I feel that I do [owe you consent]…that is, if you demand it” (328). This
comes immediately after Boldwood has implied that their marriage will be a sexless one,
“beyond the influence of passion” (328). The narrator tells us that while Boldwood makes this
claim, he knows it to be in bad faith; if we can’t yet imagine the kinds of force he will use on her
to gain her sexual consent, the rest of the scene demonstrates it. Bathsheba responds like a
woman who has compacted such a marriage, and is then pressured into consenting to sex: she
feels that she does owe him consent, if he demands it. Recall Barbara Bodichon’s articulation of
the law, wherein “a Woman’s body belongs to her husband; she is in his custody, and he can
enforce his right by writ of habeas corpus” (qtd. in Surridge 88). Bathsheba clearly understands
the sexual implications of this demand that she consent to an engagement, which Boldwood
“beg[s] in a husky voice, unable to sustain the forms of mere friendship any longer” (328). That
the placement of the ring on her finger symbolizes sexual contact is made clear by her horror of
it; for the first half of the scene she remains relatively calm, declaring that she has “no feeling in
the matter at all.” It is only when Boldwood attempts to place the ring on her finger that she
recoils in true fear and horror. We read that “in her trouble at not being able to get her hand away
from him at once, she stamped passionately on the floor and tears crowded her eyes” (329). And
yet the scene ends in exactly the way we might expect a marital rape to conclude: she is “fairly
beaten into non-resistance,” and he leaves happy, only sending his maid to her “when he thought
she might be sufficiently composed” (329). The price of his satisfaction is her pain and distress,
and that it should be that way seems quite natural to him.
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Though it ends with a happy marriage, contained within Far From the Madding Crowd
are two tragic marriages: one in which a woman is entrapped by her own desire in a physically,
emotionally, and financially ruinous marriage and another in which a woman is doomed to a
marriage which she can only consent to by evacuating herself of her own desires, by consigning
herself to “a living death” (Beegel 111). As my account of the novel suggests, it is the
passionless but not sexless marriage to Boldwood that the novel fears most profoundly (so much
so, I would argue, that it can only represent it in phantom terms). The harms of coverture and
nineteenth-century gender ideology work two ways in this novel, in that sex necessitates
marriage and that marriage necessitates sex. Thus marriage constrains women both when it is
founded on desire (since it also entails a business partnership) and when it is founded on business
(since it implies the wife’s sexual consent). Thus this novel, which is often considered an
anomaly within Hardy’s canon for its ultimately ‘successful’ marriage plot, actually
demonstrates the harms of marriage in great detail. The anomaly, to my mind, is not so much that
it represents a happy marriage but that it—in putting a happy marriage in dialogue with two
tragic ones—entertains the possibility that authentic love can survive under such cultural
conditions.84 Hardy’s later novel Tess of the d’Urbervilles would present a far more cynical
account of the viability of love in a society where relations between the sexes were defined by
sexual coercion and economic exploitation. While Tess will go on to examine the harms of rape
more explicitly, Far from the Madding Crowd remains an important exploration of the harms of
marriage as a structure of sexual violation. As such it offers an under-recognized contribution to
the debates of the later nineteenth-century over women’s rights to divorce and own property (and
thus to increasingly be recognized as liberal subjects).
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Susan Beegel and Trish Ferguson also make this argument.

176

II. Tess of the d’Urbervilles and the Harms of Rape: “It was to be.”
The rest of this chapter focuses on a question which has not been a primary focus of
studies of Tess of the d’Urbervilles: how is Tess harmed by her individual experiences of sexual
violence, and her position within a gendered world which is structurally violent to women
(particularly lower-class women)? How is Tess, in other words, a novel about harm? What
ideological questions does it ask about harm, and how does it aesthetically represent such harm?
I will argue that it is even too specific to read Tess as a study of the psychological trauma
produced by rape (though I think that reading is available, and I wonder why more critics have
not pursued this course). Instead, I see this novel as the one which anticipates the violence of
global modernity by treating rape capaciously, as a structure of violence embedded into society.
Its goal, I will argue, is twofold: to examine the harms of such structures on individual lives and
to suggest the ways in which individual harms concretize into community, societal, and even
global harms. Rape in the novel thus represents the paradigmatic social structure which
oppresses women and all the other ways in which a figure like Tess is marginalized by her
community.
I have said rape is represented in Tess, but that statement requires clarification, since
numerous critics have argued just the opposite. Ellen Rooney has claimed that the mark of sexual
violence in a text is “often no more than a long passage of mourning” (“Criticism” 1269).
Rooney sees Tess as the quintessential example of this representational strategy, where instead of
describing Tess’s rape, Hardy’s narrator “withdraws from the scene of the violent encounter to
grieve [and]… ponder questions in philosophy and ethics” (Rooney “Criticism” 1269). Sophie
Gilmartin and Rod Mengham, too, describe the text’s representation of Tess’s rape as “the
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famous lacuna that ends ‘Phase the First’ of the novel in which the narrator asks why it was that
Tess should have been violated” (6). Kristin Brady remarks on the narrative’s “lea[p] into the
second phase in the novel, “Maiden No More’—as if Tess’s loss of virginity had taken place on
the bare page between the two phases” (131). Similarly, Oliver Lovesey argues that the
“interpretive uneasiness” which critics have felt over “the exact nature of [Tess’s]
seduction/rape” arises from the “notoriously ambiguous and fragmentary incident in the Chase”
(913). Though he notes that the earlier scene in which Alec forces a strawberry between Tess’s
lips “figuratively” “anticipat[es]” the Chase scene, he concludes that the “gaps in descriptive
detail” make it impossible to determine the kind of violation to which Tess is subject (Lovesey
913).
That critics have tended to locate the scene’s ambiguity in its “gaps in descriptive detail”
fascinates me, since as a reader I don’t experience those gaps in the same way. It is certainly true
that Hardy’s narrator registers different aspects of the scene in different ways, sometimes
recording the character’s movements in close physical detail (Tess’s warm breath against Alec’s
cheek, for instance) while in other moments it pulls back, orienting Tess in a dizzyingly complex
world of interlocking natural systems (the stars above, the birds in the trees).85 And yet, these
shifts do not necessarily imply an obfuscation of the events of the scene. Critical readings of this
scene from Tess seem to desire a certain kind of descriptive detail that could count as ‘proof’ or
‘evidence’ of what occurred. They have also generally attributed Hardy’s refusal to provide such
description to either Victorian propriety or to Hardy’s desire to complicate Tess’s moral
complicity in the scene. And yet, either such reading requires that we take it as obvious that
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Here I refer to the narrator as an “it.” Early readers of Tess weren’t sure of the author’s gender, and the narrator
seems meaningfully different here than the one to which I have referred in speaking of Trollope, who brings his own
potentially embodied status up again and again as a way to complicate the narrative.
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Hardy is trying to conceal something in this scene. As I hope I have shown, such strategies for
reading this moment respond primarily to the wish to adjudicate what has ‘happened’ between
Tess and Alec, without recognizing that this impulse obscures other ways the scene might be
read.
What I want to ask now that my focus is exclusively on Tess is, is it even true that Hardy
(or Hardy’s narrator) obscures this scene? Why should a change in the register of the narration (a
turn to “griev[ing]” or “ponder[ing]” large questions, for instance) imply the obfuscation of
sexual violence (Rooney “Criticism” 1269)? Why should descriptive detail be the index of
‘truth’ in this moment? Why should the other violations the text vividly and explicitly
describes—such as the forced feeding scene, or the brutal sexual harassment Tess faces from
both Alec and Farmer Groby at Flintcombe-Ashe—be only grudgingly acknowledged sites of the
text’s representation of sexual violence? In other words, what would it take—in terms of
representation—for us to read sexual violence in this scene? It almost seems as if critics expect
that the only aesthetic strategy which can represent rape is descriptive literalness. One wonders if
anything less than triple-x explicitness could satisfy such readers’ wish for clarity. And yet a
close reading of the scene in its entirety—not merely the final two paragraphs of the chapter—
reveals the depths of Alec’s coercion and violence. As I have already argued, knowing what we
know about that violence, whether Alec rapes Tess in this scene in a criminal sense is
immaterial, since we know without a doubt that he seriously harms her by sexually violating her.
Following my capacious conception, I think of that harm as constituting rape, but I am far less
urgent in my wish to convince readers that Alec rapes Tess than that he harms her. As I
suggested in the first chapter, often when we focus on a literary event’s status as rape, we end up
ignoring the harms produced by the event. Even when we do so in service of punishment, we
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focus our attention on represented aggressors over and against their represented victims. When
we focus on harm, we are finally able to decenter the rapist.
The chapter begins just as Alec has intervened in a fight Tess is having with the women
with whom she works. Frightened of their anger, and aware that leaving with Alec will allow her
to “triumph over them,” she accepts a ride from the man whose company “at almost any other
moment of her life she would have refused…as she had refused [it] several times before” (52-3).
Alec immediately attempts to exploit the obligation that she will owe him for having ‘saved’ her,
asking her if she is grateful to him, and trying to extort kisses from her. When he asks her why
she hasn’t “told [him] when [he has] made [her] angry” by attempting to kiss her, she guilelessly
explains that she cannot do so in her position as his employee. “You know very well why,” she
says, “because I cannot help myself here” (54). He continues pestering her until she lapses into
sleep. He takes this opportunity to try to embrace her, and she jolts awake: “this immediately put
her on the defensive, and with one of those sudden impulses of reprisal to which she was liable
she gave him a little push from her” (54). With this Alec begins his cajoling again, first
chastising her for her pushing him, and then demanding—as a sort of punishment for that
‘violence’—that she allow him to “treat [her] as a lover” (55). She demurs again, explaining that
her position precludes the possibility of authentic consent: “how can I say yes or no,” she asks,
“writhing uneasily on her seat” (55). Like Bathsheba before her, she is temporarily overcome:
“he settled the matter by clasping his arm round her as he desired—and Tess expressed no
further negative” (55).
That is until Tess realizes that Alec has purposely extended their journey, “just” at the
moment that she has “pu[t] such trust” in him, when she had been, as she puts it, “obliging you to
please you, because I thought I had wronged you by that push” (55). Though Tess wants to walk
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home, Alec declares that they are lost in “the oldest wood in England” (55). Asking her to wait
while he determines their location, he “st[eals] a cursory kiss” and leaves her, telling her that she
need not hold his horse while he’s gone, since it has “had enough of it for to-night” (55). This is
another moment—similar to the smart crack which Troy applies to Poppet when he’s really
angry at Bathsheba, or Boldwood’s proprietary gazing at his “dependents” in their stable—where
a male character’s behavior towards his horse is revealing. Like Tess, who is exhausted from
both the manual labor she does for work and the emotional labor of fending off Alec’s advances,
the horse has been driven to exhaustion, left a “panting creature” (55). Before departing into the
darkness, Alec leaves Tess with a new piece of knowledge which is designed to further lower her
resistance: “your father has a new cob to-day. Somebody gave it to him…and the children have
some toys” (56). Admitting that she is “grateful” to him but doesn’t love him, she tells him that
his behavior “hampers [her] so” and bursts into tears (56).
It should already be clear that the text explicitly represents the multiple forms of coercion
Alec uses on Tess in this scene. He is constantly jockeying back and forth between strategies;
first plying her with the carrot of flattery, then threatening her with the stick of his disapproval.
At the end of the novel this same dynamic will reappear in the form of his waffling between
declarations of passion for her and threats that he will master her, despite her repeated refusals of
him. In this early scene, Tess registers both his blandishments and his angry criticisms as
strategies of coercion. As she tells him, his behavior “hampers” her; she “cannot help” herself
against him, without fear of losing her job and further imperiling her already desperate family,
which he very well knows (56). Tess is caught here in a power dynamic which repeats that which
originally convinced her to ‘claim kin’ in the first place: if she hadn’t felt guilty for ‘killing’
Prince, she would never have agreed to her mother’s plan. Similarly, the small push she
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reflexively gives Alec while asleep gets her caught in a sense of her own responsibility; it is
when she begs his pardon for this ‘offence’ that Alec declares he “won’t pardon [her] unless
[she] show[s] some confidence in [him]…by letting [him] clasp [her] with [his] arm” (54-55). As
this moment shows, each small violation paves the way for a greater one, exactly as Alec
intends.
When he returns from attempting to determine their location, he finds Tess sleeping on a
pile of dead leaves. He cannot distinctly see her, but he perceives her in flashes of sensory detail:
“a pale nebulousness” glows at “his feet,” and he hears her “gentle regular breathing” (57). He
stoops until he can feel the heat of her breath, and then presses his face against her cheek, where
he feels her tears. It is at this moment where critics have registered the narrator’s turn to
reflection, as we read that:
Darkness and silence ruled everywhere around. Above them rose the primeval
yews and oaks of The Chase, in which were poised gentle roosting birds in their last nap;
and about them stole the hopping rabbits and hares. But, might some say, where was
Tess’s guardian angel? Where was the Providence of her simple faith? Perhaps, like that
other god of whom the ironical Tishbite spoke, he was talking, or he was pursuing, or he
was in a journey, or he was sleeping and not be awaked (57).
One way to read this passage is to say that Hardy’s narrator reaches the limits of description once
it has represented the natural world that surrounds Tess and Alec. Though the natural imagery
suggests their total isolation from the human world, it is not at all threatening (except, perhaps, in
how little it accords to or reflects the human situation at hand).86 It would seem that the moment
at which the narrator asks, “But, might some say, where was Tess’s guardian angel?” is what
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As J Hillis Miller puts it, nature in Hardy is “indifferent and aloof, the patient bearer of meanings man has
inscribed on it, meanings with which it has nothing to do” (269).
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Rooney characterizes as the narrator “withdraw[ing] from the scene of the violent encounter to
grieve [and]… ponder questions in philosophy and ethics” (“Criticism” 1269). And yet—can we
take Hardy’s narrator at face value here? Do we read the narrator’s meditation on the event,
which invokes various indistinctly related moral systems (the “Guardian Angel,” “Providence,”
the pagan god Baal, and the Old Testament ethos of an “eye for an eye”), as earnest? The
narrator slyly introduces the turn to such “ponder[ing]” with the qualification “some might say,”
a phrase which reflects the skepticism with which it treats all the questions that follow (Rooney
1269; Hardy 57). As Manya Lempert puts it, “in Hardy’s incipiently modernist fiction, no
celestial or terrestrial script assures … salvation” (471). While scholars generally recognize this
thorough-going cynicism in Hardy, readings of this scene in Tess have tended to treat the
narrator’s plaintive questions as sincere rather than bitterly ironic. While I think Hardy is sincere
in his representation—through this textual moment—of the real pathos humans feel in their
attempts to understand suffering, his narrator certainly isn’t genuinely entertaining various
epistemological systems here, but dispensing with each as it arises. As the narrator concludes,
the explanations provided by philosophy and religion “d[o] not mend the matter” of Tess (57).
Writing of the challenge of critically responding to Hardy’s huge body of poetry, J. Hillis
Miller observes that in order to do so “we need all of Hardy’s poetry…we need it all, even
though there is a sense in which there is too much of it, too much to hold in one’s mind at once,
too much to reduce to an orderly mapping” (270). This idea of ‘too-muchness’ might be
helpfully applied to important moments in Hardy’s fiction as well, since often in them Hardy is
seeking to represent the way in which moments in life become overdetermined by a multitude of
signs, perceptions, and interpretations. Numerous critics have pointed out that Hardy repeatedly
invokes competing explanatory systems in his novels, and in Tess in particular. These include
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Victorian science, Greco-Roman myth, a Romantic account of nature, Victorian law, and ancient
history, among others.87 For much of the first century of Hardy criticism, these shifts in frame
and tone were read as failures on Hardy’s part. As Hillis Miller points out, in writing of his mode
of selecting works of poetry for publication, Hardy himself acknowledges that his tonal shifts
from poem to poem have been “read as misfires” by those who, “deaf to the sudden change of
key” are “unconscious that [they are] laughing with the author and not at him” (qtd in Hillis
Miller 271). Hardy continues:
I admit that I did not foresee such contingencies as I ought to have done, and that people
might not perceive when the tone is altered. …I must trust for right note-catching to those
finely-touched spirits who can divine without half a whisper, whose intuitiveness is proof
against all the accidents of inconsequence. (qtd Hillis Miller 271-2).
I see such tonal “alter[ations]” as moments of metalepsis which “force us to reflect on narrative
construction and our suspensions of disbelief” (Freedgood “Settlements” 398). We usually think
of metalepsis, following Genette, as a self-consciously metafictional act on the part of the
narrator (as in Eliot’s famous, “Why always Dorothea?”). And yet what if the moments of tonal
change in Hardy’s narration works similarly to metalepsis, as theorized by Freedgood, wherein
the text references an object outside of itself in order to rupture its own fictionality? Freedgood
elaborates using the example of real places which appear in fictional texts (such as Sherlock
Holmes’s Baker Street office):
The fact that Baker Street is within the diegetic [space] doesn’t solve the problem [posed
by metalepsis]: you cannot, strictly speaking, have a real street within a fictional diegetic
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See Gillian Beers for the most influential reading of Hardy in the context of contemporary science. Zena
Meadowsong’s “Thomas Hardy and the Machine: The Mechanical Deformation of Narrative Realism in Tess of the
d’Urbervilles” captures the way overdetermination works in the novel in general.

184

space. … Thomas Hardy’s detailed mapping of Wessex, with its real and fictional
coordinates, speaks to this problem in the language of fiction: you can think of Jude as
you walk the streets of Oxford, but strictly speaking, he was not there—fictionally or
literally (in the liberal sense of literally—to the letter). Christminster may be Oxford, but
the remove is important: simply having to find a referent makes Christminster fictional
and leaves Jude in a fictional world—however interrupted by the palimpsestic reality of
Dorset that hovers above, or below, the fictional maps that accompany the Wessex
novels.” (398)
Applying Freedgood’s formulation in the opposite direction, we can see that the historical reality
of sexual violence can also introduce metalepsis, since it forces the reader to contend with a
fictional woman in a situation which has coordinates as equally real—though less literal—as the
map of Wessex. One reason that Hardy’s narrator moves quickly—even abruptly—between
close physical description, reflection, and allusion in the description of Tess’s rape is that to do
so jolts the reader in and out of what Freedgood calls a “diegetic mobility,” where they are able
to “operate as a fictionalized character in a world that is the same or structurally very similar to
the one [in which they] live” (399). As Freedgood points out, this mobility is both playful and
profoundly self-revealing (she compares it to both the computer game “Second Life and…the
transference of psychoanalysis”) (398).
As far as I can tell, no literary critical reading of Tess has yet explored what such
“diegetic mobility” might have meant to readers of the novel. No one has asked how the real
historical fact of widespread sexual abuse by employers of lower-class women interacted with
the fictional world that the text presents, which portrays not just one such woman hounded by
circumstance but a number of woman characters whose lives are attenuated by their class and
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gender positions. Considering this, one wonders what the novel meant to female readers and to
Victorian feminists. What did they take from its descriptions of rape and more generally, the
gendered abuse of women which the novel depicted? To put it in more contemporary terms, were
readers of the novel ‘triggered’?88
This question provokes another: why—despite the fact that Hardy represents Tess as
uniquely susceptible to being hurt by stories about sexual violence after her rape—have literary
critics neglected to read Tess through a trauma studies lens? Contemporary literary critical
theorizations of trauma, which represent it as “a speechless void, unrepresentable, inherently
pathologic, timeless, and repetitious” seem especially helpful in explaining the narrative gaps
and silences in Tess which have so perturbed critics (Balaev 3). There are remarkably few such
readings; despite the widespread acknowledgement, particularly among feminist critics of the
novel, that Tess is often represented by absence, somnambulism, and vacuity, only Brooke
McLaughlin Mitchell explicitly connects these textual blanks to the fragmentation of Tess’s self
after the trauma of rape.89 As Mitchell puts it, “For Tess, the only way to survive is to become a
new—not altered—person, distinct from the one she was before the night in The Chase” (195).
Gesturing towards trauma theory from the realm of aesthetics, Kaja Silverman argues that Tess is
essentially a “traumatic apprehension of the central role played in the constitution of the subject
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The most voluminous accounts of women’s responses to Tess come from Hardy himself, in his autobiography.
Interestingly, he writes of having received “strange letters” after the publication of the novel, “some from husbands
whose experiences had borne a resemblance to that of Angle Clare, though more, many more, from wives with a
past like that of Tess; but who had not told their husbands, and asking for [Hardy’s] counsel under the burden of
their concealment” (257). Hardy also reported on the “curious and humorous” response to Tess among high society,
recounting the story of a Duchess who used reader’s opinions as a friendship litmus test: “the novel has saved her all
future trouble in the assortment of her friends. They have been almost fighting across her dinner-table over Tess’s
character. What she now says to them is ‘Do you support her or no?’ If they say ‘No indeed. She deserved hanging:
a little harlot!’ she puts them in one group. If they say ‘Poor wronged innocent!’ and pity her, she puts them in the
other group where she is herself” (258).
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See Penny Boumelha, Thomas Hardy and Women, Mary Jacobus, “Tess’s Purity”, and Rosemary Morgan,
Women and Sexuality in the Novels of Thomas Hardy, for three such influential feminist accounts of the novel.
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by the language and desire of the Other” (28). In other words, what’s frightening about the novel
is its account of the self-as-constituted-by the Other, and in particular, as-constituted-by the
abuses of the Other.
In a foundational text of contemporary trauma studies, Cathy Caruth argues that trauma
cannot be represented in literature because it “is not locatable in the simple violent or original
event in an individual’s past, but rather in … its very unassimilated nature—the way it was
precisely not known in the first instance—returns to haunt the survivor later on” (4). Here Caruth
means not that the traumatic event is literally unknown to the person who experiences it, but that
it can’t be integrated into that person’s psyche in an unconflicted way. Victorian theories of
trauma saw things slightly more literally, with both Pierre Janet and Sigmund Freud arguing that
traumas were generally actually forgotten (one goal of talk therapy, then, was to bring them back
to consciousness). For Caruth, what is intellectually understood (for instance, that x trauma
happened) is not always psychologically or emotionally understood (since, as Hardy points out
again and again, explaining why trauma happens is far more difficult than admitting that it has
happened).
Tess’s trajectory of understanding her past demonstrates that she is conflicted in this way:
she literally understands what has happened, but not how to interpret its meaning. Throughout
the time represented in the novel (and even sometimes within the space of a few paragraphs) she
holds a number of different interpretations of her contact with Alec d’Urberville. Seen through
the lens of trauma, a famous passage which many have read as evidencing Tess’s complicity in
her assault reflects the “unassimilated nature” of what has happened to her:
Get Alec d’Urberville in the mind to marry her. He marry her! On matrimony he had
never once said a word. And what if he had? How a convulsive snatching at social
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salvation might have impelled her to answer him she could not say. But her poor foolish
mother little knew her present feeling towards this man. Perhaps it was unusual in the
circumstances, unlucky, unaccountable; but there it was; and this, as she said, was what
made her detest herself. She had never wholly cared for him, she did not at all care for
him now. She had dreaded him, winced before him, succumbed to adroit advantages he
took of her helplessness; then, temporarily blinded by his ardent manners, had been
stirred to confused surrender awhile: had suddenly despised and disliked him, and had
run away. That was all. Hate him she did not quite, but he was dust and ashes to her, and
even for her name’s sake she scarcely wished to marry him. (64)
Though this is perhaps the most cited, it is only one of many passages which describe Tess’s
mind toggling between her fear of her own responsibility, and a conviction that she has been
victimized by multiple people (most obviously Alec, but also her mother and father, Angel, and
Farmer Groby). It is important to remember here that in the real historical world to which Tess’s
story refers, rape was a contested concept. As William A. Davis shows, Victorian law generally
recognized sex with a sleeping woman as rape, since it precluded the possibility of her giving
consent. That said, numerous studies have shown that it was exceedingly rare and extremely hard
for accusations of rape to be prosecuted successfully in the period.90 What’s more, the
circumstances of Tess’s rape (that she knew her assailant, that he was known to be interested in
her, and that she had willingly accepted a ride with him) would have likely made the event’s
status as rape even more illegible. 91 Unsurprisingly, given this context, though she registers that
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See Bashar, “Rape in England between 1550 and 1700,” Dabhoiwala, The Origins of Sex, and Hammerton,
Cruelty.
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As Carolyn Conley reports, “any indication of carelessness”—that is the absence of hyper-vigilance—“on the part
of the victim could destroy a case” (3). Conley recounts numerous stories which bear similarities to Tess’s situation,
including one in which “a man accused of raping a woman in the hop fields was acquitted ‘not because the jury
thought no assault had been committed, but because she had acted foolishly in going with the prisoner through the
gardens. But for this he would have been doubtless convicted” (M&K Journal 26 Sept 1863 p 3). In another case, “A
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a serious wrong has been done to her, Tess never identifies what has happened to her as a crime
in a legal sense; the only semi-legal redress her mother (and later her rapist) can imagine is that
Alec should do “the handsome thing” in marrying Tess (63).
Critics have tended to read Tess’s inability to conclusively identify herself as a victim as
an admission of guilt, and yet trauma studies offers us another explanation: Tess is “haunt[ed]”
by an experience that she fundamentally does not know how to encode within her life (Caruth 4).
That the narrative often sees her from the outside—describing the many different perceptions
which others have of her situation—is not just (as some have argued) a reflection of Hardy’s
inability to represent female subjectivity, but also a demonstration of this conflict.92 Post her
rape, to her mother she is a fool, who will not play the cards she has been dealt to improve her
station. To Alec she is alternatively his seducer and a passive object onto which he can project
his “master[y]” (60). To her colleagues in the field, who witness her ruefully nursing her baby,
she is both a victim of circumstance and an emblem of the kinds of injustices to which women of
their class are continually subject (70-71). That Tess, at various points in the novel, identifies
with these divergent readings of her situation shows us that she has never been able to
psychologically integrate the event.
Hardy repeatedly suggests that this is due to Tess’s society’s gender ideology, which
demands perfect chastity from women, and which treats virginity as a both physical and
metaphysical state which once lost, can never be reclaimed (no matter the circumstances). As
Jules David Law reminds us, the social pressure which codes Tess’s rape as, primarily, an
“irreversible” “loss of virginity” also serves to “displace” the event’s status as rape (248).

young man accused of raping a young woman who had agreed to let him walk her home was acquitted at the judge’s
direction. He had apologized and she had shown too little resistance” (Conley 524).
92
See Mary Childers, “Thomas Hardy, the Man Who ‘Liked’ Women.”
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Though she shows signs of sexual trauma throughout the rest of the novel, Tess generally
understands her situation as one in which she has been wronged by being deprived of her
virginity, which she understands not as a value in its own right but as a benefit to her future
husband. In so doing, the novel demonstrates the power of social customs to shape mental
experience, and not only in the way that critics have generally argued. It is not just that
convention causes characters like Angel to too narrowly understand moral value, but also that it
limits the ability of women characters like Tess to experience life on their own terms. Just like
her coworkers who watch her nursing her baby, sadly reflecting that its life is due to “a little
more than persuading,” Tess recognizes the patterns of abuse to which she is subject, but can’t
imagine another way (70-71). She cannot make any meaning out of her attack except that which
relies on her relationships with others, particularly men. Thus “it was to be” replaces, for the
novel’s women characters, any explanation of events which might articulate the wrongs to which
they are continually subject in political or moral terms (58).
Law points out that Hardy’s critique of the social pressures which harm Tess actually
reenacts the harm of her rape’s erasure, as when the narrator fantasizes that Tess might have
been happy as a single mother on a desert island. The narrator imagines Tess “just created,” and
happy enough “to discover herself a spouseless mother, with no experience of life except as the
parent of a nameless child” (91). Law puts it well when he writes that “the complete erasure of
the rape from this description of Tess’s situation must leave us breathless,” reminding us that
“alone on a desert island,” Tess would probably not feel shame at being unmarried, but she also
“would not have been raped” (256). This passage is further complicated by the fact that though
the narrator generally refuses to narrate her thoughts about her rape, the narrative does represent
the consequences of that rape in Tess’s future behavior. Though Tess’s anguish is primarily
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described in terms of her guilt, we are also presented with numerous images of Tess frightened,
even hunted by male eyes. Her behavior, as I will show, if often colored by her sense of the
nearness of sexual danger. So even as the narrator officially “elid[es]” the rape in its account of
Tess’s suffering, it also tells another story about the effect of trauma on Tess’s behavior (or to
put it in even less loaded terms, the way Tess’s history implies her future, not because of fate,
but because of how personal history shapes character) (Law 256).
There are a few primary ways the text shows us how the “course pattern” which has been
traced on Tess will constrain her (57). As I have already mentioned, a number of critics read
Tess as characterized by mental absence. Mary Jacobus reads Tess as essentially
“unconsciou[s],” a sleepwalker through life (qtd. in Boumelha 121). Penny Boumelha argues
that at key moments of the text Tess’s “consciousness is all but edited out,” that she is in fact
“most herself—that is, most woman—at points where she is dumb and semi-conscious” (121-2).
Boumelha reads Hardy’s unconscious misogyny in the way his narrator flattens Tess from
particular person to characteristic Woman, arguing that this allows for the projection, on Tess, of
“the narrator’s erotic fantasies of penetration and engulfment” (120). More recent work on the
novel has situated Tess’s mental absence in her circumstances: though he doesn’t use the
language of trauma theory, Law identifies in Tess “a kind of willed amnesia to the gendered
history of the body” (251). He locates this in Tess’s inability to recognize the abuse she suffers
from Farmer Groby at Flintecombe-Ashe as occasioned by her gender, and in her final
acceptance of the perception that everyone from Angel to her family to her colleagues share, that
Tess’s doom is not occasioned by specific historical and social forces, but by some kind of
natural law which may be summed up by the fatalistic “it was to be” (58). After her rape, the text
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offers us many moments where Tess feels unable to forestall Alec’s advances, during which
moments Tess dissociates. When Alec demands a goodbye kiss, we read:
“If you wish,” she answered indifferently. “See how you’ve mastered me!” She
thereupon turned round and lifted her face to his, and remained like a marble term while
he imprinted a kiss upon her cheek…Her eyes vaguely rested upon the remotest trees in
the lane while the kiss was given, as though she were nearly unconscious of what he did.
(60).
Here we see Tess profoundly alienated from her own body. Beyond even repugnance, she turns
herself to stone in order to bear the kiss which her rapist “imprint[ts]” on her. Critics have read
the repeated imagery of Tess’s body as something which is “imprinted” by male action and
desire as another index of her vacuity (or Hardy’s misogyny), but what if it actually serves to
linguistically thematize the marks that personal history can leave?93 That these marks are
“imprinted” on Tess’s body, as her mind travels far away “upon the remotest trees” accords to
theories of trauma which locate its harm in the way it severs the mind-body connection, as well
as flattens time. That Tess’s rape is continually cast in terms of mythic or historical recurrence
also reflects that temporal flattening; in that it never enters the mind or the personal history, as
Caruth notes, trauma is both the thing that has never happened (because it has never been
mentally integrated) and the thing which never stops happening.
After Tess separates from her husband, she will spend much of the rest of the novel
traveling by foot, and these sections make the effect of the rape on her behavior particularly
clear. On her first journey to Flintcombe-Ashe, we read that

93
It is useful here to note that eighteenth-century law often identified rape by the “imprint[s] it was supposed to
leave on women’s bodies” (Walker “Everyman” 19). “Rape but not consensual sex was presumed to leave makers—
bruises, swellings, lacerations—on a women’s genitals and thighs.” (Walker 19).

192

Among the difficulties of her lonely position not the least was the attention she excited by
her appearance, a certain bearing of distinction which she had caught from Clare being
superadded to her natural attractiveness. Whilst the clothes lasted which had been
prepared for her marriage these casual glances of interest caused her no inconvenience,
but as soon as she was compelled to don the wrapper of a field-woman rude words were
addressed to her more than once: but nothing occurred to cause her bodily fear till a
particular November afternoon. (216)
Here the narrator officially tells us that Tess is not generally frightened for her safety amidst the
constant “interest” she occasions on the road. This claim is undercut, however, by the very fact
of its articulation: to say that Tess is not always afraid suggests that her environment is in fact a
dangerous one. Of course it is not just literal danger which the passage depicts, but also the
psychic burden of the surveillance Tess is under, which means she must be constantly assessing
whether or not she should actually be afraid for her “bodily” safety. That the psychic danger
posed by street harassment grows more literal—more bodily—as Tess’s clothing registers her
lower-class position reflects the special vulnerability of lower-class women to sexual violence.
In the scene that follows, Tess meets a man on the road who addresses her in acceptably
polite, though sexually loaded terms, saying “Good-night, my pretty maid” (217). After
“star[ing] hard” at her, however, he recognizes her as “the young wench who was at Trantridge
awhile—young Squire d’Urberville’s friend” (217). In a “spasm of anguish,” she recognizes the
man who speaks to her as the man who Angel had recently “knocked down…for addressing her
coarsely,” but remains silent and frozen (217). Then, the man suggestively remarks that Tess
“ought to beg [his] pardon for that blow,” a comment which recalls the language of injury that
Alec used to cajole Tess into initially accepting his embraces in the Chase scene (217). It is at
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this moment that Tess runs—still perfectly silent— “with the speed of the wind” away (217).
The only “escape for her hunted soul” lies in burrowing herself into the woods, where she makes
“a sort of nest in the middle” of a pile of “dead leaves” (217). “Into this Tess crept” (217).
The next morning she awakens to find that she has made her nest in a thicket where a
group of pheasants have come to hide from a shooting party. One by one the “badly wounded
birds” that “had escaped and hidden themselves away,” taking refuge in the trees around her,
start to fall off their boughs as they grow weaker and die (218). In a scene which prefigures her
own off-stage hanging, she hears the “strange sounds” of their deaths: “sometimes…a
palpitation, sometimes a flutter; sometimes…a sort of gasp or gurgle” (218). These noises are
“followed by the fall of a heavy body upon the ground” (218). Tess mercy-kills the birds who are
slowly dying, but not before the narrator reflects on those who have hunted them:
[Tess] had occasionally caught glimpses of these men in her girlhood, looking over
hedges or peering through bushes and pointing their guns; strangely accoutered, a
bloodthirsty light in their eyes. She had been told that, rough and brutal as they seemed
just then, they were not like this all year round, but were, in fact, quite civil persons; save
during certain weeks of autumn and winter when, like the inhabitants of the Malay
Peninsula, they ran amuck, and made it their purpose to destroy life—in this case
harmless feathered creatures, brought into being by artificial means solely to gratify these
propensities—at once so unmannerly and so unchivalrous towards their weaker fellows in
nature’s teeming family (218-9).
It is a commonplace of Tess criticism to remark that the novel’s narrator repeatedly fails to
sympathize with Tess, particularly by depriving her control over the narrative through free
indirect discourse. And yet while this passage doesn’t capture the tone of Tess’s mental voice in
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the way we often expect such indirect discourse to do, it does give us a close phenomenological
account of Tess’s experience. If it does not move with Tess’s voice, it at least moves with her
mind. Here the upper-class men who descended into the woods of Marlott for hunting parties are
never identified as such, but rather represented as frightening specters of Tess’s childhood. We
experience with Tess a quasi-anthropological account (“strangely accoutered”) of these fearsome
strangers, who periodically invade her home. The frightening image the passage conjures, of
well-dressed men lurking in the forest, “a bloodthirsty light in their eyes,” not only recalls Tess’s
rape by Alec, but also the text’s larger sense that women can never escape the surveillance of the
men who would ‘hunt’ them. That the rich hunters find their hunting-ground “articifical[ly]”
stocked for their “gratif[ication]” reflects the way the same upper-class men (exemplified by
Alec, but also Angel and Farmer Groby) see lower-class women as disposable objects to be used
for pleasure or profit.
That this scene occurs directly after Tess’s escape from the stranger who she will soon
learn is Farmer Groby, her employer at Flintcombe-Ashe, only makes the connections it draws
between the birds and the trauma Tess is subject to because of her gender more clear. In fact, the
word “trauma” comes from the Greek τραῦμα, meaning simply “wound” (which Hardy surely
knew). One way to read the scene of the pheasants is to say that like them, Tess has been
seriously wounded by her rape; since then, she has “hidden” herself “away,” and propped herself
up, “maintain[ing] [her] position till [she] grew weaker with the loss of blood” (218). It is soon
after this scene that Alec will tell her she looks as white as a “bled calf,” and like the birds, she
will eventually have her neck broken (230).
Though Hardy’s narrator initially describes that wound as a social one, the later phases of
the book reveal it to be emotional and psychological as well. When Tess reencounters Alec as a
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converted preacher, her “unreasoning memory” perceives a danger which her intellect realizes is
uncalled for: “though he stood there openly and palpably a converted man, who was sorrowing
for his past irregularities, a fear overcome her, paralyzing her movements so that she neither
retreated nor advanced” (239). In her later contact with Alec, Tess vacillates between shocking
herself with her own violence and being absolutely paralyzed by fear, as when she “without the
slightest warning passionately sw[ings] [her] glove by the gauntlet directly in his face” and then
immediately cowers (261). These behaviors—the paralyzing fear which loses contact with reality
and the sudden swings towards violence—also evidence a traumatized mind. Alec too toggles
between tenderness for her, guilt over his own behavior, and ruthless aggression: shortly after
reminding her that he wanted to marry her he tells her angrily: “I was your master once; I will be
your master again” (261). Shortly afterwards, Alec bribes Farmer Groby—who abuses Tess with
relish—to free her from her work responsibilities early so that he can continue to cajole her into
becoming his mistress, a small but important moment in which the two men, both of whom are
sadistically aggressive towards Tess, work together to further constrain her.
By situating the meaning of Tess’s experience in whether or not she was raped,
adjudicative readings of this novel actually obscure its thoroughgoing representation of the
harms of sexual violence for women. Even such readings which argue that Tess is a victim of
rape (such as those by William Davis and Melanie Williams) tend to collapse all the other harms
to which Tess is subject into that of rape, rather than registering the myriad harms against
women that the novel depicts. If we treat rape capaciously, we can see that most of these harms
are at the very least mediated by the sexual violence which suffuses the depicted culture. For
instance, though Tess believes that Farmer Groby doesn’t desire her, and thus feels relatively
safe around him, his continued harassment of her clearly evidences his desire to control her
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body. “We’ll see,” he tells her after she defies him, “which is master here,” before assigning her
a punishing physical task (228). Though as their employer he has some control over the bodies of
all the women who work for him, he takes special pleasure in assigning Tess the hardest physical
labors, reminding her continually that her sexual history gives him the right to abuse her. Though
the domain in which he “masters” her is not explicitly sexual, his flagrant sadomasochism (as
well as his diction of “mastery,” a term which is sexualized throughout Hardy’s oeuvre) suggests
the entanglement of the economic and sexual spheres. Similarly, the sexual coercion that Alec
exerts over Tess is most powerful and effective when he exploits her economic precarity.
Hardy is that unlikely novelist who is both what we would today call “sex positive” and
acutely aware of the harms of sex in his particular historical moment. While he bucked a gender
ideology which was uncomfortable with desiring women, he also described the various ways in
which their gender and class inequality made sex especially dangerous for women. This is not to
say that he represents women characters as devoid of agency, sexual or otherwise, but that his
women characters are often caught in social systems which deny their agency. If Bathsheba
chooses to be a sexual agent, for instance, in marrying Troy, she loses her economic and political
agency under coverture. If she chooses an economically and socially advantageous marriage to
Boldwood, she risks becoming the victim of a man whose wish to dominate her is equally
frightening and perhaps even more violent. That Bathsheba even has this luxury of bad choices is
a privilege, however, a depressing fact revealed by Hardy’s representation of lower-class women
in Tess. If Bathsheba’s choices are circumscribed, Tess’s are hardly choices at all.
The mythic resonance of Tess, which has been explored at length by critics, powerfully
supports this reading.94 Tess is not woman in a biologically deterministic or fatalistic sense, but

94

See Beer, Darwin’s Plots, Bonaparte, “The Deadly Misreading of Mythic Texts,” Wall, The Callisto Myth from
Ovid to Atwood, Parker, “‘Pure Woman’ and Tragic Heroine?,” Lovesey, “Reconstructing Tess,” Gussow,
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in that her experience is prototypical of women in her situation and thus likely to recur. Though
Hardy repeatedly invokes different systems in order to explain Tess’s fate (that, for instance, she
is being karmically repaid for the crimes of her ancestors, or that she possesses a violent gene
that has passed through the d’Urbervilles for generations), we must resist these explanations in
order to understand and prioritize the harm which Tess suffers. Part of the novel’s exploration of
harm thus lies ultimately in the reader’s hands, since our only chance of redressing (or even
accurately conceptualizing) similar harms in the real world lies in our ability to recognize the
structural, rather than psychological, foundations of women’s oppression as it is represented in
the novel.

“Dreaming Holmberry-Lipped Tess,” Humma, “Language and Disguise,” and Franke, “Hardy’s Ur-Priestess.”
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CONCLUSION
The two accounts of rape which bookend this study should be recognizable to modern
readers. As chapter two suggests, Samuel Richardson’s account of rape prefigures a second-wave
feminist theorization of sexual violence, in which male pathology leads to female victimization.
As chapter five argues, Thomas Hardy’s account of rape is more consistent with a contemporary
view of trauma, which holds that it is primarily the body which ‘remembers’ and reexperiences
trauma. Trauma for Tess is limbic; she is a hunted animal who acts on instinct rather than
cognition. Trauma for Clarissa is initially deranging and then profoundly clarifying; she is a
vengeful angel, finally sure of herself and intent on carrying her point. It divorces her from her
body, but in very different ways than it does for Tess. For Clarissa, dissociation is a symbolic
act, by which she bids farewell to a social world she very consciously repudiates. For Tess, it is
the loss of contact with her desiring self, and ultimately a passive acceptance of her punishment.
While dissociation from her body rarifies Clarissa, it disorganizes Tess.
Richardson’s account of Clarissa’s victimization possesses a distinctly modern whiff of
‘empowerment.’ Though she dies in the process, Clarissa obtains a symbolic victory in shaping
her own narrative such that her interpretation of events is vindicated. She is convinced of the
deadly meaning of Lovelace’s violence, and unwilling to allow anyone to rewrite that violence as
courtship or seduction. Tess cannot make similar meaning out of her victimization. She has no
class position upon which to rest a claim to bodily integrity, and no language of either propriety
or natural rights with which to defend herself. Tess is just one of many people who Alec and his
social peers treat almost as natural resources to be exploited. Like the familial history from
which Alec takes his name, Tess is merely an object to be appropriated. Though Tess has a
native sense of her own self-worth, she lacks even the limited forms of power which Clarissa is

199

granted. Clarissa, at least, lives in a world which recognizes her social (if not legal) existence;
Tess never really fits into such a community, and never benefits from its protection. She
variously finds herself hyper-visible to the middle-class men who would exploit her (like Farmer
Groby) and totally invisible to the upper-class men who might protect her (like Angel’s brothers,
who walk past her on the road without recognizing her plight). The women with whom she forms
alliances, at the dairy, are equally dispossessed, though they advocate for her in the limited ways
to which they have access. While Clarissa’s victimization ultimately empowers her, Tess’s buries
her deeper within a web of multiple marginalization. Trauma has no purpose, clarifies nothing,
and teaches no lesson. All that can be done post tragedy is to patch together a life which will be
indelibly marked by that tragedy, as Angel and Liza Lu seem to do at the end of the novel, when
they fall to their knees to pray for Tess and then plod on up the hill.
The trajectory I have sketched from Richardson to Hardy clearly maps onto our general
sense of literary history, where realism’s ontological order slowly collapses into modernism’s
chaos around the turn of the twentieth century. That should not be taken to suggest, however,
that I see Hardy’s conception of rape as more advanced than Richardson’s. Both the
psychological and the structural account of rape remain in circulation, and both are useful. In
fact, I argue for a capacious conception of rape partly because I want to disrupt the distinction we
have imposed between the two, which quickly breaks down (as both Richardson and Hardy, as
well as Austen and Trollope, amply show.) Literary criticism remains a field, unlike history,
sociology, anthropology, and other social sciences, which does not have a language for talking
about rape as both a particular event and a world-historical trauma. And yet rape is always both.
It is my hope that the new rape studies will find ways to bring together these discourses. Taking
our lessons from critical race and disability studies, we need to build linguistic technologies
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which would allow us to describe the world-historical impact of rape without effacing the
particularity of individual events.
Without reducing literature about rape to a strictly utilitarian social purpose, we need to
find a way for thinking about such representations as a tradition which testifies to a profound
trauma that has global significance. It is certainly easier to think about rape as a product of
psychological phenomena—an event which happens, as Lovelace puts it, “one person to one
person” precisely because it allows us to avoid doing so (Clarissa 719).95 As the work of criticalrace and queer scholars shows, it is difficult to tell stories which were never meant to be told.
This work is a methodological challenge as well as an ethical one. It is downright hard to think
about, even for those who reject the idea that literature may ‘trigger’ them. Just as critical-race
scholars have identified the necessity of studying whiteness, sexual violence scholars need to
make a case for studying the subject position which feels invulnerable to sexual violence.
Though many of us take it for granted that we will never be raped, that certainty arises not from
observation or evidence but from a carefully (if unconsciously) constructed discourse of rape that
genders and racializes it, making young white women hyper-visible victims while the
vulnerabilities of others go unrecognized. Much work has already been done to disrupt this
discourse, particularly by bringing visibility to the experiences of women of color. But we also
need to recognize that there is no safety from rape. If you feel invulnerable, that is only because
you have been made to feel that way. Just as white people often fail to recognize their status as
racialized beings, men need to recognize that their sense of invulnerability to sexual violence
relies on the maintenance of a discourse which demands the vulnerability of women.

95
Lovelace’s full declaration is as follows: “As to the means [of my planned assault], thou dost not imagine that I
expect a direct consent—My main hope is but in a yielding reluctance, without which I will be sworn, whatever
rapes have been attempted, none ever were committed one person to one person” (719).
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This is not to say that all men literally feel invulnerable to sexual assault, or that all
women are burdened by feeling vulnerable to sexual assault. Of course that is not the case. My
goal is not to scare men as much as women are often scared. Rather I think we need to simply
recognize the vulnerability we all share, and that doing so is part of the project of undoing the
epistemic violence by which the “Western bourgeois” “man…overrepresents itself as if it were
the human itself,” to borrow Sylvia Wynter’s terms (260). In this sense the work of the new rape
studies is coextensive with that of queer, critical-race, and disability scholars; we must, while
tracing the aesthetics and hermeneutics of literary rape, be mindful that it is our responsibility not
only to bring new stories to light, but also to repair the harms of the existing critical discourse
around rape.
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